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It's Time to Master the Lift & Shift: Migrating from VMware vSphere to Microsoft Azure

While cloud adoption has been top of mind for many IT professionals for nearly a decade, it’s only in recent months, with industry changes and announcements from key players, that many recognize the time to make the move is now. It may feel like a daunting task, but tools exist to help you move your virtual machines (VMs) to a public cloud provider – like Microsoft Azure

April’s Patch Tuesday Brings Record Number of Fixes

If only Patch Tuesdays came around infrequently — like total solar eclipse rare — instead of just creeping up on us each month like The Man in the Moon. Although to be fair, it would be tough for Microsoft to eclipse the number of vulnerabilities fixed in this month’s patch batch — a record 147 flaws in Windows and related software.

Yes, you read that right. Microsoft today released updates to address 147 security holes in Windows, Office, Azure, .NET Framework, Visual Studio, SQL Server, DNS Server, Windows Defender, Bitlocker, and Windows Secure Boot.

“This is the largest release from Microsoft this year and the largest since at least 2017,” said Dustin Childs, from Trend Micro’s Zero Day Initiative (ZDI). “As far as I can tell, it’s the largest Patch Tuesday release from Microsoft of all time.”

Tempering the sheer volume of this month’s patches is the middling severity of many of the bugs. Only three of April’s vulnerabilities earned Microsoft’s most-dire “critical” rating, meaning they can be abused by malware or malcontents to take remote control over unpatched systems with no help from users.

Most of the flaws that Microsoft deems “more likely to be exploited” this month are marked as “important,” which usually involve bugs that require a bit more user interaction (social engineering) but which nevertheless can result in system security bypass, compromise, and the theft of critical assets.

Ben McCarthy, lead cyber security engineer at Immersive Labs called attention to CVE-2024-20670, an Outlook for Windows spoofing vulnerability described as being easy to exploit. It involves convincing a user to click on a malicious link in an email, which can then steal the user’s password hash and authenticate as the user in another Microsoft service.

Another interesting bug McCarthy pointed to is CVE-2024-29063, which involves hard-coded credentials in Azure’s search backend infrastructure that could be gleaned by taking advantage of Azure AI search.

“This along with many other AI attacks in recent news shows a potential new attack surface that we are just learning how to mitigate against,” McCarthy said. “Microsoft has updated their backend and notified any customers who have been affected by the credential leakage.”

CVE-2024-29988 is a weakness that allows attackers to bypass Windows SmartScreen, a technology Microsoft designed to provide additional protections for end users against phishing and malware attacks. Childs said one of ZDI’s researchers found this vulnerability being exploited in the wild, although Microsoft doesn’t currently list CVE-2024-29988 as being exploited.

“I would treat this as in the wild until Microsoft clarifies,” Childs said. “The bug itself acts much like CVE-2024-21412 – a [zero-day threat from February] that bypassed the Mark of the Web feature and allows malware to execute on a target system. Threat actors are sending exploits in a zipped file to evade EDR/NDR detection and then using this bug (and others) to bypass Mark of the Web.”

Update, 7:46 p.m. ET: A previous version of this story said there were no zero-day vulnerabilities fixed this month. BleepingComputer reports that Microsoft has since confirmed that there are actually two zero-days. One is the flaw Childs just mentioned (CVE-2024-21412), and the other is CVE-2024-26234, described as a “proxy driver spoofing” weakness.

Satnam Narang at Tenable notes that this month’s release includes fixes for two dozen flaws in Windows Secure Boot, the majority of which are considered “Exploitation Less Likely” according to Microsoft.

“However, the last time Microsoft patched a flaw in Windows Secure Boot in May 2023 had a notable impact as it was exploited in the wild and linked to the BlackLotus UEFI bootkit, which was sold on dark web forums for $5,000,” Narang said. “BlackLotus can bypass functionality called secure boot, which is designed to block malware from being able to load when booting up. While none of these Secure Boot vulnerabilities addressed this month were exploited in the wild, they serve as a reminder that flaws in Secure Boot persist, and we could see more malicious activity related to Secure Boot in the future.”

For links to individual security advisories indexed by severity, check out ZDI’s blog and the Patch Tuesday post from the SANS Internet Storm Center. Please consider backing up your data or your drive before updating, and drop a note in the comments here if you experience any issues applying these fixes.

Adobe today released nine patches tackling at least two dozen vulnerabilities in a range of software products, including Adobe After Effects, Photoshop, Commerce, InDesign, Experience Manager, Media Encoder, Bridge, Illustrator, and Adobe Animate.

KrebsOnSecurity needs to correct the record on a point mentioned at the end of March’s “Fat Patch Tuesday” post, which looked at new AI capabilities built into Adobe Acrobat that are turned on by default. Adobe has since clarified that its apps won’t use AI to auto-scan your documents, as the original language in its FAQ suggested.

“In practice, no document scanning or analysis occurs unless a user actively engages with the AI features by agreeing to the terms, opening a document, and selecting the AI Assistant or generative summary buttons for that specific document,” Adobe said earlier this month.

U.S. Cyber Safety Board Slams Microsoft Over Breach by China-Based Hackers

The U.S. Cyber Safety Review Board (CSRB) has criticized Microsoft for a series of security lapses that led to the breach of nearly two dozen companies across Europe and the U.S. by a China-based nation-state group called Storm-0558 last year. The findings, released by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on Tuesday, found that the intrusion was preventable, and that it became successful

Patch Tuesday, March 2024 Edition

Apple and Microsoft recently released software updates to fix dozens of security holes in their operating systems. Microsoft today patched at least 60 vulnerabilities in its Windows OS. Meanwhile, Apple’s new macOS Sonoma addresses at least 68 security weaknesses, and its latest update for iOS fixes two zero-day flaws.

Last week, Apple pushed out an urgent software update to its flagship iOS platform, warning that there were at least two zero-day exploits for vulnerabilities being used in the wild (CVE-2024-23225 and CVE-2024-23296). The security updates are available in iOS 17.4, iPadOS 17.4, and iOS 16.7.6.

Apple’s macOS Sonoma 14.4 Security Update addresses dozens of security issues. Jason Kitka, chief information security officer at Automox, said the vulnerabilities patched in this update often stem from memory safety issues, a concern that has led to a broader industry conversation about the adoption of memory-safe programming languages [full disclosure: Automox is an advertiser on this site].

On Feb. 26, 2024, the Biden administration issued a report that calls for greater adoption of memory-safe programming languages. On Mar. 4, 2024, Google published Secure by Design, which lays out the company’s perspective on memory safety risks.

Mercifully, there do not appear to be any zero-day threats hounding Windows users this month (at least not yet). Satnam Narang, senior staff research engineer at Tenable, notes that of the 60 CVEs in this month’s Patch Tuesday release, only six are considered “more likely to be exploited” according to Microsoft.

Those more likely to be exploited bugs are mostly “elevation of privilege vulnerabilities” including CVE-2024-26182 (Windows Kernel), CVE-2024-26170 (Windows Composite Image File System (CimFS), CVE-2024-21437 (Windows Graphics Component), and CVE-2024-21433 (Windows Print Spooler).

Narang highlighted CVE-2024-21390 as a particularly interesting vulnerability in this month’s Patch Tuesday release, which is an elevation of privilege flaw in Microsoft Authenticator, the software giant’s app for multi-factor authentication. Narang said a prerequisite for an attacker to exploit this flaw is to already have a presence on the device either through malware or a malicious application.

“If a victim has closed and re-opened the Microsoft Authenticator app, an attacker could obtain multi-factor authentication codes and modify or delete accounts from the app,” Narang said. “Having access to a target device is bad enough as they can monitor keystrokes, steal data and redirect users to phishing websites, but if the goal is to remain stealth, they could maintain this access and steal multi-factor authentication codes in order to login to sensitive accounts, steal data or hijack the accounts altogether by changing passwords and replacing the multi-factor authentication device, effectively locking the user out of their accounts.”

CVE-2024-21334 earned a CVSS (danger) score of 9.8 (10 is the worst), and it concerns a weakness in Open Management Infrastructure (OMI), a Linux-based cloud infrastructure in Microsoft Azure. Microsoft says attackers could connect to OMI instances over the Internet without authentication, and then send specially crafted data packets to gain remote code execution on the host device.

CVE-2024-21435 is a CVSS 8.8 vulnerability in Windows OLE, which acts as a kind of backbone for a great deal of communication between applications that people use every day on Windows, said Ben McCarthy, lead cybersecurity engineer at Immersive Labs.

“With this vulnerability, there is an exploit that allows remote code execution, the attacker needs to trick a user into opening a document, this document will exploit the OLE engine to download a malicious DLL to gain code execution on the system,” Breen explained. “The attack complexity has been described as low meaning there is less of a barrier to entry for attackers.”

A full list of the vulnerabilities addressed by Microsoft this month is available at the SANS Internet Storm Center, which breaks down the updates by severity and urgency.

Finally, Adobe today issued security updates that fix dozens of security holes in a wide range of products, including Adobe Experience Manager, Adobe Premiere Pro, ColdFusion 2023 and 2021, Adobe Bridge, Lightroom, and Adobe Animate. Adobe said it is not aware of active exploitation against any of the flaws.

By the way, Adobe recently enrolled all of its Acrobat users into a “new generative AI feature” that scans the contents of your PDFs so that its new “AI Assistant” can  “understand your questions and provide responses based on the content of your PDF file.” Adobe provides instructions on how to disable the AI features and opt out here.

Iran-Linked UNC1549 Hackers Target Middle East Aerospace & Defense Sectors

An Iran-nexus threat actor known as UNC1549 has been attributed with medium confidence to a new set of attacks targeting aerospace, aviation, and defense industries in the Middle East, including Israel and the U.A.E. Other targets of the cyber espionage activity likely include Turkey, India, and Albania, Google-owned Mandiant said in a new analysis. UNC1549 is said to overlap with&nbsp

Microsoft Expands Free Logging Capabilities for all U.S. Federal Agencies

Microsoft has expanded free logging capabilities to all U.S. federal agencies using Microsoft Purview Audit irrespective of the license tier, more than six months after a China-linked cyber espionage campaign targeting two dozen organizations came to light. "Microsoft will automatically enable the logs in customer accounts and increase the default log retention period from 90 days to 180 days,"

Malicious 'SNS Sender' Script Abuses AWS for Bulk Smishing Attacks

A malicious Python script known as SNS Sender is being advertised as a way for threat actors to send bulk smishing messages by abusing Amazon Web Services (AWS) Simple Notification Service (SNS). The SMS phishing messages are designed to propagate malicious links that are designed to capture victims' personally identifiable information (PII) and payment card details, SentinelOne 

Experts Detail New Flaws in Azure HDInsight Spark, Kafka, and Hadoop Services

Three new security vulnerabilities have been discovered in Azure HDInsight's Apache Hadoop, Kafka, and Spark services that could be exploited to achieve privilege escalation and a regular expression denial-of-service (ReDoS) condition. "The new vulnerabilities affect any authenticated user of Azure HDInsight services such as Apache Ambari and Apache Oozie," Orca security

Goblob - A Fast Enumeration Tool For Publicly Exposed Azure Storage Blobs

By: Zion3R


Goblob is a lightweight and fast enumeration tool designed to aid in the discovery of sensitive information exposed publicy in Azure blobs, which can be useful for various research purposes such as vulnerability assessments, penetration testing, and reconnaissance.

Warning. Goblob will issue individual goroutines for each container name to check in each storage account, only limited by the maximum number of concurrent goroutines specified in the -goroutines flag. This implementation can exhaust bandwidth pretty quickly in most cases with the default wordlist, or potentially cost you a lot of money if you're using the tool in a cloud environment. Make sure you understand what you are doing before running the tool.


Installation

go install github.com/Macmod/goblob@latest

Usage

To use goblob simply run the following command:

$ ./goblob <storageaccountname>

Where <storageaccountname> is the target storage account to enumerate public Azure blob storage URLs on.

You can also specify a list of storage account names to check:

$ ./goblob -accounts accounts.txt

By default, the tool will use a list of common Azure Blob Storage container names to construct potential URLs. However, you can also specify a custom list of container names using the -containers option. For example:

$ ./goblob -accounts accounts.txt -containers wordlists/goblob-folder-names.txt

The tool also supports outputting the results to a file using the -output option:

$ ./goblob -accounts accounts.txt -containers wordlists/goblob-folder-names.txt -output results.txt

If you want to provide accounts to test via stdin you can also omit -accounts (or the account name) entirely:

$ cat accounts.txt | ./goblob

Wordlists

Goblob comes bundled with basic wordlists that can be used with the -containers option:

Optional Flags

Goblob provides several flags that can be tuned in order to improve the enumeration process:

  • -goroutines=N - Maximum number of concurrent goroutines to allow (default: 5000).
  • -blobs=true - Report the URL of each blob instead of the URL of the containers (default: false).
  • -verbose=N - Set verbosity level (default: 1, min: 0, max: 3).
  • -maxpages=N - Maximum of container pages to traverse looking for blobs (default: 20, set to -1 to disable limit or to 0 to avoid listing blobs at all and just check if the container is public)
  • -timeout=N - Timeout for HTTP requests (seconds, default: 90)
  • -maxidleconns=N - MaxIdleConns transport parameter for HTTP client (default: 100)
  • -maxidleconnsperhost=N - MaxIdleConnsPerHost transport parameter for HTTP client (default: 10)
  • -maxconnsperhost=N - MaxConnsPerHost transport parameter for HTTP client (default: 0)
  • -skipssl=true - Skip SSL verification (default: false)
  • -invertsearch=true - Enumerate accounts for each container instead of containers for each account (default: false)

For instance, if you just want to find publicly exposed containers using large lists of storage accounts and container names, you should use -maxpages=0 to prevent the goroutines from paginating the results. Then run it again on the set of results you found with -blobs=true and -maxpages=-1 to actually get the URLs of the blobs.

If, on the other hand, you want to test a small list of very popular container names against a large set of storage accounts, you might want to try -invertsearch=true with -maxpages=0, in order to see the public accounts for each container name instead of the container names for each storage account.

You may also want to try changing -goroutines, -timeout and -maxidleconns, -maxidleconnsperhost and -maxconnsperhost and -skipssl in order to best use your bandwidth and find results faster.

Experiment with the flags to find what works best for you ;-)

Example

A fast enumeration tool for publicly exposed Azure Storage blobs. (6)

Contributing

Contributions are welcome by opening an issue or by submitting a pull request.

TODO

  • Check blob domain for NXDOMAIN before trying wordlist to save bandwidth (maybe)
  • Improve default parameters for better performance

Wordcloud

An interesting visualization of popular container names found in my experiments with the tool:


If you want to know more about my experiments and the subject in general, take a look at my article:



Researchers Uncover Undetectable Crypto Mining Technique on Azure Automation

Cybersecurity researchers have developed what's the first fully undetectable cloud-based cryptocurrency miner leveraging the Microsoft Azure Automation service without racking up any charges. Cybersecurity company SafeBreach said it discovered three different methods to run the miner, including one that can be executed on a victim's environment without attracting any attention. "While this

Microsoft Warns of Cyber Attacks Attempting to Breach Cloud via SQL Server Instance

Microsoft has detailed a new campaign in which attackers unsuccessfully attempted to move laterally to a cloud environment through an SQL Server instance. "The attackers initially exploited a SQL injection vulnerability in an application within the target's environment," security researchers Sunders Bruskin, Hagai Ran Kestenberg, and Fady Nasereldeen said in a Tuesday report. "This allowed the

Researchers Detail 8 Vulnerabilities in Azure HDInsight Analytics Service

By: THN
More details have emerged about a set of now-patched cross-site scripting (XSS) flaws in the Microsoft Azure HDInsight open-source analytics service that could be weaponized by a threat actor to carry out malicious activities. "The identified vulnerabilities consisted of six stored XSS and two reflected XSS vulnerabilities, each of which could be exploited to perform unauthorized actions,

Experts Uncover How Cybercriminals Could Exploit Microsoft Entra ID for Elevated Privilege

By: THN
Cybersecurity researchers have discovered a case of privilege escalation associated with a Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure Active Directory) application by taking advantage of an abandoned reply URL. "An attacker could leverage this abandoned URL to redirect authorization codes to themselves, exchanging the ill-gotten authorization codes for access tokens," Secureworks Counter Threat Unit (

Banking Sector Targeted in Open-Source Software Supply Chain Attacks

By: THN
Cybersecurity researchers said they have discovered what they say is the first open-source software supply chain attacks specifically targeting the banking sector. "These attacks showcased advanced techniques, including targeting specific components in web assets of the victim bank by attaching malicious functionalities to it," Checkmarx said in a report published last week. "The attackers

Azure AD Token Forging Technique in Microsoft Attack Extends Beyond Outlook, Wiz Reports

By: THN
The recent attack against Microsoft's email infrastructure by a Chinese nation-state actor referred to as Storm-0558 is said to have a broader scope than previously thought. According to cloud security company Wiz, the inactive Microsoft account (MSA) consumer signing key used to forge Azure Active Directory (Azure AD or AAD) tokens to gain illicit access to Outlook Web Access (OWA) and

Microsoft Bug Allowed Hackers to Breach Over Two Dozen Organizations via Forged Azure AD Tokens

By: THN
Microsoft on Friday said a validation error in its source code allowed for Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) tokens to be forged by a malicious actor known as Storm-0558 using a Microsoft account (MSA) consumer signing key to breach two dozen organizations. "Storm-0558 acquired an inactive MSA consumer signing key and used it to forge authentication tokens for Azure AD enterprise and MSA

TeamTNT's Cloud Credential Stealing Campaign Now Targets Azure and Google Cloud

By: THN
A malicious actor has been linked to a cloud credential stealing campaign in June 2023 that's focused on Azure and Google Cloud Platform (GCP) services, marking the adversary's expansion in targeting beyond Amazon Web Services (AWS). The findings come from SentinelOne and Permiso, which said the "campaigns share similarity with tools attributed to the notorious TeamTNT cryptojacking crew,"

Critical 'nOAuth' Flaw in Microsoft Azure AD Enabled Complete Account Takeover

A security shortcoming in Microsoft Azure Active Directory (AD) Open Authorization (OAuth) process could have been exploited to achieve full account takeover, researchers said. California-based identity and access management service Descope, which discovered and reported the issue in April 2023, dubbed it nOAuth. "nOAuth is an authentication implementation flaw that can affect Microsoft Azure AD

Microsoft Blames Massive DDoS Attack for Azure, Outlook, and OneDrive Disruptions

Microsoft on Friday attributed a string of service outages aimed at Azure, Outlook, and OneDrive earlier this month to an uncategorized cluster it tracks under the name Storm-1359. "These attacks likely rely on access to multiple virtual private servers (VPS) in conjunction with rented cloud infrastructure, open proxies, and DDoS tools," the tech giant said in a post on Friday. Storm-#### (

Severe Vulnerabilities Reported in Microsoft Azure Bastion and Container Registry

Two "dangerous" security vulnerabilities have been disclosed in Microsoft Azure Bastion and Azure Container Registry that could have been exploited to carry out cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks. "The vulnerabilities allowed unauthorized access to the victim's session within the compromised Azure service iframe, which can lead to severe consequences, including unauthorized data access,

MAAD-AF - MAAD Attack Framework - An Attack Tool For Simple, Fast And Effective Security Testing Of M365 And Azure AD

By: Zion3R

MAAD-AF is an open-source cloud attack tool developed for testing security of Microsoft 365 & Azure AD environments through adversary emulation. MAAD-AF provides security practitioners easy to use attack modules to exploit configurations across different M365/AzureAD cloud-based tools & services.

MAAD-AF is designed to make cloud security testing simple, fast and effective. Through its virtually no-setup requirement and easy to use interactive attack modules, security teams can test their security controls, detection and response capabilities easily and swiftly.

Features

  • Pre & Post-compromise techniques
  • Simple interactive use
  • Virtually no-setup requirements
  • Attack modules for Azure AD
  • Attack modules for Exchange
  • Attack modules for Teams
  • Attack modules for SharePoint
  • Attack modules for eDiscovery

MAAD-AF Attack Modules

  • Azure AD External Recon (Includes sub-modules)
  • Azure AD Internal Recon (Includes sub-modules)
  • Backdoor Account Setup
  • Trusted Network Modification
  • Disable Mailbox Auditing
  • Disable Anti-Phishing
  • Mailbox Deletion Rule Setup
  • Exfiltration through Mailbox Forwarding
  • Gain User Mailbox Access
  • External Teams Access Setup (Includes sub-modules)
  • eDiscovery exploitation (Includes sub-modules)
  • Bruteforce
  • MFA Manipulation
  • User Account Deletion
  • SharePoint exploitation (Includes sub-modules)

Getting Started

Plug & Play - It's that easy!

  1. Clone or download the MAAD-AF github repo to your windows host
  2. Open PowerShell as Administrator
  3. Navigate to the local MAAD-AF directory (cd /MAAD-AF)
  4. Run MAAD_Attack.ps1 (./MAAD_Attack.ps1)

Requirements

  1. Internet accessible Windows host
  2. PowerShell (version 5 or later) terminal as Administrator
  3. The following PowerShell modules are required and will be installed automatically:

Tip: A 'Global Admin' privilege account is recommended to leverage full capabilities of modules in MAAD-AF

Limitations

  • MAAD-AF is currently only fully supported on Windows OS

Contribute

  • Thank you for considering contributing to MAAD-AF!
  • Your contributions will help make MAAD-AF better.
  • Join the mission to make security testing simple, fast and effective.
  • There's ongoing efforts to make the source code more modular to enable easier contributions.
  • Continue monitoring this space for updates on how you can easily incorporate new attack modules into MAAD-AF.

Add Custom Modules

  • Everyone is encouraged to come up with new attack modules that can be added to the MAAD-AF Library.
  • Attack modules are functions that leverage access & privileges established by MAAD-AF to exploit configuration flaws in Microsoft services.

Report Bugs

  • Submit bugs or other issues related to the tool directly in the "Issues" section

Request Features

  • Share those great ideas. Submit new features to add to the MAAD-AFs functionality.

Contact

  • If you found this tool useful, want to share an interesting use-case, bring issues to attention, whatever the reason - I would love to hear from you. You can contact at: maad-af@vectra.ai or post in repository Discussions.


Azure-AccessPermissions - Easy to use PowerShell script to enumerate access permissions in an Azure Active Directory environment

By: Zion3R


Easy to use PowerShell script to enumerate access permissions in an Azure Active Directory environment.

Background details can be found in the accompanied blog posts:


Requirements

To run this script you'll need these two PowerShell modules:

All of these can be installed directly within PowerShell:

PS:> Install-Module Microsoft.Graph
PS:> Install-Module AADInternals
PS:> Install-Module AzureADPreview

Usage

First time use

The script uses a browser-based Login UI to connect to Azure. If you run the tool for the first time you might experience the following error

emulation not set for PowerShell or PowerShell ISE! Would you like set the emulation to IE 11? Otherwise the login form may not work! (Y/N): Y Emulation set. Restart PowerShell/ISE!" dir="auto">
[*] Connecting to Microsoft Graph...
WARNING: WebBrowser control emulation not set for PowerShell or PowerShell ISE!
Would you like set the emulation to IE 11? Otherwise the login form may not work! (Y/N): Y
Emulation set. Restart PowerShell/ISE!

To solve this simply allow PowerShell to emulate the browser and rerun your command.

Example use

Import and run, no argumentes needed.

Note: On your first run you will likely have to authenticate twice (once Microsoft Graph and once against Azure AD Graph). I might wrap this into a single login in the future...

PS:> Import-Module .\Azure-AccessPermissions.ps1



Researchers Discover 3 Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Azure API Management Service

Three new security flaws have been disclosed in Microsoft Azure API Management service that could be abused by malicious actors to gain access to sensitive information or backend services. This includes two server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaws and one instance of unrestricted file upload functionality in the API Management developer portal, according to Israeli cloud security firm Ermetic. "

Newly Discovered "By-Design" Flaw in Microsoft Azure Could Expose Storage Accounts to Hackers

A "by-design flaw" uncovered in Microsoft Azure could be exploited by attackers to gain access to storage accounts, move laterally in the environment, and even execute remote code. "It is possible to abuse and leverage Microsoft Storage Accounts by manipulating Azure Functions to steal access-tokens of higher privilege identities, move laterally, potentially access critical business assets, and

Microsoft Fixes New Azure AD Vulnerability Impacting Bing Search and Major Apps

Microsoft has patched a misconfiguration issue impacting the Azure Active Directory (AAD) identity and access management service that exposed several "high-impact" applications to unauthorized access. "One of these apps is a content management system (CMS) that powers Bing.com and allowed us to not only modify search results, but also launch high-impact XSS attacks on Bing users," cloud security

Researchers Detail Severe "Super FabriXss" Vulnerability in Microsoft Azure SFX

Details have emerged about a now-patched vulnerability in Azure Service Fabric Explorer (SFX) that could lead to unauthenticated remote code execution. Tracked as CVE-2023-23383 (CVSS score: 8.2), the issue has been dubbed "Super FabriXss" by Orca Security, a nod to the FabriXss flaw (CVE-2022-35829, CVSS score: 6.2) that was fixed by Microsoft in October 2022. "The Super FabriXss vulnerability

New Microsoft Azure Vulnerability Uncovered — EmojiDeploy for RCE Attacks

A new critical remote code execution (RCE) flaw discovered impacting multiple services related to Microsoft Azure could be exploited by a malicious actor to completely take control of a targeted application. "The vulnerability is achieved through CSRF (cross-site request forgery) on the ubiquitous SCM service Kudu," Ermetic researcher Liv Matan said in a report shared with The Hacker News. "By

Microsoft Azure Services Flaws Could've Exposed Cloud Resources to Unauthorized Access

Four different Microsoft Azure services have been found vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks that could be exploited to gain unauthorized access to cloud resources. The security issues, which were discovered by Orca between October 8, 2022 and December 2, 2022 in Azure API Management, Azure Functions, Azure Machine Learning, and Azure Digital Twins, have since been addressed

Cypherhound - Terminal Application That Contains 260+ Neo4j Cyphers For BloodHound Data Sets


A Python3 terminal application that contains 260+ Neo4j cyphers for BloodHound data sets.

Why?

BloodHound is a staple tool for every red teamer. However, there are some negative side effects based on its design. I will cover the biggest pain points I've experienced and what this tool aims to address:

  1. My tools think in lists - until my tools parse exported JSON graphs, I need graph results in a line-by-line format .txt file
  2. Copy/pasting graph results - this plays into the first but do we need to explain this one?
  3. Graphs can be too large to draw - the information contained in any graph can aid our goals as the attacker and we need to be able to view all data efficiently
  4. Manually running custom cyphers is time-consuming - let's automate it :)

This tool can also help blue teams to reveal detailed information about their Active Directory environments as well.


Features

Take back control of your BloodHound data with cypherhound!

  • 264 cyphers as of date
    • Set cyphers to search based on user input (user, group, and computer-specific)
    • User-defined regex cyphers
  • User-defined exporting of all results
    • Default export will be just end object to be used as target list with tools
    • Raw export option available in grep/cut/awk-friendly format

Installation

Make sure to have python3 installed and run:

python3 -m pip install -r requirements.txt

Usage

Start the program with: python3 cypherhound.py -u <neo4j_username> -p <neo4j_password>

Commands

The full command menu is shown below:

Command Menu
set - used to set search parameters for cyphers, double/single quotes not required for any sub-commands
sub-commands
user - the user to use in user-specific cyphers (MUST include @domain.name)
group - the group to use in group-specific cyphers (MUST include @domain.name)
computer - the computer to use in computer-specific cyphers (SHOULD include .domain.name or @domain.name)
regex - the regex to use in regex-specific cyphers
example
set user svc-test@domain.local
set group domain admins@domain.local
set computer dc01.domain.local
set regex .*((?i)web).*
run - used to run cyphers
parameters
cypher number - the number of the cypher to run
example
run 7
export - used to export cypher results to txt files
parameters
cypher number - the number of the cypher to run and then export
output filename - the number of the output file, extension not needed
raw - write raw output or just end object (optional)
example
export 31 results
export 42 results2 raw
list - used to show a list of cyphers
parameters
list type - the type of cyphers to list (general, user, group, computer, regex, all)
example
list general
list user
list group
list computer
list regex
list all
q, quit, exit - used to exit the program
clear - used to clear the terminal
help, ? - used to display this help menu

Important Notes

  • The program is configured to use the default Neo4j database and URI
  • Built for BloodHound 4.2.0, certain edges will not work for previous versions
  • Windows users must run pip3 install pyreadline3
  • Shortest paths exports are all the same (raw or not) due to their unpredictable number of nodes

Future Goals

  • Add cyphers for Azure edges

Issues and Support

Please be descriptive with any issues you decide to open and if possible provide output (if applicable).



AzureHound - Azure Data Exporter For BloodHound


The BloodHound data collector for Microsoft Azure

Get AzureHound

Release Binaries

Download the appropriate binary for your platform from one of our Releases.

Rolling Release

The rolling release contains pre-built binaries that are automatically kept up-to-date with the main branch and can be downloaded from here.

Warning: The rolling release may be unstable.

Compiling

Prerequisites

To build this project from source run the following:

go build -ldflags="-s -w -X github.com/bloodhoundad/azurehound/constants.Version=`git describe tags --exact-match 2> /dev/null || git rev-parse HEAD`"

Usage

Quickstart

Print all Azure Tenant data to stdout

❯ azurehound list -u "$USERNAME" -p "$PASSWORD" -t "$TENANT"

Print all Azure Tenant data to file

❯ azurehound list -u "$USERNAME" -p "$PASSWORD" -t "$TENANT" -o "mytenant.json"

Configure and start data collection service for BloodHound Enterprise

❯ azurehound configure
(follow prompts)

❯ azurehound start

CLI

❯ azurehound --help
AzureHound vx.x.x
Created by the BloodHound Enterprise team - https://bloodhoundenterprise.io

The official tool for collecting Azure data for BloodHound and BloodHound Enterprise

Usage:
azurehound [command]

Available Commands:
completion Generate the autocompletion script for the specified shell
configure Configure AzureHound
help Help about any command
list Lists Azure Objects
start Start Azure data collection service for BloodHound Enterprise

Flags:
-c, --config string AzureHound configuration file (default: /Users/dlees/.config/azurehound/config.json)
-h, --help help for azurehound
--json Output logs as json
-j, --jwt string Use an acquired JWT to authenticate into Azure
--log- file string Output logs to this file
--proxy string Sets the proxy URL for the AzureHound service
-r, --refresh-token string Use an acquired refresh token to authenticate into Azure
-v, --verbosity int AzureHound verbosity level (defaults to 0) [Min: -1, Max: 2]
--version version for azurehound

Use "azurehound [command] --help" for more information about a command.


AzureGraph - Azure AD Enumeration Over MS Graph


AzureGraph is an Azure AD information gathering tool over Microsoft Graph.

Thanks to Microsoft Graph technology, it is possible to obtain all kinds of information from Azure AD, such as users, devices, applications, domains and much more.

This application, allows you to query this data through the API in an easy and simple way through a PowerShell console. Additionally, you can download all the information from the cloud and use it completely offline.


Requirements

  • PowerShell 4.0 or higher

Download

It's recommended to clone the complete repository or download the zip file.
You can do this by running the following command:

git clone https://github.com/JoelGMSec/AzureGraph

Usage

.\AzureGraph.ps1 -h

_ ____ _
/ \ _____ _ _ __ ___ / ___|_ __ __ _ _ __ | |__
/ _ \ |_ / | | | '__/ _ \ | _| '__/ _' | '_ \| '_ \
/ ___ \ / /| |_| | | | __/ |_| | | | (_| | |_) | | | |
/_/ \_\/___|\__,_|_| \___|\____|_| \__,_| .__/|_| |_|
|_|
-------------------- by @JoelGMSec --------------------


Info: This tool helps you to obtain information from Azure AD
like Users or Devices, using de Microsft Graph REST API

Usage: .\AzureGraph.ps1 -h
Show this help, more info on my blog: darkbyte.net

.\AzureGraph.ps1
Execute AzureGraph in fully interactive mode

Warning: You need previously generated MS Graph token to use it
You can use a refresh token too, or generate a new one

The detailed guide of use can be found at the following link:

https://darkbyte.net/azuregraph-enumerando-azure-ad-desde-microsoft-graph

License

This project is licensed under the GNU 3.0 license - see the LICENSE file for more details.

Credits and Acknowledgments

This tool has been created and designed from scratch by Joel Gámez Molina // @JoelGMSec

Contact

This software does not offer any kind of guarantee. Its use is exclusive for educational environments and / or security audits with the corresponding consent of the client. I am not responsible for its misuse or for any possible damage caused by it.

For more information, you can find me on Twitter as @JoelGMSec and on my blog darkbyte.net.



Researchers Disclose Details of Critical 'CosMiss' RCE Flaw Affecting Azure Cosmos DB

Microsoft on Tuesday said it addressed an authentication bypass vulnerability in Jupyter Notebooks for Azure Cosmos DB that enabled full read and write access. The tech giant said the problem was introduced on August 12, 2022, and rectified worldwide on October 6, 2022, two days after responsible disclosure from Orca Security, which dubbed the flaw CosMiss. "In short, if an attacker had

Microsoft Confirms Server Misconfiguration Led to 65,000+ Companies' Data Leak

Microsoft this week confirmed that it inadvertently exposed information related to thousands of customers following a security lapse that left an endpoint publicly accessible over the internet sans any authentication. "This misconfiguration resulted in the potential for unauthenticated access to some business transaction data corresponding to interactions between Microsoft and prospective

Researchers Detail Azure SFX Flaw That Could've Allowed Attackers to Gain Admin Access

Cybersecurity researchers have shared more details about a now-patched security flaw in Azure Service Fabric Explorer (SFX) that could potentially enable an attacker to gain administrator privileges on the cluster. The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2022-35829, carries a CVSS severity rating of 6.2 and was addressed by Microsoft as part of its Patch Tuesday updates last week. <!--adsense--> Orca

Monkey365 - Tool For Security Consultants To Easily Conduct Not Only Microsoft 365, But Also Azure Subscriptions And Azure Active Directory Security Configuration Reviews


Monkey365 is an Open Source security tool that can be used to easily conduct not only Microsoft 365, but also Azure subscriptions and Azure Active Directory security configuration reviews without the significant overhead of learning tool APIs or complex admin panels from the start. To help with this effort, Monkey365 also provides several ways to identify security gaps in the desired tenant setup and configuration. Monkey365 provides valuable recommendations on how to best configure those settings to get the most out of your Microsoft 365 tenant or Azure subscription.


Introduction

Monkey365 is a plugin-based PowerShell module that can be used to review the security posture of your cloud environment. With Monkey365 you can scan for potential misconfigurations and security issues in public cloud accounts according to security best practices and compliance standards, across Azure, Azure AD, and Microsoft365 core applications.

Installation

You can either download the latest zip by clicking this link or download Monkey365 by cloning the repository:

Once downloaded, you must extract the file and extract the files to a suitable directory. Once you have unzipped the zip file, you can use the PowerShell V3 Unblock-File cmdlet to unblock files:

Get-ChildItem -Recurse c:\monkey365 | Unblock-File

Once you have installed the monkey365 module on your system, you will likely want to import the module with the Import-Module cmdlet. Assuming that Monkey365 is located in the PSModulePath, PowerShell would load monkey365 into active memory:

Import-Module monkey365

If Monkey365 is not located on a PSModulePath path, you can use an explicit path to import:

Import-Module C:\temp\monkey365

You can also use the Force parameter in case you want to reimport the Monkey365 module into the same session

Import-Module C:\temp\monkey365 -Force

Basic Usage

The following command will provide the list of available command line options:

Get-Help Invoke-Monkey365

To get a list of examples use:

Get-Help Invoke-Monkey365 -Examples

To get a list of all options and examples with detailed info use:

Get-Help Invoke-Monkey365 -Detailed

The following example will retrieve data and metadata from Azure AD and SharePoint Online and then print results. If credentials are not supplied, Monkey365 will prompt for credentials.

$param = @{
Instance = 'Microsoft365';
Analysis = 'SharePointOnline';
PromptBehavior = 'SelectAccount';
IncludeAzureActiveDirectory = $true;
ExportTo = 'PRINT';
}
$assets = Invoke-Monkey365 @param

Regulatory compliance checks

Monkey365 helps streamline the process of performing not only Microsoft 365, but also Azure subscriptions and Azure Active Directory Security Reviews.

160+ checks covering industry defined security best practices for Microsoft 365, Azure and Azure Active Directory.

Monkey365 will help consultants to assess cloud environment and to analyze the risk factors according to controls and best practices. The report will contain structured data for quick checking and verification of the results.

Supported standards

By default, the HTML report shows you the CIS (Center for Internet Security) Benchmark. The CIS Benchmarks for Azure and Microsoft 365 are guidelines for security and compliance best practices.

The following standards are supported by Monkey365:

  • CIS Microsoft Azure Foundations Benchmark v1.4.0
  • CIS Microsoft 365 Foundations Benchmark v1.4.0

More standards will be added in next releases (NIST, HIPAA, GDPR, PCI-DSS, etc..) as they are available.

Additional information such as Installation or advanced usage can be found in the following link



Scale security on the fly in Microsoft Azure Cloud with Cisco Secure Firewall

The release of Microsoft Azure Gateway Load Balancer is great news for customers, empowering them to simply and easily add Cisco Secure Firewall capabilities to their Azure cloud infrastructure. By combining Azure Gateway Load Balancer with Cisco Secure Firewall, organizations can quickly scale their firewall presence across their Azure cloud environment, providing protection for infrastructure and applications exactly where and when they need it.

With applications and resources hyper-distributed across hybrid-multicloud environments, organizations require agile security to protect their environment at each control point. This integration empowers organizations to dynamically insert Cisco’s security controls and threat defense capabilities in their Azure environment, removing the clunkiness of provisioning and deploying firewalls, as well as the need to rearchitect the network. Organizations can now enjoy highly available threat defense on the fly, protecting their infrastructure and applications from known and unknown threats.

Securing cloud infrastructure while reducing complexity

Combining Secure Firewall with Azure Gateway Load Balancer offers a significant reduction in operational complexity when securing cloud infrastructure. Azure Gateway Load Balancer provides bump-in-the-wire functionality ensuring Internet traffic to and from an Azure VM, such as an application server, is inspected by Secure Firewall without requiring any routing changes. It also offers a single entry and exit point at the firewall and allows organizations to maintain visibility of the source IP address. Complementing these features, organizations can take advantage of our new Cloud-delivered Firewall Management Center. It enables organizations to manage their firewall presence 100% through the cloud with the same look and feel as they’ve grown accustomed to with Firewall Management Center. With Cloud-delivered Firewall Management Center, organizations will achieve faster time-to-value with simplified firewall deployment and management.

Benefits of Cisco Secure Firewall with Azure Gateway Load Balancer

  • Secure Firewall lowers cloud spend with Azure Autoscale support – Quickly and seamlessly scale virtual firewall instances up and down to meet demand.
  • De-risk projects by removing the need to re-architect – Effortlessly insert Cisco Secure Firewall in existing network architecture without changes, providing win/win outcomes across NetOps, SecOps, DevOps, and application teams.
  • Firewalling where and when you need it – Easily deploy and remove Secure Firewall and its associated security services, including IPS, application visibility and control, malware defense, and URL filtering as needed in the network path.
  • Greater visibility for your applications – Simplify enablement of your intended infrastructure by eliminating the need for source and destination NAT. No additional configuration needed.
  • Health monitoring – Ensure efficient routing with continuous health-checks that monitor your virtual firewall instances via Gateway Load Balancer.
  • Included Cisco Talos® Threat Intelligence – Protect your organization from new and emerging threats with rapid and actionable threat intelligence updated hourly from one of the world’s largest commercial threat intelligence teams, Cisco Talos.

Use-cases

Inbound

Figure 1: Inbound traffic flow to Cisco Secure Firewall with Azure Gateway Load Balancer

 

Figure 2: Inbound traffic flow to a stand-alone server

Outbound

Figure 3: Internal server is behind a public load balancer. Flow is the same as outbound flow for an inbound connection.

 

Figure 4: Outbound flow where the internal server is a stand-alone server.

Azure Gateway Load Balancer support for Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense Virtual is available now. To learn more about how Cisco Secure Firewall drives security resilience across your hybrid-multicloud environment, see the additional resources below and reach out to your Cisco sales representative.

Additional Resources

Microsoft Blog: Gateway Load Balancer now generally available in all regions

Azure Marketplace listing: Cisco Secure Firewall Threat Defense Virtual

Cisco Secure Firewall

Cisco Secure Firewall At-a-Glance

Cisco Secure Firewall for Public Cloud

Cloud-delivered Firewall Management Center


We’d love to hear what you think. Ask a Question, Comment Below, and Stay Connected with Cisco Secure on social!

Cisco Secure Social Channels

Instagram
Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn

TerraformGoat - "Vulnerable By Design" Multi Cloud Deployment Tool


TerraformGoat is selefra research lab's "Vulnerable by Design" multi cloud deployment tool.

Currently supported cloud vendors include Alibaba Cloud, Tencent Cloud, Huawei Cloud, Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud Platform, Microsoft Azure.


Scenarios

ID Cloud Service Company Types Of Cloud Services Vulnerable Environment
1 Alibaba Cloud Networking VPC Security Group Open All Ports
2 Alibaba Cloud Networking VPC Security Group Open Common Ports
3 Alibaba Cloud Object Storage Bucket HTTP Enable
4 Alibaba Cloud Object Storage Object ACL Writable
5 Alibaba Cloud Object Storage Object ACL Readable
6 Alibaba Cloud Object Storage Special Bucket Policy
7 Alibaba Cloud Object Storage Bucket Public Access
8 Alibaba Cloud Object Storage Object Public Access
9 Alibaba Cloud Object Storage Bucket Logging Disable
10 Alibaba Cloud Object Storage Bucket Policy Readable
11 Alibaba Cloud Object Storage Bucket Object Traversal
12 Alibaba Cloud Object Storage Unrestricted File Upload
13 Alibaba Cloud Object Storage Server Side Encryption No KMS Set
14 Alibaba Cloud Object Storage Server Side Encryption Not Using BYOK
15 Alibaba Cloud Elastic Computing Service ECS SSRF
16 Alibaba Cloud Elastic Computing Service ECS Unattached Disks Are Unencrypted
17 Alibaba Cloud Elastic Computing Service ECS Virtual Machine Disks Are Unencrypted
18 Tencent Cloud Networking VPC Security Group Open All Ports
19 Tencent Cloud Networking VPC Security Group Open Common Ports
20 Tencent Cloud Object Storage Bucket ACL Writable
21 Tencent Cloud Object Storage Bucket ACL Readable
22 Tencent Cloud Object Storage Bucket Public Access
23 Tencent Cloud Object Storage Object Public Access
24 Tencent Cloud Object Storage Unrestricted File Upload
25 Tencent Cloud Object Storage Bucket Object Traversal
26 Tencent Cloud Object Storage Bucket Logging Disable
27 Tencent Cloud Object Storage Server Side Encryption Disable
28 Tencent Cloud Elastic Computing Service CVM SSRF
29 Tencent Cloud Elastic Computing Service CBS Storage Are Not Used
30 Tencent Cloud Elastic Computing Service CVM Virtual Machine Disks Are Unencrypted
31 Huawei Cloud Networking ECS Unsafe Security Group
32 Huawei Cloud Object Storage Object ACL Writable
33 Huawei Cloud Object Storage Special Bucket Policy
34 Huawei Cloud Object Storage Unrestricted File Upload
35 Huawei Cloud Object Storage Bucket Object Traversal
36 Huawei Cloud Object Storage Wrong Policy Causes Arbitrary File Uploads
37 Huawei Cloud Elastic Computing Service ECS SSRF
38 Huawei Cloud Relational Database Service RDS Mysql Baseline Checking Environment
39 Amazon Web Services Networking VPC Security Group Open All Ports
40 Amazon Web Services Networking VPC Security Group Open Common Ports
41 Amazon Web Services Object Storage Object ACL Writable
42 Amazon Web Services Object Storage Bucket ACL Writable
43 Amazon Web Services Object Storage Bucket ACL Readable
44 Amazon Web Services Object Storage MFA Delete Is Disable
45 Amazon Web Services Object Storage Special Bucket Policy
46 Amazon Web Services Object Storage Bucket Object Traversal
47 Amazon Web Services Object Storage Unrestricted File Upload
48 Amazon Web Services Object Storage Bucket Logging Disable
49 Amazon Web Services Object Storage Bucket Allow HTTP Access
50 Amazon Web Services Object Storage Bucket Default Encryption Disable
51 Amazon Web Services Elastic Computing Service EC2 SSRF
52 Amazon Web Services Elastic Computing Service Console Takeover
53 Amazon Web Services Elastic Computing Service EBS Volumes Are Not Used
54 Amazon Web Services Elastic Computing Service EBS Volumes Encryption Is Disabled
55 Amazon Web Services Elastic Computing Service Snapshots Of EBS Volumes Are Unencrypted
56 Amazon Web Services Identity and Access Management IAM Privilege Escalation
57 Google Cloud Platform Object Storage Object ACL Writable
58 Google Cloud Platform Object Storage Bucket ACL Writable
59 Google Cloud Platform Object Storage Bucket Object Traversal
60 Google Cloud Platform Object Storage Unrestricted File Upload
61 Google Cloud Platform Elastic Computing Service VM Command Execution
62 Microsoft Azure Object Storage Blob Public Access
63 Microsoft Azure Object Storage Container Blob Traversal
64 Microsoft Azure Elastic Computing Service VM Command Execution


Install

TerraformGoat is deployed using Docker images and therefore requires Docker Engine environment support, Docker Engine installation can be found in https://docs.docker.com/engine/install/

Depending on the cloud service provider you are using, choose the corresponding installation command.

Alibaba Cloud

docker pull registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_aliyun:0.0.4
docker run -itd --name terraformgoat_aliyun_0.0.4 registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_aliyun:0.0.4
docker exec -it terraformgoat_aliyun_0.0.4 /bin/bash

Tencent Cloud

docker pull registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_tencentcloud:0.0.4
docker run -itd --name terraformgoat_tencentcloud_0.0.4 registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_tencentcloud:0.0.4
docker exec -it terraformgoat_tencentcloud_0.0.4 /bin/bash

Huawei Cloud

docker pull registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_huaweicloud:0.0.4
docker run -itd --name terraformgoat_huaweicloud_0.0.4 registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_huaweicloud:0.0.4
docker exec -it terraformgoat_huaweicloud_0.0.4 /bin/bash

Amazon Web Services

docker pull registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_aws:0.0.4
docker run -itd --name terraformgoat_aws_0.0.4 registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_aws:0.0.4
docker exec -it terraformgoat_aws_0.0.4 /bin/bash

Google Cloud Platform

docker pull registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_gcp:0.0.4
docker run -itd --name terraformgoat_gcp_0.0.4 registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_gcp:0.0.4
docker exec -it terraformgoat_gcp_0.0.4 /bin/bash

Microsoft Azure

docker pull registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_azure:0.0.4
docker run -itd --name terraformgoat_azure_0.0.4 registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_azure:0.0.4
docker exec -it terraformgoat_azure_0.0.4 /bin/bash


Demo

After entering the container, cd to the corresponding scenario directory and you can start deploying the scenario.

Here is a demonstration of the Alibaba Cloud Bucket Object Traversal scenario build.

docker pull registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_aliyun:0.0.4
docker run -itd --name terraformgoat_aliyun_0.0.4 registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat_aliyun:0.0.4
docker exec -it terraformgoat_aliyun_0.0.4 /bin/bash


 

cd /TerraformGoat/aliyun/oss/bucket_object_traversal/
aliyun configure
terraform init
terraform apply



The program prompts Enter a value:, type yes and enter, use curl to access the bucket, you can see the object traversed.



To avoid the cloud service from continuing to incur charges, remember to destroy the scenario in time after using it.

terraform destroy

Uninstall

If you are in a container, first execute the exit command to exit the container, and then execute the following command under the host.

docker stop $(docker ps -a -q -f "name=terraformgoat*")
docker rm $(docker ps -a -q -f "name=terraformgoat*")
docker rmi $(docker images -a -q -f "reference=registry.cn-beijing.aliyuncs.com/huoxian_pub/terraformgoat*")

Notice

  1. The README of each vulnerable environment is executed within the TerraformGoat container environment, so the TerraformGoat container environment needs to be deployed first.
  2. Due to the horizontal risk of intranet horizontal on the cloud in some scenarios, it is strongly recommended that users use their own test accounts to configure the scenarios, avoid using the cloud account of the production environment, and install TerraformGoat using Dockerfile to isolate the user's local cloud vendor token and the test account token.
  3. TerraformGoat is used for educational purposes only, It is not allowed to use it for illegal and criminal purposes, any consequences arising from TerraformGoat are the responsibility of the person using it, and not the selefra organization.


Contributing

Contributions are welcomed and greatly appreciated. Further reading — CONTRIBUTING.md for details on contribution workflow.

License

TerraformGoat is under the Apache 2.0 license. See the LICENSE file for details.



Cloud-based Cryptocurrency Miners Targeting GitHub Actions and Azure VMs

GitHub Actions and Azure virtual machines (VMs) are being leveraged for cloud-based cryptocurrency mining, indicating sustained attempts on the part of malicious actors to target cloud resources for illicit purposes. "Attackers can abuse the runners or servers provided by GitHub to run an organization's pipelines and automation by maliciously downloading and installing their own cryptocurrency

New 'FabricScape' Bug in Microsoft Azure Service Fabric Impacts Linux Workloads

Cybersecurity researchers from Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 disclosed details of a new security flaw affecting Microsoft's Service Fabric that could be exploited to obtain elevated permissions and seize control of all nodes in a cluster. The issue, which has been dubbed FabricScape (CVE-2022-30137), could only be weaponized on containers that are configured to have runtime access. It has been 

Microsoft Patch Tuesday, June 2022 Edition

Microsoft on Tuesday released software updates to fix 60 security vulnerabilities in its Windows operating systems and other software, including a zero-day flaw in all supported Microsoft Office versions on all flavors of Windows that’s seen active exploitation for at least two months now. On a lighter note, Microsoft is officially retiring its Internet Explorer (IE) web browser, which turns 27 years old this year.

Three of the bugs tackled this month earned Microsoft’s most dire “critical” label, meaning they can be exploited remotely by malware or miscreants to seize complete control over a vulnerable system. On top of the critical heap this month is CVE-2022-30190, a vulnerability in the Microsoft Support Diagnostics Tool (MSDT), a service built into Windows.

Dubbed “Follina,” the flaw became public knowledge on May 27, when a security researcher tweeted about a malicious Word document that had surprisingly low detection rates by antivirus products. Researchers soon learned that the malicious document was using a feature in Word to retrieve a HTML file from a remote server, and that HTML file in turn used MSDT to load code and execute PowerShell commands.

“What makes this new MS Word vulnerability unique is the fact that there are no macros exploited in this attack,” writes Mayuresh Dani, manager of threat research at Qualys. “Most malicious Word documents leverage the macro feature of the software to deliver their malicious payload. As a result, normal macro-based scanning methods will not work to detect Follina. All an attacker needs to do is lure a targeted user to download a Microsoft document or view an HTML file embedded with the malicious code.”

Kevin Beaumont, the researcher who gave Follina its name, penned a fairly damning account and timeline of Microsoft’s response to being alerted about the weakness. Beaumont says researchers in March 2021 told Microsoft they were able achieve the same exploit using Microsoft Teams as an example, and that Microsoft silently fixed the issue in Teams but did not patch MSDT in Windows or the attack vector in Microsoft Office.

Beaumont said other researchers on April 12, 2022 told Microsoft about active exploitation of the MSDT flaw, but Microsoft closed the ticket saying it wasn’t a security issue. Microsoft finally issued a CVE for the problem on May 30, the same day it released recommendations on how to mitigate the threat from the vulnerability.

Microsoft also is taking flak from security experts regarding a different set of flaws in its Azure cloud hosting platform. Orca Security said that back on January 4 it told Microsoft about a critical bug in Azure’s Synapse service that allowed attackers to obtain credentials to other workspaces, execute code, or leak customer credentials to data sources outside of Azure.

In an update to their research published Tuesday, Orca researchers said they were able to bypass Microsoft’s fix for the issue twice before the company put a working fix in place.

“In previous cases, vulnerabilities were fixed by the cloud providers within a few days of our disclosure to the affected vendor,” wrote Orca’s Avi Shua. “Based on our understanding of the architecture of the service, and our repeated bypasses of fixes, we think that the architecture contains underlying weaknesses that should be addressed with a more robust tenant separation mechanism. Until a better solution is implemented, we advise that all customers assess their usage of the service and refrain from storing sensitive data or keys in it.”

Amit Yoran, CEO of Tenable and a former U.S. cybersecurity czar, took Microsoft to task for silently patching an issue Tenable reported in the same Azure Synapse service.

“It was only after being told that we were going to go public, that their story changed…89 days after the initial vulnerability notification…when they privately acknowledged the severity of the security issue,” Yoran wrote in a post on LinkedIn. “To date, Microsoft customers have not been notified. Without timely and detailed disclosures, customers have no idea if they were, or are, vulnerable to attack…or if they fell victim to attack prior to a vulnerability being patched. And not notifying customers denies them the opportunity to look for evidence that they were or were not compromised, a grossly irresponsible policy.”

Also in the critical and notable stack this month is CVE-2022-30136, which is a remote code execution flaw in the Windows Network File System (NFS version 4.1) that earned a CVSS score of 9.8 (10 being the worst). Microsoft issued a very similar patch last month for vulnerabilities in NFS versions 2 and 3.

“This vulnerability could allow a remote attacker to execute privileged code on affected systems running NFS. On the surface, the only difference between the patches is that this month’s update fixes a bug in NFSV4.1, whereas last month’s bug only affected versions NSFV2.0 and NSFV3.0,” wrote Trend Micro’s Zero Day Initiative. “It’s not clear if this is a variant or a failed patch or a completely new issue. Regardless, enterprises running NFS should prioritize testing and deploying this fix.”

Beginning today, Microsoft will officially stop supporting most versions of its Internet Explorer Web browser, which was launched in August 1995. The IE desktop application will be disabled, and Windows users who wish to stick with a Microsoft browser are encouraged to move to Microsoft Edge with IE mode, which will be supported through at least 2029.

For a closer look at the patches released by Microsoft today and indexed by severity and other metrics, check out the always-useful Patch Tuesday roundup from the SANS Internet Storm Center. And it’s not a bad idea to hold off updating for a few days until Microsoft works out any kinks in the updates: AskWoody.com usually has the dirt on any patches that may be causing problems for Windows users.

As always, please consider backing up your system or at least your important documents and data before applying system updates. And if you run into any problems with these updates, please drop a note about it here in the comments.

Technical Details Released for 'SynLapse' RCE Vulnerability Reported in Microsoft Azure

Microsoft has incorporated additional improvements to address the recently disclosed SynLapse security vulnerability in order to meet comprehensive tenant isolation requirements in Azure Data Factory and Azure Synapse Pipelines. The latest safeguards include moving the shared integration runtimes to sandboxed ephemeral instances and using scoped tokens to prevent adversaries from using a client

Offensive-Azure - Collection Of Offensive Tools Targeting Microsoft Azure


Collection of offensive tools targeting Microsoft Azure written in Python to be platform agnostic. The current list of tools can be found below with a brief description of their functionality.

  • ./Device_Code/device_code_easy_mode.py
    • Generates a code to be entered by the target user
    • Can be used for general token generation or during a phishing/social engineering campaign.
  • ./Access_Tokens/token_juggle.py
    • Takes in a refresh token in various ways and retrieves a new refresh token and an access token for the resource specified
  • ./Access_Tokens/read_token.py
    • Takes in an access token and parses the included claims information, checks for expiration, attempts to validate signature
  • ./Outsider_Recon/outsider_recon.py
    • Takes in a domain and enumerates as much information as possible about the tenant without requiring authentication
  • ./User_Enum/user_enum.py
    • Takes in a username or list of usernames and attempts to enumerate valid accounts using one of three methods
    • Can also be used to perform a password spray
  • ./Azure_AD/get_tenant.py
    • Takes in an access token or refresh token, outputs tenant ID and tenant Name
    • Creates text output file as well as BloodHound compatible aztenant file
  • ./Azure_AD/get_users.py
    • Takes in an access token or refresh token, outputs all users in Azure AD and all available user properties in Microsoft Graph
    • Creates three data files, a condensed json file, a raw json file, and a BloodHound compatible azusers file
  • ./Azure_AD/get_groups.py
    • Takes in an access token or refresh token, outputs all groups in Azure AD and all available group properties in Microsoft Graph
    • Creates three data files, a condensed json file, a raw json file, and a BloodHound compatible azgroups file
  • ./Azure_AD/get_group_members.py
    • Takes in an access token or refresh token, outputs all group memberships in Azure AD and all available group member properties in Microsoft Graph
    • Creates three data files, a condensed json file, a raw json file, and a BloodHound compatible azgroups file
  • ./Azure_AD/get_subscriptions.py
    • Takes in an ARM token or refresh token, outputs all subscriptions in Azure and all available subscription properties in Azure Resource Manager
    • Creates three data files, a condensed json file, a raw json file, and a BloodHound compatible azgroups file
  • ./Azure_AD/get_resource_groups.py
    • Takes in an ARM token or refresh token, outputs all resource groups in Azure and all available resource group properties in Azure Resource Manager
    • Creates two data files, a raw json file, and a BloodHound compatible azgroups file
  • ./Azure_AD/get_vms.py
    • Takes in an ARM token or refresh token, outputs all virtual machines in Azure and all available VM properties in Azure Resource Manager
    • Creates two data files, a raw json file, and a BloodHound compatible azgroups file

Installation

Offensive Azure can be installed in a number of ways or not at all.

You are welcome to clone the repository and execute the specific scripts you want. A requirements.txt file is included for each module to make this as easy as possible.

Poetry

The project is built to work with poetry. To use, follow the next few steps:

git clone https://github.com/blacklanternsecurity/offensive-azure.git
cd ./offensive-azure
poetry install

Pip

The packaged version of the repo is also kept on pypi so you can use pip to install as well. We recommend you use pipenv to keep your environment as clean as possible.

pipenv shell
pip install offensive_azure

Usage

It is up to you for how you wish to use this toolkit. Each module can be ran independently, or you can install it as a package and use it in that way. Each module is exported to a script named the same as the module file. For example:

Poetry

poetry install
poetry run outsider_recon your-domain.com

Pip

pipenv shell
pip install offensive_azure
outsider_recon your-domain.com


Sentinel-Attack - Tools To Rapidly Deploy A Threat Hunting Capability On Azure Sentinel That Leverages Sysmon And MITRE ATT&CK


Sentinel ATT&CK aims to simplify the rapid deployment of a threat hunting capability that leverages Sysmon and MITRE ATT&CK on Azure Sentinel.

DISCLAIMER: This tool requires tuning and investigative trialling to be truly effective in a production environment.


Overview

Sentinel ATT&CK provides the following tools:

Usage

Head over to the WIKI to learn how to deploy and run Sentinel ATT&CK.

A copy of the DEF CON 27 cloud village presentation introducing Sentinel ATT&CK can be found here and here.

Contributing

As this repository is constantly being updated and worked on, if you spot any problems we warmly welcome pull requests or submissions on the issue tracker.

Authors and contributors

Sentinel ATT&CK is built with <3 by:

  • Edoardo Gerosa

Special thanks go to the following contributors:



AzureRT - A Powershell Module Implementing Various Azure Red Team Tactics


Powershell module implementing various cmdlets to interact with Azure and Azure AD from an offensive perspective.

Helpful utilities dealing with access token based authentication, switching from Az to AzureAD and az cli interfaces, easy to use pre-made attacks such as Runbook-based command execution and more.


The Most Valuable Cmdlets

This toolkit brings lots of various cmdlets. This section highlights the most important & useful ones.

Typical Red Team / audit workflow starting with stolen credentials can be summarised as follows:

Credentials Stolen -> Authenticate to Azure/AzureAD -> find whether they're valid -> find out what you can do with them

The below cmdlets are precisely suited to help you follow this sequence:

  1. Connect-ART - Offers various means to authenticate to Azure - credentials, PSCredential, token

  2. Connect-ARTAD - Offers various means to authenticate to Azure AD - credentials, PSCredential, token

  3. Get-ARTWhoami - When you authenticate - run this to check whoami and validate your access

  4. Get-ARTAccess - Then, when you know you have access - find out what you can do & what's possible by performing Azure situational awareness

  5. Get-ARTADAccess - Similarly you can find out what you can do scoped to Azure AD.


Use Cases

Cmdlets implemented in this module came helpful in following use & attack scenarios:

  • Juggling with access tokens from Az to AzureAD and back again.
  • Nicely print authentication context (aka whoami) in Az, AzureAD, Microsoft.Graph and az cli at the same time
  • Display available permissions granted to the user on a target Azure VM
  • Display accessible Azure Resources along with permissions we have against them
  • Easily read all accessible Azure Key Vault secrets
  • Authenticate as a Service Principal to leverage Privileged Role Administrator role assigned to that Service Principal
  • Execute attack against Azure Automation via malicious Runbook

Installation

This module depends on Powershell Az and AzureAD modules pre-installed. Microsoft.Graph and az cli are optional but nonetheless really useful. Before one starts crafting around Azure, following commands may be used to prepare one's offensive environment:

Install-Module Az -Force -Confirm -AllowClobber -Scope CurrentUser
Install-Module AzureAD -Force -Confirm -AllowClobber -Scope CurrentUser
Install-Module Microsoft.Graph -Force -Confirm -AllowClobber -Scope CurrentUser # OPTIONAL
Install-Module MSOnline -Force -Confirm -AllowClobber -Scope CurrentUser # OPTIONAL
Install-Module AzureADPreview -Force -Confirm -AllowClobber -Scope CurrentUser # OPTIONAL
Install-Module AADInternals -Force -Confirm -AllowClobber -Scope CurrentUser # OPTIONAL

Import-Module Az
Import-Module AzureAD

Even though only first two modules are required by AzureRT, its good to have others pre-installed too.

Then to load this module, simply type:

PS> . .\AzureRT.ps1

And you're good to go.

Or you can let AzureRT to install and import all the dependencies:

PS> . .\AzureRT.ps1
PS> Import-ARTModules

Batteries Included

The module will be gradually receiving next tools and utilities, naturally categorised onto subsequent kill chain phases.

Every cmdlet has a nice help message detailing parameters, description and example usage:

PS C:\> Get-Help Connect-ART

Currently, following utilities are included:

Authentication & Token mechanics

  • Get-ARTWhoami - Displays and validates our authentication context on Azure, AzureAD, Microsoft.Graph and on AZ CLI interfaces.

  • Connect-ART - Invokes Connect-AzAccount to authenticate current session to the Azure Portal via provided Access Token or credentials. Skips the burden of providing Tenant ID and Account ID by automatically extracting those from provided Token.

  • Connect-ARTAD - Invokes Connect-AzureAD (and optionally Connect-MgGraph) to authenticate current session to the Azure Active Directory via provided Access Token or credentials. Skips the burden of providing Tenant ID and Account ID by automatically extracting those from provided Token.

  • Connect-ARTADServicePrincipal - Invokes Connect-AzAccount to authenticate current session to the Azure Portal via provided Access Token or credentials. Skips the burden of providing Tenant ID and Account ID by automatically extracting those from provided Token. Then it creates self-signed PFX certificate and associates it with Service Principal for authentication. Afterwards, authenticates as that Service Principal to AzureAD and deassociates that certificate to cleanup

  • Get-ARTAccessTokenAzCli - Acquires access token from az cli, via az account get-access-token

  • Get-ARTAccessTokenAz - Acquires access token from Az module, via Get-AzAccessToken .

  • Get-ARTAccessTokenAzureAD - Gets an access token from Azure Active Directory. Authored by Simon Wahlin, @SimonWahlin

  • Get-ARTAccessTokenAzureADCached - Attempts to retrieve locally cached AzureAD access token (https://graph.microsoft.com), stored after Connect-AzureAD occurred.

  • Remove-ARTServicePrincipalKey - Performs cleanup actions after running Connect-ARTADServicePrincipal

Recon & Situational Awareness

  • Get-ARTAccess - Performs Azure Situational Awareness.

  • Get-ARTADAccess - Performs Azure AD Situational Awareness.

  • Get-ARTTenants - List Tenants available for the currently authenticated user (or the one based on supplied Access Token)

  • Get-ARTDangerousPermissions - Analyzes accessible Azure Resources and associated permissions user has on them to find all the Dangerous ones that could be abused by an attacker.

  • Get-ARTResource - Authenticates to the https://management.azure.com using provided Access Token and pulls accessible resources and permissions that token Owner have against them.

  • Get-ARTRoleAssignment - Displays a bit easier to read representation of assigned Azure RBAC roles to the currently used Principal.

  • Get-ARTADRoleAssignment - Displays Azure AD Role assignments on a current user or on all Azure AD users.

  • Get-ARTADScopedRoleAssignment - Displays Azure AD Scoped Role assignments on a current user or on all Azure AD users, associated with Administrative Units

  • Get-ARTRolePermissions - Displays all granted permissions on a specified Azure RBAC role.

  • Get-ARTADRolePermissions - Displays all granted permissions on a specified Azure AD role.

  • Get-ARTADDynamicGroups - Displays Azure AD Dynamic Groups along with their user Membership Rules, members count and current user membership status

  • Get-ARTApplication - Lists Azure AD Enterprise Applications that current user is owner of (or all existing when -All used) along with their owners and Service Principals

  • Get-ARTApplicationProxy - Lists Azure AD Enterprise Applications that have Application Proxy setup.

  • Get-ARTApplicationProxyPrincipals - Displays users and groups assigned to the specified Application Proxy application.

  • Get-ARTStorageAccountKeys - Displays all the available Storage Account keys.

  • Get-ARTKeyVaultSecrets - Lists all available Azure Key Vault secrets. This cmdlet assumes that requesting user connected to the Azure AD with KeyVaultAccessToken (scoped to https://vault.azure.net) and has "Key Vault Secrets User" role assigned (or equivalent).

  • Get-ARTAutomationCredentials - Lists all available Azure Automation Account credentials and attempts to pull their values (unable to pull values!).

  • Get-ARTAutomationRunbookCode - Invokes REST API method to pull specified Runbook's source code.

  • Get-ARTAzVMPublicIP - Retrieves Azure VM Public IP address

  • Get-ARTResourceGroupDeploymentTemplate - Displays Resource Group Deployment Template JSON based on input parameters, or pulls all of them at once.

  • Get-ARTAzVMUserDataFromInside - Retrieves Azure VM User Data from inside of a VM by reaching to Instance Metadata endpoint.

Privilege Escalation

  • Add-ARTADGuestUser - Sends Azure AD Guest user invitation e-mail, allowing to expand access to AAD tenant for the external attacker & returns Invite Redeem URL used to easily accept the invitation.

  • Set-ARTADUserPassword - Abuses Authentication Administrator Role Assignment to reset other non-admin users password.

  • Add-ARTUserToGroup - Adds a specified Azure AD User to the specified Azure AD Group.

  • Add-ARTUserToRole - Adds a specified Azure AD User to the specified Azure AD Role.

  • Add-ARTADAppSecret - Add client secret to the Azure AD Applications. Authored by Nikhil Mittal, @nikhil_mitt

Lateral Movement

  • Invoke-ARTAutomationRunbook - Creates an Automation Runbook under specified Automation Account and against selected Worker Group. That Runbook will contain Powershell commands to be executed on all the affected Azure VMs.

  • Invoke-ARTRunCommand - Abuses virtualMachines/runCommand permission against a specified Azure VM to run custom Powershell command.

  • Update-ARTAzVMUserData - Modifies Azure VM User Data script through a direct API invocation.

  • Invoke-ARTCustomScriptExtension - Creates new or modifies Azure VM Custom Script Extension leading to remote code execution.

Misc

  • Get-ARTTenantID - Retrieves Current user's Tenant ID or Tenant ID based on Domain name supplied.

  • Get-ARTPRTToken - Retrieves Current user's PRT (Primary Refresh Token) value using Dirk-Jan Mollema's ROADtoken

  • Get-ARTPRTNonce - Retrieves Current user's PRT (Primary Refresh Token) nonce value

  • Get-ARTUserId - Acquires current user or user specified in parameter ObjectId via Az module

  • Get-ARTSubscriptionId - Helper that collects current Subscription ID.

  • Parse-JWTtokenRT - Parses input JWT token and prints it out nicely.

  • Invoke-ARTGETRequest - Takes Access Token and invokes GET REST method API request against a specified URI. It also verifies whether provided token has required audience set.

  • Import-ARTModules - Installs & Imports required & optional Powershell modules for Azure Red Team activities


Show Support

This and other projects are outcome of sleepless nights and plenty of hard work. If you like what I do and appreciate that I always give back to the community, Consider buying me a coffee (or better a beer) just to say thank you!


Mariusz Banach / mgeeky, (@mariuszbit)
<mb [at] binary-offensive.com>


Wrongsecrets - Examples With How To Not Use Secrets


Welcome to the OWASP WrongSecrets p0wnable app. With this app, we have packed various ways of how to not store your secrets. These can help you to realize whether your secret management is ok. The challenge is to find all the different secrets by means of various tools and techniques.

Can you solve all the 16 challenges? 


Support

Need support? Contact us via OWASP Slack for which you sign up here, file a PR, file an issue , or use discussions. Please note that this is an OWASP volunteer based project, so it might take a little while before we respond.

Basic docker exercises

Can be used for challenges 1-4, 8, 12-15

For the basic docker exercises you currently require:

You can install it by doing:

docker run -p 8080:8080 jeroenwillemsen/wrongsecrets:1.4.0-no-vault

Now you can try to find the secrets by means of solving the challenge offered at:

Note that these challenges are still very basic, and so are their explanations. Feel free to file a PR to make them look better ;-).

Running these on Heroku

You can test them out at https://wrongsecrets.herokuapp.com/ as well! But please understand that we have NO guarantees that this works. Given we run in Heroku free-tier, please do not fuzz and/or try to bring it down: you would be spoiling it for others that want to testdrive it.

Deploying the app under your own heroku account

  1. Sign up to Heroku and log in to your account
  2. Click the button below and follow the instructions

Basic K8s exercise

Can be used for challenges 1-6, 8, 12-16

Minikube based

Make sure you have the following installed:

The K8S setup currently is based on using Minikube for local fun:

    minikube start
kubectl apply -f k8s/secrets-config.yml
kubectl apply -f k8s/secrets-secret.yml
kubectl apply -f k8s/secret-challenge-deployment.yml
while [[ $(kubectl get pods -l app=secret-challenge -o 'jsonpath={..status.conditions[?(@.type=="Ready")].status}') != "True" ]]; do echo "waiting for secret-challenge" && sleep 2; done
kubectl expose deployment secret-challenge --type=LoadBalancer --port=8080
minikube service secret-challenge

now you can use the provided IP address and port to further play with the K8s variant (instead of localhost).

k8s based

Want to run vanilla on your own k8s? Use the commands below:

    kubectl apply -f k8s/secrets-config.yml
kubectl apply -f k8s/secrets-secret.yml
kubectl apply -f k8s/secret-challenge-deployment.yml
while [[ $(kubectl get pods -l app=secret-challenge -o 'jsonpath={..status.conditions[?(@.type=="Ready")].status}') != "True" ]]; do echo "waiting for secret-challenge" && sleep 2; done
kubectl port-forward \
$(kubectl get pod -l app=secret-challenge -o jsonpath="{.items[0].metadata.name}") \
8080:8080

now you can use the provided IP address and port to further play with the K8s variant (instead of localhost).

Vault exercises with minikube

Can be used for challenges 1-8, 12-16 Make sure you have the following installed:

Run ./k8s-vault-minkube-start.sh, when the script is done, then the challenges will wait for you at http://localhost:8080 . This will allow you to run challenges 1-8, 12-15.

When you stopped the k8s-vault-minikube-start.sh script and want to resume the port forward run: k8s-vault-minikube-resume.sh. This is because if you run the start script again it will replace the secret in the vault and not update the secret-challenge application with the new secret.

Cloud Challenges

Can be used for challenges 1-16

READ THIS: Given that the exercises below contain IAM privilege escalation exercises, never run this on an account which is related to your production environment or can influence your account-over-arching resources.

Running WrongSecrets in AWS

Follow the steps in the README in the AWS subfolder.

Running WrongSecrets in GCP

Follow the steps in the README in the GCP subfolder.

Running WrongSecrets in Azure

Follow the steps in the README in the Azure subfolder.

Running Challenge15 in your own cloud only

When you want to include your own Canarytokens for your cloud-deployment, do the following:

  1. Fork the project.
  2. Make sure you use the GCP ingress or AWS ingress scripts to generate an ingress for your project.
  3. Go to canarytokens.org and select AWS Keys, in the webHook URL field add <your-domain-created-at-step1>/canaries/tokencallback.
  4. Encrypt the received credentials so that Challenge15 can decrypt them again.
  5. Commit the unencrypted and encrypted materials to Git and then commit again without the decrypted materials.
  6. Adapt the hints of Challenge 15 in your fork to point to your fork.
  7. Create a container and push it to your registry
  8. Override the K8s definition files for either AWS or GCP.

Do you want to play without guidance?

Each challenge has a Show hints button and a What's wrong? button. These buttons help to simplify the challenges and give explanation to the reader. Though, the explanations can spoil the fun if you want to do this as a hacking exercise. Therefore, you can manipulate them by overriding the following settings in your env:

  • hints_enabled=false will turn off the Show hints button.
  • reason_enabled=false will turn of the What's wrong? explanation button.

Special thanks & Contributors

Leaders:

Top contributors:

Testers:

Special mentions for helping out:

Help Wanted

You can help us by the following methods:

  • Star us
  • Share this app with others
  • Of course, we can always use your help to get more flavors of "wrongly" configured secrets in to spread awareness! We would love to get some help with other cloudproiders, like Alibabaor Tencent cloud for instance. Do you miss something else than a cloud provider as an example? File an issue or create a PR! See our guide on contributing for more details. Contributors will be listed in releases, in the "Special thanks & Contributors"-section, and the web-app.

Use OWASP WrongSecrets as a secret detection benchmark

As tons of secret detection tools are coming up for both Docker and Git, we are creating a Benchmark testbed for it. Want to know if your tool detects everything? We will keep track of the embedded secrets in this issue and have a branch in which we put additional secrets for your tool to detect. The branch will contain a Docker container generation script using which you can eventually test your container secret scanning.

Notes on development

For development on local machine use the local profile ./mvnw spring-boot:run -Dspring-boot.run.profiles=local

If you want to test against vault without K8s: start vault locally with

 export VAULT_ADDR='http://127.0.0.1:8200'
export VAULT_API_ADDR='http://127.0.0.1:8200'
vault server -dev

and in your next terminal, do (with the token from the previous commands):

export VAULT_ADDR='http://127.0.0.1:8200'
export VAULT_TOKEN='<TOKENHERE>'
vault token create -id="00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000" -policy="root"
vault kv put secret/secret-challenge vaultpassword.password="$(openssl rand -base64 16)"

Now use the local-vault profile to do your development.

./mvnw spring-boot:run -Dspring-boot.run.profiles=local,local-vault

If you want to dev without a Vault instance, use additionally the without-vault profile to do your development:

./mvnw spring-boot:run -Dspring-boot.run.profiles=local,without-vault

Want to push a container? See .github/scripts/docker-create-and-push.sh for a script that generates and pushes all containers. Do not forget to rebuild the app before composing the container

Dependency management

We have CycloneDX and OWASP Dependency-check integrated to check dependencies for vulnerabilities. You can use the OWASP Dependency-checker by calling mvn dependency-check:aggregate and mvn cyclonedx:makeBom to use CycloneDX to create an SBOM.

Automatic reload during development

To make changes made load faster we added spring-dev-tools to the Maven project. To enable this in IntelliJ automatically, make sure:

  • Under Compiler -> Automatically build project is enabled, and
  • Under Advanced settings -> Allow auto-make to start even if developed application is currently running.

You can also manually invoke: Build -> Recompile the file you just changed, this will also force reloading of the application.

How to add a Challenge

Follow the steps below on adding a challenge:

  1. First make sure that you have an Issue reported for which a challenge is really wanted.
  2. Add the new challenge in the org.owasp.wrongsecrets.challenges folder. Make sure you add an explanation in src/main/resources/explanations and refer to it from your new Challenge class.
  3. Add a unit and integration test to show that your challenge is working.
  4. Don't forget to add @Order annotation to your challenge ;-).

If you want to move existing cloud challenges to another cloud: extend Challenge classes in the org.owasp.wrongsecrets.challenges.cloud package and make sure you add the required Terraform in a folder with the separate cloud identified. Make sure that the environment is added to org.owasp.wrongsecrets.RuntimeEnvironment. Collaborate with the others at the project to get your container running so you can test at the cloud account.



Microsoft Azure job outlook

Introduction The business world is relocating to the cloud and the trend is strong. It has been predicted that by the end of 2020, 83% of all businesses will be in the cloud and by 2021, the percentage of workloads processed in cloud data centers will reach 94%. By 2022, cloud services will be three […]

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Microsoft Azure job outlook was first posted on October 20, 2020 at 8:05 am.
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Microsoft Azure Fundamentals (AZ-900) Domains Overview

Introduction The Microsoft Azure Fundamentals (AZ-900) certification exam is a great way for someone new to the field of cloud computing to demonstrate knowledge, interest and experience to current or potential employers. In this article, we will offer an overview of Microsoft Azure’s most popular certification — the Microsoft Certified Azure Fundamentals certification. We will […]

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Microsoft Azure Fundamentals (AZ-900) Domains Overview was first posted on October 6, 2020 at 8:02 am.
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Microsoft Azure Certification: Overview And Career Path

Introduction The global COVID-19 pandemic has forced individuals and organizations to adopt new ways of doing daily tasks, from working to learning. It has also accelerated the journey to the cloud for many organizations; for others, it has made them more reliant on the cloud. With that move comes a demand for professionals with cloud […]

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Microsoft Azure Certification: Overview And Career Path was first posted on October 5, 2020 at 8:03 am.
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Cloud Security Is Simple, Absolutely Simple.

“Cloud security is simple, absolutely simple. Stop over complicating it.”

This is how I kicked off a presentation I gave at the CyberRisk Alliance, Cloud Security Summit on Apr 17 of this year. And I truly believe that cloud security is simple, but that does not mean easy. You need the right strategy.

As I am often asked about strategies for the cloud, and the complexities that come with it, I decided to share my recent talk with you all. Depending on your preference, you can either watch the video below or read the transcript of my talk that’s posted just below the video. I hope you find it useful and will enjoy it. And, as always, I’d love to hear from you, find me @marknca.

For those of you who prefer to read rather than watch a video, here’s the transcript of my talk:

Cloud security is simple, absolutely simple. Stop over complicating it.

Now, I know you’re probably thinking, “Wait a minute, what is this guy talking about? He is just off his rocker.”

Remember, simple doesn’t mean easy. I think we make things way more complicated than they need to be when it comes to securing the cloud, and this makes our lives a lot harder than they need to be. There’s some massive advantages when it comes to security in the cloud. Primarily, I think we can simplify our security approach because of three major reasons.

The first is integrated identity and access management. All three major cloud providers, AWS, Google and Microsoft offer fantastic identity, and access management systems. These are things that security, and [inaudible 00:00:48] professionals have been clamouring for, for decades.

We finally have this ability, we need to take advantage of it.

The second main area is the shared responsibility model. We’ll cover that more in a minute, but it’s an absolutely wonderful tool to understand your mental model, to realize where you need to focus your security efforts, and the third area that simplifies security for us is the universal application of APIs or application programming interfaces.

These give us as security professionals the ability to orchestrate. and automate a huge amount of the grunt work away. These three things add up to, uh, the ability for us to execute a very sophisticated, uh, or very difficult to pull off, uh, security practice, but one that ultimately is actually pretty simple in its approach.

It’s just all the details are hard and we’re going to use these three advantages to make those details simpler. So, let’s take a step back for a second and look at what our goal is.

What is the goal of cybersecurity? That’s not something you hear quite often as a question.

A lot of the time you’ll hear the definition of cybersecurity is, uh, about, uh, securing the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information or data. The CIA triad, different CIA, but I like to phrase this in a different way. I think the goal is much clearer, and the goal’s much simpler.

It is to make sure that whatever you’re building works as intended and only as intended. Now, you’ll realize you can’t accomplish this goal just as a security team. You need to work with your, uh, developers, you need to work with operations, you need to work with the business units, with the end users of your application as well.

This is a wonderful way of phrasing our goal, and realizing that we’re all in this together to make sure whatever you’re building works as intended, and only as intended.

Now, if we move forward, and we look at who are we up against, who’s preventing our stuff from working, uh, well?

You look at normally, you think of, uh, who’s attacking our systems? Who are the risks? Is it nation states? Is it maybe insider threats? While these are valid threats, they’re really overblown. You’re… don’t have to worry about nation state attacks.

If you’re a nation state, worry about it. If you’re not a nation state, you don’t have to worry about it because frankly, there’s nothing you can do to stop them. You can slow them down a little bit, but by definition, they’re going to get through your resources.

As far as insider attacks, this is an HR problem. Treat your people well. Um, check in with them, and have a strong information management policy in place, and you’re going to reduce this threat naturally. If you go hunting for people, you’re going to create the very threats that you’re looking at.

So, it brings us to the next set. What about cyber criminals? You know, we do have to worry about cyber criminals.

Cyber criminals are targeting systems simply because these systems are online, these are profit motivated criminals who are organized, and have a good set of tools, so we absolutely need to worry about them, but there’s a more insidious or more commonplace, maybe a simpler threat that we need to worry about, and that’s one of mistakes.

The vast majority of issues that happen around data breaches around security vulnerabilities in the cloud are mistake driven. In fact, to the point where I would not even worry about cyber criminals simply because all the work we’re going to do to focus on, uh, preventing mistakes.

And catching, and rectifying the stakes really, really quickly is going to uh, you a cover all the stuff that we would have done to block out cyber criminals as well, so mistakes are very common because people are using a lot more services in the cloud.

You have a lot more, um, parts and moving, uh, complexity in your deployment, um, and you’re going to make a mistake, which is why you need to put automated systems in place to make sure that those mistakes don’t happen, or if they do happen that they’re caught very, very quickly.

This applies to standard DevOps, the philosophies for building. It also applies to security very, very wonderfully, so this is the main thing we’re going to focus on.

So, if we look at that sum up together, we have our goal of making sure whatever we’re building works as intended, and only as intended, and our major issue here, the biggest risk to this is simple mistakes and misconfigurations.

Okay, so we’re not starting from ground zero here. We can learn from others, and the first place we’re going to learn is the shared responsibility model. The shared responsibility applies to all cloud service providers.

If you look on the left hand side of the slide here, you’ll see the traditional on premise model. We roughly have six areas where something has to be done roughly daily, whether it’s patching, maintenance, uh, just operational visibility, monitoring, that kind of thing, and in a traditional on premise environment, you’re responsible for all of it, whether it’s your team, or a team underneath your organization.

Somewhere within your tree, people are on the hook for doing stuff daily. Here when we move into an infrastructure, so getting a virtual machine from a cloud provider right off the bat, half of the responsibilities are pushed away.

That’s a huge, huge win.

And, as we move further and further to the right to more managed service, or staff level services, we have less and less daily responsibilities.

Now, of course, you always still have to verify that the cloud service provider’s doing what they, uh, say they’re doing, which is why certifications and compliance frameworks come into play, uh, but the bottom line is you’re doing less work, so you can focus on fewer areas.

Um, that is, or I should say not less work, but you’re doing, uh, less broad of a work.

So you can have that deeper focus, and of course, you always have to worry about service configuration. You are given knobs and dials to turn to lock things down. You should use them like things like encrypting, uh, all your data at rest.

Most of the time it’s an easy check box, but it’s up to you to check it ‘cause it’s your responsibility.

We also have the idea of an adoption framework, and this applies for Azure, for AWS and for Google, uh, and what they do is they help you map out your business processes.

This is important to security, because it gives you the understanding of where your data is, what’s important to the business, where does it lie, who needs to touch it, and access it and process it.

That also gives us the idea, uh, or the ability to identify the stakeholders, so that we know, uh, you know, who’s concerned about this data, who is, has an investment in this data, and finally it helps to, to deliver an action plan.

The output of all of these frameworks is to deliver an action plan to help you migrate into the cloud and help you to continuously evolve. Well, it’s also a phenomenal map for your security efforts.

You want to prioritize security, this is how you do it. You get it through the adoption framework, understanding what’s important to the business, and that lets you identify critical systems and areas for your security.

Again, we want to keep things simple, right? And, the third, uh, the o- other things we want to look at is the CIS foundations. They have them for AWS, Azure and GCP, um, and these provide a prescriptive guidance.

They’re really, um, a strong baseline, and a checklist of tasks that you can accomplish, um, or take on, on your, uh, take on, on your own, excuse me, uh, in order to, um, you know, basically cover off the really basics is encryption at rest on, um, you know, do I make sure that I don’t have, uh, things needlessly exposed to the internet, that type of thing.

Really fantastic reference point and a starting point for your security practice.

Again, with this idea of keeping things as simple as possible, so when it comes to looking at our security policy, we’ve used the frameworks, um, and the baseline to kind of set up a strong, uh, start to understand, uh, where the business is concerned, and to prioritize.

And, the first question we need to ask ourselves as security practitioners, what happened? If we, if something happens, and we ask what happened?

Do we have the ability to answer this question? So, that starts us off with logging and auditing. This needs to be in place before something happened. Let me just say that again, before something happened, you need [laughs] to be able to have this information in place.

Now, uh, this is really, uh, to ask these key questions of what happened in my account, and who, or what made that thing happen?

So, this starts in the cloud with some basic services. Uh, for AWS it’s cloud trail, for Azure, it’s monitor, and for Google Cloud it used to be called Stackdriver, it is now the Google Cloud operations suite, so these need to be enabled on at full volume.

Don’t worry, you can use some lifecycle rules on the data source to keep your costs low.

But, this gives you that layer, that basic auditing and logging layer, so that you can answer that question of what happened?

So, the next question you want to ask yourself or have the ability to answer is who’s there, right? Who’s doing what in my account? And, that comes down to identity.

We’ve already mentioned this is one of the key pillars of keeping security simple, and getting that highly effective security in your cloud.

[00:09:00] So here you’re answering the questions of who are you, and what are you allowed to do? This is where we get a very simple privilege, uh, or principle in security, which is the principle of least privilege.

You want to give an identity, so whether that’s a user, or a role, or a service, uh, only the privileges they, uh, require that are essential to perform the task that, uh, they are intended to do.

Okay?

So, basically if I need to write a file into a storage, um, folder or a bucket, I should only have the ability to write that file. I don’t need to read it, I don’t need to delete it, I just need to write to it, so only give me that ability.

Remember, that comes back to the other pillar of simple security here of, of key cloud security, is integrated identity.

This is where it really takes off, is that we start to assign very granular access permissions, and don’t worry, we’re going to use the APIs to automate all this stuff, so that it’s not a management headache, but the principle of these privilege is absolutely critical here.

The services you’re going to be using, amazingly, all three cloud providers got in line, and named them the same thing. It’s IAM, identity access management, whether that’s AWS, Azure or Google Cloud.

Now, the next question we’re going to a- ask ourselves are the areas where we’re going to be looking at is really where should I be focusing security controls? Where should I be putting stuff in place?

Because up until now we’ve really talked about leveraging what’s available from the cloud service providers, and you absolutely should available, uh, maximize your usage of their, um, native and primitive, uh, structures primitive as far as base concepts, not as, um, refined.

They’re very advanced controls and, but there are times where you’re going to need to put in your own controls, and these are the areas you’re going to focus on, so you’re going to start with networking, right?

So, in your networking, you’re going to maximize the native structures that are available in the cloud that you’re in, so whether that’s a project structure in Google Cloud, whether that’s a service like transit gateway in AWS, um, and all of them have this idea of a VPC or virtual private cloud or virtual network that is a very strong boundary for you to use.

Remember, most of the time you’re not charged for the creation of those. You have limits in your accounts, but accounts are free, and you can keep adding more, uh, virtual networks. You may be saying, wait a minute, I’m trying to simplify things.

Actually, having multiple virtual networks or virtual private clouds ends up being far simpler because each of them has a task. You go, this application runs in this virtual private cloud, not a big shared one in this specific VPC, and that gives you this wonderfully strong security boundaries, and a very simple way of looking at one VPC, one action, very much the Unix philosophy in play.

Key here though is understanding that while all of the security controls in place for your service provider, um, give you, so, you know, whether it’s VPCs, routing tables, um, uh, access control lists, security groups, all the SDN features that they’ve got in place.

These really help you figure out whether service A or system A is allowed to talk to B, but they don’t tell you what they’re saying.

And, that’s where additional controls called an IPS, or intrusion prevention system come into play, and you may want to look at getting a third party control in to do that, because none of the th- big three cloud providers offer an IPS at this point.

[00:12:00] But that gives you the ability to not just say, “Hey, you’re allowed to talk to each other.” But, to monitor that conversation, to ensure that there’s not malicious code being passed back and forth between systems that nobody’s trying a denial of service attack.

A whole bunch of extra things on there have, so that’s where IPS comes into play in your network defense. Now, we look at compute, right?

We can have compute in various forms, whether that’s in serverless functions, whether that’s in containers, manage containers, whether that’s in traditional virtual machines, but all the principles are the same.

You want to understand where the shared responsibility line is, how much is on your plate, how much is on the CSPs?

You want to understand that you need to harden the EOS, or the service, or both in some cases, make sure that, that’s locked down, so have administrator passwords. Very, very complicated.

Don’t log into these systems, uh, you know, because you want to be fixing things upstream. You want to be fixing things in the build pipeline, not logging into these systems directly, and that’s a huge thing for, uh, systems people to get over, but it’s absolutely essential for security, and you know what?

It’s going to take a while, but there’s some tricks there you can follow with me. You can see, uh, on the slides, uh, at Mark, that is my social everywhere, uh, happy to walk you through the next steps.

This idea of this presentation’s really just the simple basics to start with, to give you that overview of where to focus your time, and, dispel that myth that cloud security is complicating things.

It is a huge path is simplicity, which is a massive lens, or for security.

So, the last area you want to focus here is in data and storage. Whether this is databases, whether this is big blob storage, or, uh, buckets in AWS, it doesn’t really matter the principles, again, all the same.

You want to encrypt your data at rest using the native cloud provided, uh, cloud service provider, uh, features functionality, because most of the time it’s just give it a key address, and give it a checkbox, and you’re good to go.

It’s never been easier to encrypt things, and there is no excuse for it and none of the providers charge extra for, uh, encryption, which is amazing, and you absolutely want to be taking advantage of that, and you want to be as granular as possible with your IAM, uh, and as reasonable, okay?

So, there’s a line here, and a lot of the data stores that are native to the cloud service providers, you can go right down to the data cell level and say, Mark has access, or Mark doesn’t have access to this cell.

That can be highly effective, and maybe right for your use case. It might be too much as well.

But, the nice thing is that you have that option. It’s integrated, it’s pretty straightforward to implement, and then, uh, when we look here, uh, sorry. and then, finally you want to be looking at lifecycle strategies to keep your costs under control.

Um, data really spins out of control when you don’t have to worry about capacity. All of the cloud service providers have some fantastic automations in place.

Basically, just giving you, uh, very simple rules to say, “Okay, after 90 days, move this over to cheaper storage. After 180 days, you know, get rid of it completely, or put it in cold storage.”

Take advantage of those or your bill’s going to spiral out of control, and, and that relates to availability ‘cause uh, uh, and reliability, ‘cause the more you’re spending on that kind of stuff, the less you have to spend on other areas like security and operational efficiency.

So, that brings us to our next big security question. Is this working?

[00:15:00] How do you know if any of this stuff is working? Well, you want to talk about the concept of traceability. Traceability is a, you know, somewhat formal definition, but for me it really comes down to where did this come from, who can access it, and when did they access it?

That ties very closely with the concept of observability. Basically, the ability to look at, uh, closed systems and to infer what’s going on inside based on what’s coming into that system, and what’s leaving that system, really what’s going on.

There’s some great tools here from the service providers. Again, you want to look at, uh, Amazon CloudWatch, uh, Azure Monitor and the Google Cloud operations, uh, suite. Um, and here this leads us to the key, okay?

This is the key to simplifying everything, and I know we’ve covered a ton in this presentation, but I really want you to take a good look at this slide, and again, hit me up, uh, @marknca, happy to answer any questions with, questions afterwards as well here, um, that this will really, really make this simple, and this will really take your security practice to the next level.

If the idea of something happened in your, cloud system, right? In your deployment, there’s a trigger, and then, it either is generating an event or a log.

If you go the bottom row here, you’ve got a log, which you can then react to in a function to deliver some sort of result. That’s the slow-lane on the bottom.

We’re talking minutes here. You also have the top lane where your trigger fires off an event, and then, you react to that with a function, and then, you get a result in the fast lane.

These things happen in seconds, sub-second time. You start to build out your security practice based on this model.

You start automating more and more in these functions, whether it’s, uh, Lambda, whether it’s Cloud Functions, whether it’s Azure Functions, it doesn’t matter.

The CSPs all offer the same core functionality here. This is the critical, critical success metric, is that when you start reacting in the fast lane automatically to things, so if you see that a security event is triggered from like your malware, uh, on your, uh, virtual machine, you can lock that off, and have a new one spin up automatically.

Um, if you’re looking for compliance stuff, the slow lane is the place to go, because it takes minutes.

Reactions happen up top, more, um, stately or more sedate things, so somebody logging into a system is both up top and down low, so up top, if you logged into a VPC or into, um, an instance, or a virtual machine, you’d have a trigger fire off and maybe ask me immediately, “Mark, did you log into the system? Uh, ‘cause you’re, you know, you’re not supposed to be.”

But then I’d respond and say, “Yeah, I, I did log in.” So, immediately you don’t have to respond. It’s not an incident response scenario, but on the bottom track, maybe you’re tracking how many times I’ve logged in.

And after the three or fourth time maybe someone comes by, and has a chat with me, and says, “Hey, do you keep logging into these systems? Can’t you fix it upstream in the deployment, uh, and build a pipeline ‘cause that’s where we need to be moving?”

So, you’ll find this balance, and this concept, I just wanted to get into your heads right now of automating your security practice. If you have a checklist, it should be sitting in a model like this, because it’ll help you, uh, reduce your workload, right?

The idea is to get as much automated possible, and keep things in very clear, and simple boundaries, and what’s more simple than having every security action listed as an automated function, uh, sitting in a code repository somewhere?

[00:18:00] Fantastic approach to modern security practice in the cloud. Very simple, very clear. Yes, difficult to implement. It can be, but it’s an awesome, simple mental model to keep in your head that everything gets automated as a function based on a trigger somewhere.

So, what are the keys to success? What are the keys to keeping this cloud security thing simple? And, hopefully you’ve realized the difference between a simple mental model, and the challenges, uh, in, uh, implementation.

It can be difficult. It’s not easy to implement, but the mental model needs to be kept simple, right? Keep things in their own VPCs, and their own accounts, automate everything. Very, very simple approach. Everything fits into this s- into this structure, so the keys here are remembering the goal.

Make sure that cybersecurity, uh, is making sure that whatever you build works as intended and only as intended. It’s understanding the shared responsibility model, and it’s really looking at, uh, having a plan through cloud adoption frameworks, how to build well, which is a, uh, a concept called the Well-Architected Framework.

It’s specific to AWS, but it’s generic, um, its principles, it can be applied everywhere. We didn’t cover it here, but I’ll put the links, um, in the materials for you, uh, as well as remembering systems over people, right?

Adding the right controls at the right time, uh, and then, finally observing and react. Be vigilant, practice. You’re not going to get this right out of the gates, uh, perfect.

You’re going to have to refine, iterate, and then it’s extremely cloud friendly. That is the cloud model is, get it out there, iterate quickly, but putting the structures in place, you’re not going to make sure that you’re not doing that in an insecure manner.

Thank you very much, uh, here’s a couple of links that’ll help you out before we take some Q&A here, um, trendmicro.com/cloud will get you to the products to learn more. We’re also doing this really cool streaming.

Uh, I host a show called Let’s Talk Cloud. Um, we uh, interview experts, uh, and have a great conversation around, um, what they’re talking about, uh, in the cloud, what they’re working on, and not just around security, but just in building in general.

You can hit that up at trendtalks.fyi. Um, and again, hit me up on social @marknca.

So, we have a couple of questions to kick this off, and you can put more questions in the webinar here, and they will send them along, or answer them in kind if they can.

Um, and that’s really what these are about, is the interaction is getting that, um, to and from. So, the first question that I wanted to tackle is an interesting one, and it’s really that systems over people.

Um, you heard me mention it in the, uh, in the end and the question is really what does that mean systems over people? Isn’t security really about people’s expertise?

And, yes and no, so if you are a SOC analyst, if you are working in a security, uh, role right now, I am really confident saying that 80%, 90% of what you do right now could be delegated out to a system.

So, if you were looking at log lines, and stuff that should be done by systems and bubble up, just the goal for you to investigate to do what people are good at in systems are bad at, so systems mean, uh, you know, putting in, uh, to build pipeline, putting in container scanning in the build pipeline, so that you have to manually scan stuff, right to get rid of the basics. Is that a pen test? 100% no.

Um, but it gets rid of that, hey, you didn’t upgrade to, um, you know, this version of this library.

[00:21:00] That’s all automated, and those, the more systems you get in place, the more you as a security professional, or your security team will be able to focus on where they can really deliver value and frankly, where it’s more interesting work, so that’s what systems over people mean, is basically automate as much as you can to get people doing what people are really good at, and to make sure that the systems catch what we make as mistakes all the time.

If you accidentally try to push an old build out, you know that systems should stop that, if you push a build that hasn’t been checked by that container scanning or by, um, you know, it doesn’t have the appropriate security policy in place.

Systems should catch all that humans shouldn’t have to worry about it at all. That’s systems over processing. You saw that on the, uh, keys to success slide here. I’ll just pull it up. Um, you know, is that, that’s absolutely key.

Another question that we had, uh, was what we didn’t get into here, which was around the Well-Architected Framework. Now, this is a document that was published by AWS, uh, a number of years back, and they’ve kept it going.

They’ve evolved it and essentially it has five pillars. Um, performance, efficiency, uh, op- reliability, security, cost optimization, and operational excellence. Hey, I’ve got all five.

Um, and really [laughs] what that is, is it’s about how to take advantage of these cloud tools.

Now, AWS publishes it, but honestly it applies to Azure, it applies to Google Cloud as well. It’s not service specific. It teaches you how to build in the cloud, and obviously security is one of those big pillars, but it’s… so talking about teaching you how to make those trade offs, how to build an innovation flywheel, so that you have an idea, test it, uh, get the feedback from it, and move forward.

Um, and that’s really, really key. Again, now you should be reading that even if you are an Azure, or GCP customer or, uh, that’s where you’re putting your most of your stuff, because it’s really about the principles, and everything we do, and encourage people to build well, it means that there’s less security issues, right?

Especially we know that the number one problem is mistakes.

That leads to the last question we have here, which is about that, how can I say that cyber criminals, you don’t need to worry about them.

You need to worry about mistakes? That’s a good question. It’s valid, and, um, Trend Micro does a huge amount of research around cyber criminals. I do a whole huge amount of research around cyber criminals.

Uh, my training, by training, and by professional experience. I’m a forensic investigator. This is what I do is take down cyber crimes. Um, but I think mistakes are the number one thing that we deal with in the cloud simply because of the underlying complexity.

I know it’s ironic, and to talk about simplicity, to talk about complexity, but the idea is, um, is that you look at all the major breaches, especially around s3 buckets, those are all m- based on mistake.

There’ve been billions, and billions, and billions of records, and, uh, millions of dollars of damage exposed because of simple mistakes, and that is far more common, uh, than cyber criminals.

And yes, cyber crimes you have [inaudible 00:23:32] worry. You have to worry about them, but everything you’re going to do to fix mistakes, and to put systems in place to stop those mistakes from happening is also going to be for your pr- uh, protection up against cyber criminals, and honestly, if you’re the guy who runs around your organization’s screaming about cyber criminals all the time, you’re far less credible than if you’re saying, “Hey, I want to make sure that we build really, really well, and don’t make mistakes.”

Thank you for taking the time. My name’s Mark Nunnikhoven. I’m the vice president of cloud research at Trend Micro. I’m also an AWS community hero, and I love this stuff. Hit me up on social @marknca. Happy to chat more.

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The Fear of Vendor Lock-in Leads to Cloud Failures

 

Vendor lock-in has been an often-quoted risk since the mid-1990’s.

Fear that by investing too much with one vendor, an organization reduces their options in the future.

Was this a valid concern? Is it still today?

 

The Risk

Organizations walk a fine line with their technology vendors. Ideally, you select a set of technologies that not only meet your current need but that align with your future vision as well.

This way, as the vendor’s tools mature, they continue to support your business.

The risk is that if you have all of your eggs in one basket, you lose all of the leverage in the relationship with your vendor.

If the vendor changes directions, significantly increases their prices, retires a critical offering, the quality of their product drops, or if any number of other scenarios happen, you are stuck.

Locking in to one vendor means that the cost of switching to another or changing technologies is prohibitively expensive.

All of these scenarios have happened and will happen again. So it’s natural that organizations are concerned about lock-in.

Cloud Maturity

When the cloud started to rise to prominence, the spectre of vendor lock-in reared its ugly head again. CIOs around the world thought that moving the majority of their infrastructure to AWS, Azure, or Google Cloud would lock them into that vendor for the foreseeable future.

Trying to mitigate this risk, organizations regularly adopt a “cloud neutral” approach. This means they only use “generic” cloud services that can be found from the providers. Often hidden under the guise of a “multi-cloud” strategy, it’s really a hedge so as not to lose position in the vendor/client relationship.

In isolation, that’s a smart move.

Taking a step back and looking at the bigger picture starts to show some of the issues with this approach.

Automation

The first issue is the heavy use of automation in cloud deployments means that vendor “lock-in” is not nearly as significant a risk as in was in past decades. The manual effort required to make a vendor change for your storage network used to be monumental.

Now? It’s a couple of API calls and a consumption-based bill adjusted by the megabyte. This pattern is echoed across other resource types.

Automation greatly reduces the cost of switching providers, which reduces the risk of vendor lock-in.

Missing Out

When your organization sets the mandate to only use the basic services (server-based compute, databases, network, etc.) from a cloud service provider, you’re missing out one of the biggest advantages of moving to the cloud; doing less.

The goal of a cloud migration is to remove all of the undifferentiated heavy lifting from your teams.

You want your teams directly delivering business value as much of the time as possible. One of the most direct routes to this goal is to leverage more and more managed services.

Using AWS as an example, you don’t want to run your own database servers in Amazon EC2 or even standard RDS if you can help it. Amazon Aurora and DynamoDB generally offer less operation impacts, higher performance, and lower costs.

When organizations are worried about vendor lock-in, they typically miss out on the true value of cloud; a laser focus on delivering business value.

 

But Multi-cloud…

In this new light, a multi-cloud strategy takes on a different aim. Your teams should be trying to maximize business value (which includes cost, operational burden, development effort, and other aspects) wherever that leads them.

As organizations mature in their cloud usage and use of DevOps philosophies, they generally start to cherry pick managed services from cloud providers that best fit the business problem at hand.

They use automation to reduce the impact if they have to change providers at some point in the future.

This leads to a multi-cloud split that typically falls around 80% in one cloud and 10% in the other two. That can vary depending on the situation but the premise is the same; organizations that thrive have a primary cloud and use other services when and where it makes sense.

 

Cloud Spanning Tools

There are some tools that are more effective when they work in all clouds the organization is using. These tools range from software products (like deployment and security tools) to metrics to operational playbooks.

Following the principles of focusing on delivering business value, you want to actively avoid duplicating a toolset unless it’s absolutely necessary.

The maturity of the tooling in cloud operations has reached the point where it can deliver support to multiple clouds without reducing its effectiveness.

This means automation playbooks can easily support multi-cloud (e.g.,  Terraform). Security tools can easily support multi-cloud (e.g., Trend Micro Cloud One™).  Observability tools can easily support multi-cloud (e.g., Honeycomb.io).

The guiding principle for a multi-cloud strategy is to maximize the amount of business value the team is able to deliver. You accomplish this by becoming more efficient (using the right service and tool at the right time) and by removing work that doesn’t matter to that goal.

In the age of cloud, vendor lock-in should be far down on your list of concerns. Don’t let a long standing fear slow down your teams.

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Celebrating Decades of Success with Microsoft at the Security 20/20 Awards

Effective collaboration is key to the success of any organization. But perhaps none more so than those working towards the common goal of securing our connected world. That’s why Trend Micro has always been keen to reach out to industry partners in the security ecosystem, to help us collectively build a safer world and improve the level of protection we can offer our customers. As part of these efforts, we’ve worked closely with Microsoft for decades.

Trend Micro is therefore doubly honored to be at the Microsoft Security 20/20 awards event in February, with nominations for two of the night’s most prestigious prizes.

Better together

No organization exists in a vacuum. The hi-tech, connectivity-rich nature of modern business is the source of its greatest power, but also one of its biggest weaknesses. Trend Micro’s mission from day one has been to make this environment as safe as possible for our customers. But we learned early on that to deliver on this vision, we had to collaborate. That’s why we work closely with the world’s top platform and technology providers — to offer protection that is seamless and optimized for these environments.

As a Gold Application Development Partner we’ve worked for years with Microsoft to ensure our security is tightly integrated into its products, to offer protection for Azure, Windows and Office 365 customers — at the endpoint, on servers, for email and in the cloud. It’s all about simplified, optimized security designed to support business agility and growth.

Innovating our way to success

This is a vision that comes from the very top. For over three decades, our CEO and co-founder Eva Chen has been at the forefront of industry leading technology innovation and collaborative success at Trend Micro. Among other things during that time, we’ve released:

  • The world’s first hardware-based system lockdown technology (StationLock)
  • Innovative internet gateway virus protection (InterScan VirusWall)
  • The industry’s first two-hour virus response service-level agreement
  • The first integrated physical-virtual security offering, with agentless threat protection for virtualized desktops (VDI) and data centers (Deep Security)
  • The first ever mobile app reputation service (MARS)
  • AI-based writing-style analysis for protection from Business Email Compromise (Writing Style DNA)
  • Cross-layer detection and response for endpoint, email, servers, & network combined (XDR)
  • Broadest cloud security platform as a service (Cloud One)

Two awards

We’re delighted to have been singled out for two prestigious awards at the Microsoft Security 20/20 event, which will kick off RSA Conference this year:

Customer Impact

At Trend Micro, the customer is at the heart of everything we do. It’s the reason we have hundreds of researchers across 15 threat centers around the globe leading the fight against emerging black hat tools and techniques. It’s why we partner with leading technology providers like Microsoft. And it’s why the channel is so important for us.

Industry Changemaker: Eva Chen

It goes without saying that our CEO and co-founder is an inspirational figure within Trend Micro. Her vision and strong belief that our only real competition as cybersecurity vendors are the bad guys and that the industry needs to stand united against them to make the digital world a safer place, guides the over 6000 employees every day. But she’s also had a major impact on the industry at large, working tirelessly over the years to promote initiatives that have ultimately made our connected world more secure. It’s not an exaggeration to say that without Eva’s foresight and dedication, the cybersecurity industry would be a much poorer place.

We’re all looking forward to the event, and for the start of 2020. As we enter a new decade, Trend Micro’s innovation and passion to make the digital world a safer place has never been more important.

 

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