An operator left their full working directory exposed on an open HTTP server. Hunt.io crawled it, 2,616 files, and rebuilt the campaign from the corpus.

• Three exploitation paths in parallel: an asyncio credential brute-forcer, a CVE-2021-33044/33045 auth-bypass chain, and P2P relay abuse reaching cameras by serial number
• The relay path never authenticates the connecting party, only the session, via a cloud-issued token obtainable with the fixed SDK credentials in every Dahua client
• Two CVE labels in the tooling don't hold up: CVE-2024-39943 is an unrelated Rejetto HFS flaw, and CVE-2025-31702 is a narrower post-auth case, not the unauthenticated relay abuse (that path is a separate non-CVE issue documented by ITRES)
• Full PTCP tunnel breakdown, including the Inverted STUN packet and the bind-to-127.0.0.1 technique

Neutral attribution throughout, the corpus shows how the operation was built and run, not who ran it.

Check the full breakdown, IOCs and mitigation strategies:
https://hunt.io/blog/operation-cameraswarm-dahua-cameras-compromised

Hunt.io researchers analyzed two open directories recovered through Attack Capture system and reconstructed the tooling one operator used to find, exploit, and view internet-exposed cameras in Ukraine.

Technical highlights:

• A custom FastAPI/Docker project the operator named camview, which wraps the open-source Ingram scanner, brute-forces camera credentials over HTTP and RTSP (3,811 pair dictionary), and transcodes RTSP to MJPEG for browser viewing
• Ingram targets known camera CVEs: CVE-2017-7921 and CVE-2021-36260 (Hikvision), CVE-2021-33044/33045 (Dahua), CVE-2020-25078 (D-Link), CVE-2020-25169 (Reolink)
• The operator's logs recorded live viewing sessions from 58 Ukrainian cameras, with session lengths, frame counts, and frame rates
• A proxy script authenticated to a compromised OpenCart admin panel and relayed the operator's traffic through the victim network
• A second, separately operated directory was linked only by the same Ingram scanner. It chained TP-Link Archer CVEs (CVE-2024-53375, CVE-2024-57049) and MikroTik API brute-forcing to turn edge devices into SOCKS5 proxies reporting to a chisel listener on port 4444

No state attribution. Full analysis, IOCs, and ATT&CK mapping in the writeup

Caught this in three open directories on a Hong Kong server, exposed July 9 to 13. The agent is Hermes, open source, and the recovered logs show it running LinPEAS and walking a ministry web root without a human in the loop. Target was Thailand's Ministry of Finance.