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Sinkholing CountLoader: Insights into Its Recent Campaign

13 May 2026 at 10:00

Authored by Harshil Patel and Sakshi Jaiswal 

McAfee Labs has recently uncovered a large scale CountLoader campaign that uses multiple layers of obfuscation and staged payload delivery to evade detection and maintain persistence in infected systems. The infection process relies on several layers of loaders, including PowerShell scripts, obfuscated JavaScript executed through mshta.exe, and in memory shellcode injection, each stage decrypting and launching the next. The attackers employ a custom encrypted communication protocol to interact with their C2 servers. By registering a backup domain used by the malware, we were able to sinkhole the traffic and observe thousands of infected machines connecting to the C2 infrastructure. Final payload deployed in this campaign is a cryptocurrency clipper, which monitors clipboard activity and replaces copied wallet addresses with attacker controlled ones to redirect cryptocurrency transactions. 

Sinkholing 

Sinkholing is a defensive technique in which researchers take control of malicious domains or infrastructure used by malware. Instead of allowing infected systems to communicate with attacker controlled C2 servers, the traffic is redirected to a researcher controlled server. This approach enables researchers to monitor infected hosts, collect telemetry, measure the scale and spread of a campaign. 

Key Findings 

  • McAfee researchers identified a large-scale CountLoader campaign using multi-stage payload delivery and heavy obfuscation techniques. 
  • Researchers successfully sinkholed malware communication using a backup C2 domain, enabling visibility into the campaign’s infrastructure and infected hosts. 
  • The sinkhole received approximately 5,000 connections per minute from infected systems. 
  • Telemetry collected during the investigation revealed around 86,000 unique infected machines. 
  • The malware also spreads through USB drives, with approximately 9,000 infections attributed to removable media. 
  • The final payload deployed in this campaign is cryptocurrency clipper malware that hijacks clipboard data to redirect cryptocurrency transactions. 

C2 Sinkholing and Geographical Prevalence  

As the malware contacts the C2 servers in the reverse order and only hell1-kitty[.]cc was used by attackers, we were able to register hell10-kitty[.]cc and were able to gain insights into the campaign. 

Figure 3 : Sinkholing malware communication
Figure 1: Sinkholing malware communication

On average, around 5,000 infected clients contacted our server every minute. 

In total, we observed approximately 86,000 unique infections. 

Telemetry collected revealed that this CountLoader campaign has a broad global footprint. The highest number of infections were observed in India, followed by Indonesia, the United States, and several countries across Southeast Asia. 

Figure 2 : Global distribution of CountLoader infections.
Figure 2: Global distribution of CountLoader infections.

Conclusion 

CountLoader is a multistage malware loader that uses obfuscated JavaScript and trusted Windows utilities to deliver additional payloads. It ensures persistence via scheduled tasks and uses multiple fallback C2 domains to maintain reliability. Malware employs in-memory execution and security bypass techniques to evade detection.  

In recent campaigns, it has been observed deploying cryptocurrency clipper malware to silently hijack transactions.  

McAfee Researchers identified a flaw in its communication mechanism and were able to exploit it to gain insights into the campaign. 

Technical Analysis 

The following diagram illustrates the complete infection chain used in this CountLoader campaign, from the initial execution to the deployment of the final payload. 

Figure 3 : Infection Chain
Figure 3: Infection Chain

The infection begins when an EXE file is executed. This file launches a PowerShell command, which downloads and executes an obfuscated JavaScript loader known as CountLoader. The loader is executed using mshta.exe, a legitimate Windows utility often abused by malware to run scripts. 

Once executed, it performs several tasks: 

  • Establishes persistence by creating a scheduled task that runs every 30 minutes. 
  • Contacts multiple C2 servers, trying them in reverse order until a connection is successful. 
  • Attempts to spread via USB drives by replacing files with malicious LNK shortcuts that execute the malware when opened. 
  • Wait for the C2 server to issue commands to download and execute payloads. 

The payload execution chain consists of several stages: 

Launcher: A secondary JavaScript component creates another scheduled task that runs every 60 minutes, ensuring long term persistence. 

PowerShell Packer: The launcher executes an obfuscated PowerShell script that acts as a packer. This script decrypts and launches the next stage. 

Injector: The next PowerShell stage disables security mechanisms such as AMSI and injects shellcode into a legitimate process. 

Shellcode Execution: The injected shellcode unpacks the final payload directly in memory. 

Final Payload: The final payload is executed under the process systeminfo.exe. In this campaign, the deployed payload was identified as a cryptocurrency clipper malware, which monitors clipboard activity and replaces copied cryptocurrency wallet addresses with attacker controlled addresses. 

Stage 1 Exe 

The infection chain begins with the execution of a malicious EXE file, it immediately runs a PowerShell one-liner as shown in the below image. 

Example of the execution chain

Stage 2 – PowerShell 

The PowerShell script fetched from the URL decodes a Base64-encoded string and executes the resulting content. It also employs an unusual obfuscation technique, where the variable names are crafted to resemble the highlighted pattern, making the script harder to read and analyze.

Power Shell

Multiple such variables are used to create a complete base64 string which is then decoded and executed through Invoke-Expression. 

Payload 2

Stage 3 – CountLoader 

The file is a HTA file with JavaScript that uses string obfuscation technique to evade detection. 

Countloader

It starts by hiding the mshta window to ensure that the malicious activity runs silently in the background without alerting the user. 

The script then attempts to delete its own file in case it was executed locally. If the script determines that it is not being executed from a URL, it terminates immediately.  

Countlaoder 2

Then the script tries to contact C2 serversiterating through the list in reverse order.

Countloader 3

Figure 4: C2 communication protocol.
Figure 4: C2 communication protocol.

A handshake process is performed to verify connectivity with the server. The client sends an encrypted “checkStatus” message, and the server responds with an encrypted “success” message if the connection is valid 

All communications between the client and the server are encrypted, with slightly different encryption schemes used for each direction: 

  1. Client to Server:  text → (key+(base64encode(utf16le(xor(text, key))))) 
  2. Server to Client:  text → (key+(base64encode(xor(text, key)))) 

The key is a randomly generated six digit number created for each message. 

The key is a randomly generated six digit number created for each message. If the handshake is successful, the corresponding domain is selected as the active C2 server, which is used for all subsequent communications. 

To maintain persistence on the infected system, the malware creates a scheduled task if one does not already exist. 

To maintain persistence on the infected system, the malware creates a scheduled task if one does not already exist.

The scheduled task command line is slightly different if it detects CrowdStrike or Reason AV installed on the system, likely as an attempt to evade detection from these AVs. 

After establishing persistence, the malware gets a JWT token from the C2 server, which is used to authenticate further requests. 

The get_jwt_token function sends system information about the infected host to the server.

The get_jwt_token function sends system information about the infected host to the server.

This includes details related to cryptocurrency usage, such as installed wallets and browser extensions, allowing the attackers to determine whether the victim is likely involved with cryptocurrency.

This includes details related to cryptocurrency usage, such as installed wallets and browser extensions, allowing the attackers to determine whether the victim is likely involved with cryptocurrency. 

Finally, the malware gets commands from the C2 server, which is then executed on the compromised system. 

command from the C2 server

Each command contains a taskType value that determines the action to be performed on the infected system. 

The table below shows the command codes and their actions. 

Code   Command 
1  execute exe file 
2  execute python file 
3  execute dll file 
4  uninstall itself 
5  send domain info to C2 
6  execute msi file 
9  spread by infecting usb files 
10  execute HTA file 
11  execute powershell file 

We observed two commands from the above list being sent to the malware as highlighted below: 

Spreading via USB drives (taskType – 9) 

When instructed by the C2 server to spread via USB drives, the malware replaces certain file types on all connected external drives with LNK shortcut files. These shortcuts are crafted so that when a user opens them, the malware executes while simultaneously opening the original file to avoid suspicion. 

Targeted file types are  exe , pdf , doc and docx. 

The build ID of the malware is appended with “_usb”. 

The build ID of the malware is appended with “_usb”.

Deploying payload using powershell (taskType – 11) 

The CountLoader is capable of running many types of executable files, In this campaign, it deploys a separate execution chain that ultimately leads to a clipper malware. 

CountLoader launches the next stage using the following command line: 

CountLoader launches the next stage using the following command line:

Payload Launcher 

The Payload Launcher is very similar to CountLoader in terms of both functionality and obfuscation techniques. 

However, unlike CountLoader, which retrieves tasks from the C2 server, the launcher contains hard-coded task information. 

For persistence, it creates a scheduled task which executes "mshata.exe {domain}/{name}" every 60 minutes.

For persistence, it creates a scheduled task which executes  “mshata.exe {domain}/{name} every 60 minutes. 

For persistence, it creates a scheduled task which executes  "mshata.exe {domain}/{name}" every 60 minutes. 

In the task configuration: 

“url” specifies the url of the payload. 

“taskType” is set to 11, indicating that the payload should be executed as a PowerShell script. 

"taskType" is set to 11, indicating that the payload should be executed as a PowerShell script.

Powershell Packer 

The PowerShell script executed by the launcher acts as a simple packer. It is obfuscated using the same obfuscation technique mentioned earlier. Its primary function is to decrypt and execute another PowerShell script. 

Powershell Packer

Injector 

The next stage is another PowerShell script responsible for injecting shellcode into a running process. 

Before performing the injection, the script disables AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) using script from GitHub – S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Amsi-Bypass-Powershell.  

powershell script

After disabling AMSI, the script executes code that performs shellcode injection, 

After disabling AMSI, the script executes code that performs shellcode injection,

And injects in one of these legitimate processes: 

And injects in one of these legitimate processes:

Shellcode 

The injected shellcode unpacks and loads the final payload directly into memory, 

Final Payload 

The payload observed in this campaign is a clipper malware. This type of malware changes cryptocurrency address in clipboard to that of attacker’s when user copies any address. 

It starts by fetching the C2 server address, which it gets by a technique called EtherHiding, where the C2 server address is fetched from Ethereum blockchain. 

It starts by fetching the C2 server address, which it gets by a technique called EtherHiding, where the C2 server address is fetched from Ethereum blockchain.

Once the C2 server address is obtained, the malware begins reporting system activity to the server. 

It then continuously monitors the clipboard contents. 

Once the C2 server address is obtained, the malware begins reporting system activity to the server. It then continuously monitors the clipboard contents.

It then continuously monitors the clipboard contents.

McAfee Coverage 

McAfee provides extensive coverage against CountLoader:  

Trojan:Script/CountLoader4.DES
Trojan:Script/JSBackdoor.HELK!2
Trojan:Shortcut/LNKDownloader.HK
Trojan:Shortcut/Worm.HELK
Trojan:Script/ObfuPS.HELK
Trojan:Script/AMSIBypass.STS!1
Ti!5F9FF671955A
Ti!DC602CB53A9C

Indicators Of Compromise 

 IOC   
EXE (stage 1)  5f9ff671955a6d551595f9838aed063c496da5039be0d222fe84f96cb3e1d32a 
PS url (stage 2)  https://memory-scanner[.]cc/Presentation[.]pdf 
PS (stage 2)  3c278499c5e3ced3bf1a6a7287808c5267075f1dec0aa5c7be2c4c444f33f2bc 
CountLoader download URLs  https://memory-scanner[.]cc/ 
https://hell1-kitty[.]cc/update1_usb_usb_usb[.]VOcx4wEV8 
CountLoader v3.3  c68e436d4cb984db026210806f50d0c81eec5f6e4860197dab91fab6f31ef796 
CountLoader v4.1  e2faad8111e7d47349cbc549b85e62231b8678057906bc813aad7242fa95ae63 
e5e1d8ec4cd109df290752ee3d4b2cbc9de6df4360e9983548f1bc6b1d088540 
CountLoader C2 Domains  hell1-kitty[.]cc 
alphazero1-endscape[.]cc 
api-microservice-us1[.]com 
bucket-aws-s1[.]com 
bucket-aws-s2[.]com 
fileless-storage-s3[.]cc 
globalsnn1-new[.]cc 
globalsnn2-new[.]cc 
globalsnn3-new[.]cc 
handle-me-sv1[.]com 
hardware-office[.]cc 
health-smooth-eu1[.]com 
health-smooth-eu2[.]com 
health-smooth-eu3[.]com 
holiday-updateservice[.]com 
memory-protection-layer1[.]cc 
memory-protection-layer2[.]cc 
microservice-update-s1-bucket[.]cc 
microservice-update-s2-bucket[.]cc 
my-smart-house1[.]com 
polystore9-servicebucket[.]cc 
s3-updatehub[.]cc 
usb lnk files  10593dbe9edfde7943fdaadd7882f190216b2f6502667daf701088a6e810deaf 
0a69a9cc75d65774e5eb90a4a739bd4335d33b176dc4923acb691bd45af66bdf 
27c6a6bda2c0ef3ecb78dad9c6bb7c3abaf2e32b3ad96f372a0102c0c9c0f08d 
2cd449f1bb24f05d2e240812a74bd62f2583bbbe4d0ccc9ae5736240e29a0068 
30dcd5c71beb76d2f8df768d5fd9e9145cb8fbbfc951a63b969d26d3b64002b9 
dd4c7f5aae404816cf447b8090b620c1a1971a35c6791116aa3f871f00ae011b 
42a1fc74334c9a3b8720c79df55f84c7398bd31609eb10581e8c7155835498e3 
9c0d334aac5a6f66016dc5ce8df75c46d519a4e6d16c68cf2b1405c81189186d 
44f6313e9542c0d51937a70160fe4137012905d8c79ad27ccc0021788ecfaa4e 
payload launcher url  https://hell1-kitty[.]cc/gamecenter[.]fileManager 
https://hardware-office[.]cc/foundation[.]halflife 
payload launcher  cbdfb46b9265a3dfb3bc6b0aade472dde28b1660dbd3ded3b67b1530b4497cca 
packer url  http://45[.]156[.]87[.]118:3015/select 
http://45[.]156[.]87[.]62:3443/production 
http://104[.]253[.]1[.]137/content 
packer  4a5e1d6ee1217e1fbacf54fc6017fbf9d24a25078266b02358d56a9c7437ceb7 
injector  05becb67d8bf1e49fcfccb0d346b82368a2b1c2bf07316078c364c7b020154de 
shellcode  44daa1b68737b55a711963eec211c7c018bcba4cb6d68c286a4b45ea781a7d73 
payload  dc602cb53a9c24abfcdaadf0ca8256b5fb5cac6d91d20ed8431bdaaf51c0cafe 
payload C2  https://edr-security-bucket1[.]cc/ 

The post Sinkholing CountLoader: Insights into Its Recent Campaign appeared first on McAfee Blog.

Foxconn Ransomware Attack Shows Nothing Is Safe Forever

12 May 2026 at 21:52
Famous for helping build Apple’s iPhones, Foxconn just suffered another cyberattack, highlighting the perils of warehousing some of the world’s most valuable data.

Patch Tuesday, May 2026 Edition

12 May 2026 at 21:46

Artificial intelligence platforms may be just as susceptible to social engineering as human beings, but they are proving remarkably good at finding security vulnerabilities in human-made computer code. That reality is on full display this month with some of the more widely-used software makers — including Apple, Google, Microsoft, Mozilla and Oracle — fixing near record volumes of security bugs, and/or quickening the tempo of their patch releases.

As it does on the second Tuesday of every month, Microsoft today released software updates to address at least 118 security vulnerabilities in its various Windows operating systems and other products. Remarkably, this is the first Patch Tuesday in nearly two years that Microsoft is not shipping any fixes to deal with emergency zero-day flaws that are already being exploited. Nor have any of the flaws fixed today been previously disclosed (potentially giving attackers a heads up in how to exploit the weakness).

Sixteen of the vulnerabilities earned Microsoft’s most-dire “critical” label, meaning malware or miscreants could abuse these bugs to seize remote control over a vulnerable Windows device with little or no help from the user. Rapid7 has done much of the heavy lifting in identifying some of the more concerning critical weaknesses this month, including:

  • CVE-2026-41089: A critical stack-based buffer overflow in Windows Netlogon that offers an attacker SYSTEM privileges on the domain controller. No privileges or user interaction are required, and attack complexity is low. Patches are available for all versions of Windows Server from 2012 onwards.
  • CVE-2026-41096: A critical RCE in the Windows DNS client implementation worthy of attention despite Microsoft assessing exploitation as less likely.
  • CVE-2026-41103: A critical elevation of privilege vulnerability that allows an unauthorized attacker to impersonate an existing user by presenting forged credentials, thus bypassing Entra ID. Microsoft expects that exploitation is more likely.

May’s Patch Tuesday is a welcome respite from April, which saw Microsoft fix a near-record 167 security flaws. Microsoft was among a few dozen tech giants given access to a “Project Glasswing,” a much-hyped AI capability developed by Anthropic that appears quite effective at unearthing security vulnerabilities in code.

Apple, another early participant in Project Glasswing, typically fixes an average of 20 vulnerabilities each time it ships a security update for iOS devices, said Chris Goettl, vice president of product management at Ivanti. On May 11, Apple shipped updates to address at least 52 vulnerabilities and backported the changes all the way to iPhone 6s and iOS 15.

Last month, Mozilla released Firefox 150, which resolved a whopping 271 vulnerabilities that were reportedly discovered during the Glasswing evaluation.

“Since Firefox 150.0.0 released, they have been on a more aggressive weekly cadence for security updates including the release of Firefox 150.0.3 on May Patch Tuesday resolving between three to five CVEs in each release,” Goettl said.

The software giant Oracle likewise recently increased its patch pace in response to their work with Glasswing. In its most recent quarterly patch update, Oracle addressed at least 450 flaws, including more than 300 fixes for remotely exploitable, unauthenticated flaws. But at the end of April, Oracle announced it was switching to a monthly update cycle for critical security issues.

On May 8, Google started rolling out updates to its Chrome browser that fixed an astonishing 127 security flaws (up from just 30 the previous month). Chrome automagically downloads available security updates, but installing them requires fully restarting the browser.

If you encounter any weirdness applying the updates from Microsoft or any other vendor mentioned here, feel free to sound off in the comments below. Meantime, if you haven’t backed up your data and/or drive lately, doing that before updating is generally sound advice. For a more granular look at the Microsoft updates released today, checkout this inventory by the SANS Internet Storm Center.

Iran Is Using Tiny ‘Mosquito’ Boats to Shut Down the Strait of Hormuz

12 May 2026 at 19:06
Iran’s traditional naval fleet has been almost completely destroyed by US-Israeli raids. But Iran’s military has put a fleet of small vessels on the water that is crippling every passageway.

The New Grad’s Guide to Job and Recruitment Scams

12 May 2026 at 12:10
blogging on social media

Graduation season should be about launching your career, not dodging scams.

But for many new grads, the job search now comes with a hidden risk: fake recruiters, fraudulent job offers, and convincing messages designed to steal money, personal information, or both.

The threat is larger than many people realize. According to McAfee’s 2026 State of the Scamiverse report, 76% of Americans have encountered a scam, and the average person receives 14 scam messages every day through text, email, and social media. Americans now spend an estimated 114 hours each year trying to figure out what is real online and what is not.

Young adults are among the most heavily targeted groups. Nearly 3 in 10 people ages 18 to 24 (28%) report receiving conversational scams that begin with casual outreach such as “Hey, how are you?” or a “wrong number” text. Those same tactics increasingly appear in fake recruiter messages, LinkedIn outreach, and texts promoting remote job opportunities.

Today’s job scams can look highly professional. Scammers build polished LinkedIn profiles, clone legitimate company websites, and even use AI-generated interviews to appear credible. Many scams unfold quickly, with nearly half completed in less than an hour, creating pressure to act before candidates have time to verify what is real.

That’s where tools like McAfee’s Scam Detector come in—flagging suspicious emails, texts, links, and messages before you engage, so you can tell what’s real before you click. 

Here’s how to avoid job scams and stay safe with McAfee: 

How Job Scams Actually Work

Step

What Happens

Red Flags

What Scammers Want

1. The Outreach

You’re contacted via email, text, or social media about a job

Unsolicited offer, vague role, overly enthusiastic recruiter

Your attention

2. The Build-Up

They walk you through interviews or onboarding steps

No video calls, inconsistent details, fast timeline

Your trust

3. The Ask

They request personal info or payment

SSN requests, bank info, “training fees”

Identity + money

4. The Trap

They escalate the situation or disappear

More payment requests or sudden silence

Continued financial gain

A Real Example: How People Get Pulled In

Even experienced professionals fall for these scams.

In one case, a tech expert with decades of experience lost $13,000 after accepting what looked like a legitimate part-time role reviewing products.

The opportunity seemed real:

  • A polished website
  • Structured onboarding
  • A small initial payout

Then came the shift. He was told he needed to deposit money to continue working and kept paying more to “unlock” earnings that never came.

This type of advance fee scam is increasingly common in job fraud, and it works because it builds trust first.

What the Data Says

Recent graduates are entering the workforce at a time when scams are more sophisticated, more personalized, and harder to spot than ever before. McAfee’s 2026 State of the Scamiverse report highlights why younger job seekers should be especially cautious.

Young Adults Face Higher Risk

  • Younger adults report the highest rates of repeat scam victimization. McAfee’s research found that scam victims under 35 are more likely than older adults to be targeted again, suggesting that early-career professionals may be especially vulnerable as they navigate job searches, salaries, and onboarding for the first time.

Scam Messages Are Constant

  • Americans receive 14 scam messages per day on average.
  • 76% of Americans say they have encountered an online scam.
  • People spend 114 hours per year, nearly three full workweeks, trying to determine what is real and what is fake online.

Professional Platforms Are Not Immune

  • 7% of respondents reported encountering scams on LinkedIn.
  • 44% have replied to suspicious messages that contained no link at all.

Many modern scams begin with a simple message such as “I came across your profile” or “We’d like to discuss an opportunity,” rather than an obviously suspicious URL.

Job Scams Move Fast

  • The average scam unfolds in just 38 minutes.

Scammers often create urgency by claiming a role is limited, an offer will expire quickly, or onboarding must begin immediately.

AI Makes Fake Recruiters More Convincing

  • 35% of Americans are not confident they can spot deepfake scams.
  • McAfee predicts job scams will become increasingly personalized as scammers use AI to create tailored outreach, onboarding documents, and contracts that closely match a candidate’s background.

Job Scams Are a Growing Financial Threat

  • FTC-reported job scam losses rose nearly 40% year over year, increasing from $543 million in 2024 to $752 million in 2025.

For new graduates eager to land their first job, the lesson is simple: if an opportunity seems rushed, asks for money, or feels too good to be true, take a step back and verify before you respond.

Where McAfee Comes In

Job scams don’t just happen in one moment. They unfold in stages—first a message, then a conversation, then a request for information or money.

That’s why protection needs to work the same way: across the entire experience. McAfee’s comprehensive protection helps you stay ahead of job scams at every step:

McAfee+ Advanced gives you multiple layers working together so you are not left figuring it out after the damage is done:

  • Identity Monitoring alerts you if your personal info shows up where it should not, so you can act fast
  • Personal Data Cleanup helps remove your information from data broker sites, making you harder to target in the first place
  • Scam Detector flags suspicious texts, emails, links, and even deepfake videos before you engage
  • Safe Browsing helps block risky sites if you do click
  • Device Security helps detect malicious apps or downloads
  • Secure VPN keeps your data private, especially on public Wi-Fi   

The Biggest Red Flags to Watch For

These patterns show up again and again in job scams:

Red Flag

What It Looks Like

Why It’s a Problem

What to Do Instead

Requests for Sensitive Information Too Early

Asked for your Social Security number, banking info, or ID details early in the process

Scammers use this to steal your identity or access your accounts

Only share sensitive info after accepting a verified job—and through secure onboarding systems

You’re Asked to Pay to Work

Fees for training, equipment, onboarding, or background checks

Legitimate employers don’t charge candidates to get hired

Walk away immediately—this is one of the clearest signs of a scam

The Job Sounds Too Good to Be True

High pay, low hours, minimal experience required, vague responsibilities

Designed to hook attention and lower your guard

Research typical salaries and ask detailed questions about the role

The Hiring Process Moves Too Fast

Immediate job offers or rushed decisions without interviews

Real hiring processes involve multiple steps and evaluations

Be cautious of offers that skip standard hiring steps

No Real Interaction

Communication only via email or chat, refusal to do video or phone calls

Scammers avoid real-time interaction to stay anonymous

Request a video call or verify the recruiter through official company channels

How to Protect Yourself

You don’t need to overcomplicate it. Stick to a few grounded habits:

  • Verify the company independently: Search the company, check official sites, confirm recruiter identities
  • Keep communication on trusted platforms: Be cautious with offers coming from unexpected channels
  • Never pay upfront for a job: That’s a dealbreaker
  • Pause before sharing personal information: Especially early in the process
  • Use tools that flag risks automatically: Scam Detector helps catch what looks legitimate, but isn’t

What to Do If You Think It’s a Scam

If something feels off:

  • Stop communication immediately
  • Do not send money or personal information
  • Report the scam to the FTC
  • Monitor your accounts for suspicious activity

If you’ve already shared sensitive information, act quickly to secure your accounts.

With McAfee’s comprehensive protection, you’re not left to figure it out on your own.

From blocking risky links to monitoring your identity and helping you respond quickly, it’s designed to help you stay one step ahead, and recover faster if needed. Because job searching is stressful enough without scammers, and you deserve to land your next job with confidence.

The post The New Grad’s Guide to Job and Recruitment Scams appeared first on McAfee Blog.

Welcoming the Bangladesh Government to Have I Been Pwned

11 May 2026 at 22:27
Welcoming the Bangladesh Government to Have I Been Pwned

Today, we welcome the 43rd government onboarded to Have I Been Pwned's free gov service, Bangladesh. The BGD e-GOV CIRT department now has full access to query all their government domains via API, and monitor them against future breaches.

Welcoming the Bangladesh Government to Have I Been Pwned

Bangladesh joins a growing list of national governments using HIBP to help protect their public sector digital assets, and we look forward to supporting their efforts to identify exposure of government email addresses in data breaches and respond quickly when new incidents appear.

Welcoming the Costa Rican Government to Have I Been Pwned

11 May 2026 at 00:24
Welcoming the Costa Rican Government to Have I Been Pwned

Today, we welcome the 42nd government onboarded to Have I Been Pwned’s free gov service: Costa Rica.

The CSIRT of the Government of Costa Rica now has access to monitor government domains against the data in HIBP. This enables their national cybersecurity incident response team to identify exposure of government email addresses in data breach, support prevention and analysis activities, and respond more quickly when new incidents appear.

Costa Rica’s CSIRT plays a national role in cybersecurity incident response, helping coordinate, analyse, and respond to threats affecting the government and the broader digital ecosystem. We’re very happy to support that mission by providing visibility into breached government accounts and helping them proactively reduce risk across public sector services.

Weekly Update 503

10 May 2026 at 23:52
Weekly Update 503

Well, it's the day before the Instructure "pay or leak" deadline (at least by my Aussie watch), and the company remains removed from the ShinyHunters website. In its place sits a press statement that amounts to "we're not making any statements". So did they pay? And if so, what lofty figure would an incident of this scale command? The lawsuits are already being prepared (search for "instructure class action lawsuit"), so perhaps that will be the catalyst for transparency. What a crazy time.

Weekly Update 503
Weekly Update 503
Weekly Update 503
Weekly Update 503

How to Protect Yourself After the Canvas Education Data Breach + Fake Amazon Recall Texts

8 May 2026 at 12:10

If you have ever checked your child’s grades online, submitted a college paper through a school portal, downloaded homework assignments, or received messages from a teacher through a classroom app, there is a good chance you have used Canvas, a nationwide learning management system that was just in a massive data breach. 

This is exactly the moment McAfee+ Advanced was built for. With our built-in Scam Detector to flag risky links, QR codes, and deepfakes; Identity Monitoring that alerts you when your data appears where it shouldn’t; and Personal Data Cleanup that removes your information from the dark web and data brokers, McAfee+ Advanced is an all-in-one solution for protection after a data breach.

Now let’s get into what you need to know about this breach: 

Who Is Behind the Canvas Breach? 

The ransomware group ShinyHunters is claiming responsibility for the attack. The group alleges it stole roughly 275 million records tied to nearly 9,000 schools and educational institutions worldwide. 

How Did the Canvas Cyberattack Happen? 

Instructure, the company behind Canvas, confirmed a cyber incident affecting its cloud-hosted environment. The attackers later posted claims about the breach on their leak site, where ransomware groups pressure organizations into paying by threatening to release stolen data publicly. 

What Information Was Stolen in the Canvas Breach? 

The stolen data reportedly includes: 

  • Student names  
  • Teacher and staff names  
  • Email addresses  
  • Student IDs  
  • Course and enrollment information  
  • School-related records  

ShinyHunters claims the breach exposed roughly 275 million records and more than 231 million unique email addresses. 

How Could the Canvas Data Breach Impact Families and Students? 

Even if financial information was not exposed, this kind of data can still be extremely valuable to scammers. Criminals can use real school names, real classes, teacher names, and student information to create highly convincing phishing emails, fake school alerts, scholarship scams, tuition scams, or password reset messages. 

A scam message referencing your child’s actual school or assignment is much harder to spot as fake. 

This is what a Canvas message might look like when forwarded to your email inbox. Hackers claim to have millions of these types of messages.
This is what a Canvas message might look like when forwarded to your email inbox. Hackers claim to have millions of these types of messages.

This is a real message from Canvas from a community college professor after yours truly took an anthropology class for fun during the pandemic. It’s full of links to apply for programs and reach out to professors. It has exact details about courses I’ve taken.  

While this correspondence is real, it’s exactly the type of messaging that scammers could fake and replicate, replacing real links with fake “paid” opportunities to pursue degrees.  

Now think of the millions of messages and specific scenarios scammers have access to, to create dubious and convincing scams. That’s why protecting yourself after a breach is key.  

What To Do Right Now 

Here are some actions you can take immediately ot protect yourself after this breach:

  • Change you or your child’s Canvas password immediately, and update any other accounts where they reuse that password 
  • Turn on multi-factor authentication (2FA) on parent and student accounts wherever the school permits it — Instructure’s own post-incident guidance specifically called out enforcing MFA as a recommended precaution 
  • Ask your school what identity protection is being offered if sensitive data was involved 
  • Consider placing a credit freeze on your or your child’s file to block new accounts from being opened in their name 
  • Avoid clicking links in any messages that reference the breach, go directly to the official site instead 

And that, my friends, is issue number one in this week’s This Week in Scams. Let’s get into what else is on our radar in cybersecurity and scam news. 


Fake Amazon Recall Texts Are Targeting Shoppers  

Your phone buzzes. It’s a text from an unknown number, but the message looks official. 

“Dear Amazon Customer, we are writing to inform you that an item from your March 2026 order has been identified for recall.” There’s an order number. A link at the top of the message. A note about quality standards and a refund waiting for you. 

It looks real. It has the Amazon logo, the branded formatting, even a reference to the “Amazon Customer Safety Team.” The only thing it doesn’t have? Any connection to Amazon at all. 

A photo of a scam recall text I received this week. Luckily Scam Detector flags the link as risky if you try to click.
A photo of a scam recall text I received this week. Luckily Scam Detector flags the link as risky if you try to click.

This is a fake Amazon recall scam, and it is making the rounds right now. The goal is to get you to click that link, which takes you to a site designed to harvest your login credentials, payment information, or both.  

If you get a text like this, do not click the link. Go directly to amazon.com in your browser, log in, and check your orders and messages from there. Amazon does not initiate recall or refund processes through unsolicited texts with outside links. 

What Is a Fake Amazon Recall Scam And How Does It Work? 

A fake Amazon recall scam is a text message or email in which criminals impersonate Amazon to convince you that one of your recent orders has been flagged for a product recall. The message directs you to an external link leading to a phishing site designed to steal your Amazon credentials, credit card details, or personal information. 

Red Flags To Watch For 

  • The text comes from an unknown number, not a short code or verified sender 
  • The link goes to a domain that is not amazon.com 
  • The message asks you to complete a refund through an external link 
  • Small typos or awkward phrasing appear in what looks like official communication 
  • The greeting says “Dear Amazon Customer” rather than your actual name 

What To Do If You Get One 

  • Do not click the link 
  • Go to amazon.com directly and check your orders and account notifications 
  • Report the text to Amazon at stop-spoofing@amazon.com 
  • Block the number 

Where McAfee Steps In (So You Don’t Have to Guess)  

Scams today are layered.  A fake email leads to stolen credentials. A breach leads to targeted phishing. And those follow-ups are getting harder to spot.  

With McAfee+ Advanced, multiple layers work together so you’re not left figuring it out after the damage is done: 

  • Identity Monitoring alerts you if your personal info shows up where it should not, so you can act fast  
  • Personal Data Cleanup helps remove your information from sites selling it. 
  • Scam Detector flags suspicious texts, emails, links, QR codes, and even deepfake videos before you engage  
  • Safe Browsing helps block risky sites, even if you do accidentally click  
  • Device Security helps detect malicious apps or downloads  
  • Secure VPN keeps your data private, especially on public Wi-Fi    

McAfee Safety Tips This Week 

Our advice based on this week’s scams and stories: 

  • If your child’s school uses Canvas, update their password now and enable multi-factor authentication if available 
  • Consider a credit freeze for your child’s identity, especially if sensitive identifiers were part of the breach 
  • Never click links in unsolicited texts about refunds, recalls, or account issues — go directly to the official site instead 
  • Treat any message that references your recent orders or personal account details with extra skepticism, even if it looks legitimate 
  • Use Scam Detector to check suspicious links before engaging, and stay alert in the weeks and months after a breach, not just the first few days 

And we’ll be back next week with more scams and cybersecurity news making headlines. 

The post How to Protect Yourself After the Canvas Education Data Breach + Fake Amazon Recall Texts appeared first on McAfee Blog.

The Canvas Hack Is a New Kind of Ransomware Debacle

8 May 2026 at 05:02
Thousands of schools around the US were paralyzed on Thursday after education tech firm Instructure shut down access to its Canvas platform following a breach by hackers going by the name ShinyHunters.

Canvas Breach Disrupts Schools & Colleges Nationwide

8 May 2026 at 02:58

An ongoing data extortion attack targeting the widely-used education technology platform Canvas disrupted classes and coursework at school districts and universities across the United States today, after a cybercrime group defaced the service’s login page with a ransom demand that threatened to leak data from 275 million students and faculty across nearly 9,000 educational institutions.

A screenshot shared by a reader showing the extortion message that was shown on the Canvas login page today.

Canvas parent firm Instructure responded to today’s defacement attacks by disabling the platform, which is used by thousands of schools, universities and businesses to manage coursework and assignments, and to communicate with students.

Instructure acknowledged a data breach earlier this week, after the cybercrime group ShinyHunters claimed responsibility and said they would leak data on tens of millions of students and faculty unless paid a ransom. The stated deadline for payment was initially set at May 6, but it was later pushed back to May 12.

In a statement on May 6, Instructure said the investigation so far shows the stolen information includes “certain identifying information of users at affected institutions, such as names, email addresses, and student ID numbers, as well as as messages among users.” The company said it found no evidence the breached data included more sensitive information, such as passwords, dates of birth, government identifiers or financial information.

The May 6 update stated that Canvas was fully operational, and that Instructure was not seeing any ongoing unauthorized activity on their platform. “At this stage, we believe the incident has been contained,” Instructure wrote.

However, by mid-day on Thursday, May 7, students and faculty at dozens of schools and universities were flooding social media sites with comments saying that a ransom demand from ShinyHunters had replaced the usual Canvas login page. Instructure responded by pulling Canvas offline and replacing the portal with the message, “Canvas is currently undergoing scheduled maintenance. Check back soon.”

“We anticipate being up soon, and will provide updates as soon as possible,” reads the current message on Instructure’s status page.

While the data stolen by ShinyHunters may or may not contain particularly sensitive information (ShinyHunters claims it includes several billion private messages among students and teachers, as well as names, phone numbers and email addresses), this attack could hardly have come at a worse time for Instructure: Many of the affected schools and universities are in the middle of final exams, and a prolonged outage could be highly damaging for the company.

The extortion message that greeted countless Canvas users today advised the affected schools to negotiate their own ransom payments to prevent the publication of their data — regardless of whether Instructure decides to pay.

“ShinyHunters has breached Instructure (again),” the extortion message read. “Instead of contacting us to resolve it they ignored us and did some ‘security patches.'”

A source close to the investigation who was not authorized to speak to the press told KrebsOnSecurity that a number of universities have already approached the cybercrime group about paying. The same source also pointed out that the ShinyHunters data leak blog no longer lists Instructure among its current extortion victims, and that the samples of data stolen from Canvas customers were removed as well. Data extortion groups like ShinyHunters will typically only remove victims from their leak sites after receiving an extortion payment or after a victim agrees to negotiate.

Dipan Mann, founder and CEO of the security firm Cloudskope, slammed Instructure for referring to today’s outage as a “scheduled maintenance” event on its status page. Mann said Shiny Hunters first demonstrated they’d breached Instructure on May 1, prompting Instructure’s Chief Information Security Officer Steve Proud to declare the following day that the incident had been contained. But Mann said today’s attack is at least the third time in the past eight months that Instructure has been breached by ShinyHunters.

In a blog post today, Mann noted that in September 2025, ShinyHunters released thousands of internal University of Pennsylvania files — donor records, internal memos, and other confidential materials — through what the Daily Pennsylvanian and other outlets later determined was, in part, a Canvas/Instructure-mediated access path.

“Penn was the named victim,” Mann wrote. “Instructure was the mechanism. The incident was treated as a Penn-specific story by most of the national press and quietly handled by Instructure as a customer-specific matter. That framing was wrong then. It is dramatically more wrong in light of the May 2026 events, which now look like the planned escalation of an attack pattern that ShinyHunters had been working against Instructure’s environment for at least eight months prior. The September 2025 Penn breach was the proof of concept. The May 1, 2026 incident was the production run. The May 7, 2026 recompromise was ShinyHunters demonstrating publicly that the May 2 ‘containment’ did not happen.”

In February, a ShinyHunters spokesperson told The Daily Pennsylvanian that Penn failed to pay a $1 million ransom demand. On March 5, ShinyHunters published 461 megabytes worth of data stolen from Penn, including thousands of files such as donor records and internal memos.

ShinyHunters is a prolific and fluid cybercriminal group that specializes in data theft and extortion. They typically gain access to companies through voice phishing and social engineering attacks that often involve impersonating IT personnel or other trusted members of a targeted organization.

Last month, ShinyHunters relieved the home security giant ADT of personal information on 5.5 million customers. The extortion group told BleepingComputer they breached the company by compromising an employee’s Okta single sign-on account in a voice phishing attack that enabled access to ADT’s Salesforce instance. BleepingComputer says ShinyHunters recently has taken credit for a number of extortion attacks against high-profile organizations, including Medtronic, Rockstar Games, McGraw Hill, 7-Eleven and the cruise line operator Carnival.

The attack on Canvas customers is just one of several major cybercrime campaigns being launched by ShinyHunters at the moment, said Charles Carmakal, chief technology officer at the Google-owned Mandiant Consulting. Carmakal declined to comment specifically on the Canvas breach, but said “there are multiple concurrent and discrete ShinyHunters intrusion and extortion campaigns happening right now.”

Cloudskope’s Mann said what happens next depends largely on whether Instructure’s customers — the universities, K-12 districts, and education ministries paying for Canvas — choose to apply pressure or absorb the breach quietly.

“The history of education-vendor incidents suggests the path of least resistance is the second one,” he concluded.

Update, May 8, 11:05 a.m. ET: Instructure has published an incident update page that includes more information about the breach. Instructure said its Canvas portal is functioning normally again, and that the hackers exploited an issue related to Free-for-Teacher accounts.

“This is the same issue that led to the unauthorized access the prior week,” Instructure wrote. “As a result, we have made the difficult decision to temporarily shut down Free-for-Teacher accounts. These accounts have been a core part of our platform, and we’re committed to resolving the issues with these accounts.”

Instructure said affected organizations were notified on May 6.

“If your organization is affected, Instructure will contact your organization’s primary contacts directly,” the update states. “Please don’t rely on third-party lists or social media posts naming potentially affected organizations as those lists aren’t verified. Instructure will confirm validated information through direct outreach to all affected organizations.”

Update, May 11, 10:16 p.m. ET: Instructure posted an update saying they paid their extortionists in exchange for a promise to destroy the stolen data. “The data was returned to us,” the update reads. “We received digital confirmation of data destruction (shred logs). We have been informed that no Instructure customers will be extorted as a result of this incident, publicly or otherwise.”

How to Disable Google's Gemini in Chrome

7 May 2026 at 20:31
Chrome users were caught off guard by a 4-GB Google AI model baked into Chrome, sparking privacy concerns. The good news: You can easily uninstall it. The bad? You might not want to.

Now Available: Use ChatGPT with McAfee to Spot Scams Faster

7 May 2026 at 11:55

Scam messages are getting smarter and faster. 

According to McAfee’s 2026 State of the Scamiverse report, Americans now spend 114 hours a year trying to figure out what’s real and what’s fake online. That’s nearly three full workweeks lost to second-guessing messages, alerts, and links. 

And when scams do succeed, they move quickly. The typical scam unfolds in about 38 minutes, leaving little room for hesitation. 

That creates a gap: People want to check before they act, but the tools haven’t always met them in that moment. 

ChatGPT + McAfee is designed to close that gap, bringing scam detection directly to a platform people are already using to ask questions and make decisions. 

And it’s available to anyone. You don’t have to be a McAfee subscriber. 

This isn’t just detection. It’s guidance in the exact moment you’re deciding what to do.  

Instead of guessing, you can paste a message or drop in a screenshot and get a clear explanation of what’s riskyand what to do nextpowered by McAfee’s threat intelligence. 

What You Can Do with ChatGPT + McAfee 

With this integration, checking something suspicious becomes as simple as asking a question. 

Paste a message. Drop in a link. Upload a screenshot. 

McAfee analyzes it and explains what’s going on clearly and in context. 

Here’s how it works: 

Feature  What it does  How it protects you 
Link safety check  Paste a suspicious URL and get a reputational analysis based on McAfee threat intelligence  Scam links are often designed to look legitimate. A quick check helps avoid phishing and malware 
Message analysis  Submit texts, emails, or social messages for evaluation  Many scams now rely on urgency and tone. Analysis helps surface subtle red flags 
Screenshot uploads  Upload screenshots of messages, emails, or posts for review  Scams don’t always come as clean text. This makes it easier to check what you’re actually seeing 
Clear explanations  Get a breakdown of why something is flagged as risky or safe  Not just a warning—an explanation that helps you recognize patterns next time 
Guided next steps  Receive recommendations on what to do next  Helps prevent escalation, especially in moments of uncertainty 

It’s a quick, accessible way to get answers in the moment. But it’s just one part of a broader system designed to protect you more comprehensively. 

Add the app to your ChatGPT account here. 

McAfee's ChatGPT extension
McAfee’s ChatGPT extension

Built on McAfee’s Threat Intelligence 

Behind the scenes, ChatGPT + McAfee is powered by the same intelligence that fuels McAfee’s broader scam protection ecosystem. 

When you submit something for review: 

  • Links are checked against known threat signals  
  • Messages are analyzed for scam patterns and language cues  
  • Results are translated into clear, human-readable explanations  

The goal isn’t just to flag risk. It’s to help you understand it. 

A New Way to Stay Ahead of Scams 

Scams aren’t slowing down. If anything, they’re becoming more convincing, more personalized, and harder to detect. 

That’s where ChatGPT + McAfee comes in. But this is only one part of a much bigger system designed to protect you before, during, and after a scam attempt. 

With McAfee+ Advanced, multiple layers work together so you’re not left figuring it out after the damage is done: 

  • Identity Monitoring alerts you if your personal info shows up where it should not, so you can act fast  
  • Personal Data Cleanup helps remove your information from sites selling it. 
  • Scam Detector flags suspicious texts, emails, links, QR codes, and even deepfake videos before you engage  
  • Safe Browsing helps block risky sites, even if you do accidentally click  
  • Device Security helps detect malicious apps or downloads  
  • Secure VPN keeps your data private, especially on public Wi-Fi    

The ChatGPT experience gives you a fast, intuitive way to check something in the moment. 

McAfee+ Advanced makes sure you’re protected across everything else.

The post Now Available: Use ChatGPT with McAfee to Spot Scams Faster appeared first on McAfee Blog.

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