Chaining 3 CVEs to exfiltrate sensitive ERP data.

I registered an expired DMARC reporting domain (gca-emailauth[.]org) for $10. It had been published as the aggregate-reporting address in Global Cyber Alliance DMARC training docs going back to a 2019 bootcamp, and at some point it lapsed.

Shortly after registration, aggregate DMARC reports for 86 domains across 20+ organizations started arriving.

56 belonged to The Toro Company (NYSE-listed), including myturf[.]com, their distributor platform, which sits at p=none. The rest - University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point (14 subdomains), the North Carolina School of Science and Mathematics, Ennis ISD (Texas), Great Prairie AEA (an Iowa education agency serving 35,000 students), two county governments, and several commercial domains.

For most of these it was a second rua address sitting behind a working commercial processor (Proofpoint, in Toro's case). Reports still arrived at the primary.

GCA's engineers later traced it to a former partner who'd held the domain and let it lapse - the dependency was never written down.

As of my last sweep, 65 of the 86 still publish the endpoint. We disclosed to everyone whose reports we were receiving; only 21 domains stopped publishing the endpoint, and almost nobody replied.

After 8 months of owning the domain, we coordinated a transfer back to GCA.

Author here. We discovered a vulnerability in docker cp that allows a malicious container to create or overwrite files on the machine running the Docker CLI.

The exploit combines a filesystem race in Docker’s archive creation with unsafe symlink handling during extraction. Depending on the CLI user’s privileges, this can lead to developer-account compromise or root code execution. Docker confirmed that sbx cp was also affected.

Fixed versions:

• Docker Engine/CLI 29.7.2+
• Docker Desktop 4.86.0+
• Docker Sandboxes 0.38.0+

Happy to answer technical questions.

While working through a kernel exploit chain on Windows 11, I noticed that a stack pivot into user-mode memory didn't trigger SMAP.

I wrote up three experiments to figure out why. Short version: the normal syscall entry path arrives with RFLAGS.AC=1. SMAP is effectively disabled for any code reached through a standard IOCTL dispatch. This aligns with what MSRC documented back in 2020 (the Windows kernel simply wasn't built with SMAP in mind, and retrofitting it would touch ~2,900 locations: here)

My conclusion isn't novel here. It's just an experimental confirmation of the architectural compromise on current builds. I just wanted to shine the light on this blind spot.

Hunt.io researchers analyzed two open directories recovered through Attack Capture system and reconstructed the tooling one operator used to find, exploit, and view internet-exposed cameras in Ukraine.

Technical highlights:

• A custom FastAPI/Docker project the operator named camview, which wraps the open-source Ingram scanner, brute-forces camera credentials over HTTP and RTSP (3,811 pair dictionary), and transcodes RTSP to MJPEG for browser viewing
• Ingram targets known camera CVEs: CVE-2017-7921 and CVE-2021-36260 (Hikvision), CVE-2021-33044/33045 (Dahua), CVE-2020-25078 (D-Link), CVE-2020-25169 (Reolink)
• The operator's logs recorded live viewing sessions from 58 Ukrainian cameras, with session lengths, frame counts, and frame rates
• A proxy script authenticated to a compromised OpenCart admin panel and relayed the operator's traffic through the victim network
• A second, separately operated directory was linked only by the same Ingram scanner. It chained TP-Link Archer CVEs (CVE-2024-53375, CVE-2024-57049) and MikroTik API brute-forcing to turn edge devices into SOCKS5 proxies reporting to a chisel listener on port 4444

No state attribution. Full analysis, IOCs, and ATT&CK mapping in the writeup

Evil Fonts deceive a viewer by rendering a different letter than is actually on the disk. Evil Fonts can poison HTML, DOCX, PDFs, and anywhere else you can bring your own fonts. Works great in Windows corporate networks for bypassing security tooling, initial access through JavaScript free click fix (beats mitm web security tooling), and leaving traps around the network to harvest shells.

Imagine thinking you are copying whoami but what is actually on the disk is rm -rf \~

Demos:

(Use desktop)

https://doctoreww.github.io/EvilFontTool/

For the demos, copy and paste the HTML/DOCX to a notepad to remove the evil fonts. For the AI ones imagine your security tooling inspects the benign text on disk, but shows the obviously malicious extortion to the user.

Labs:

https://github.com/DoctorEww/EvilFontTool/blob/main/labs%2FREADME.md

Lab Walkthrough:

https://github.com/DoctorEww/EvilFontTool/blob/main/labs%2Fwalkthrough.md

Some evil font uses:

Tamper homework to make it so students poison AI queries

Poison help desk documentation

Bypass email filters

Clickfix

Beat resume AI filters

I recently analyzed a multi-stage PowerShell payload delivery chain involving heavily obfuscated PowerShell loaders and remotely hosted payloads.

The analysis covers PowerShell deobfuscation, hidden execution, Base64/XOR decoding, a decoy “Verification complete!” prompt, payload delivery, and IOCs.

Initial indicators:

203[.]188[.]171[.]166
dorenzaa[.]com

Hey everyone, I'm OP here so feel free to ask questions

Write once, shell everywhere. Sun Microsystems didn't mean it like this.

Talk from today at DEF CON's Bug Bounty Village. Full technique catalog graded for distroless containers, an errno path oracle for black-box target fingerprinting, and three minimal-guessing techniques: bash fd/255, Rails schema_cache.yml deserialization, and a Node.js worker path overwrite without process restart.

Yes, given that the legacy SCT protocol has known security vulnerabilities such as sctphantom, the industry strongly recommends deprecating it and migrating to more secure modern standards to ensure system security.

The meetingscollection has no tenant isolation. Any authenticated tl;dv user can query every meeting across every account on the platform. Each meeting record hands you the creator's email address, the conference ID (which is a joinable Google Meet or Teams room), the provider, the recording status, and timestamps.

I queried the Firestore meetings collection and saw there were 181,874 meeting records belonging to 84,312 unique users across 35,003 email domains.

ByteRay researchers have published a blog on a set of vulnerabilities they are calling TrustFall, and the findings land hard for any company that treats the Trusted Execution Environment as the part of a device you do not have to worry about.

OP-TEE is the walled-off Secure World that phones, TVs, cars, and industrial gear lean on to guard keys, DRM, and identity, and the whole point of paying for that hardware isolation is the promise that even a compromised operating system cannot reach inside.

TrustFall shows that promise was not as solid as buyers assumed. The researchers found several flaws that let the untrusted side reach into or knock over the Secure World, which is exactly the outcome the design exists to prevent. The bugs have since been fixed upstream, so patched builds are available, but the uncomfortable takeaway for vendors is that the vault they were told to trust had a way in, and "it runs in the TEE" is no longer an answer on its own.