There are reports of OVHcloud-related data being posted on a forum for sale. No official confirmation so far from OVHCloud. Given OVH’s scale, potential impact could be significant depending on scope, especially in Europe

UPDATE: OVHcloud CEO, Octave Klaba has commented that the sample dataset was not found in their system.

The transition from a niche practice of DFIR to the discipline of risk management and incident preparedness

Most AI security testing focuses on the model: prompt injection, jailbreaking, and output filtering.

We've been working on something different: testing the agent *system*. The protocols, integrations, and decision paths that determine what agents do in production. The result is a framework with 209 tests covering 4 wire protocols:

**MCP (Model Context Protocol)** Tool invocation security: auth, injection, data leakage, tool abuse, scope creep

**A2A (Agent-to-Agent)** Inter-agent communication: message integrity, impersonation, privilege escalation

**L402 (Lightning)** Bitcoin-based agent payments: payment flow integrity, double-spend, authorization bypass

**x402 (USDC/Stablecoin)** Fiat-equivalent agent payments: transaction limits, approval flows, compliance

Every test maps to a specific OWASP ASI (Agentic Security Initiatives) Top 10 category. Cross-referenced with NIST AI 800-2 categories for compliance reporting.

```

pip install agent-security-harness

```

20+ enterprise platform adapters included (Salesforce, ServiceNow, Workday, etc.).

MIT license. Feedback welcome. Especially from anyone running multi-agent systems in production. What attack vectors are we missing?

SnappyClient is a malware found by Zscaler that uses a custom binary protocol (encrypted and compressed) to communicate with its C&C server, with little to work with when it comes to network detection.

At Netomize, we set out to write a detection rule targeting the encrypted message packet by leveraging the unique features of PacketSmith + Yara-X detection module, and the result is documented in this blog post.

Schneider Electric has addressed two vulnerabilities disclosed by Team82 in its Modicon Controllers M241 / M251, and M262 PLC line. The vulnerabilities can allow an attacker to cause a denial-of-service condition that affects the availability of the controller.

Read more on our Disclosure Dashboard: http://claroty.com/team82/disclosure-dashboard

Or download SE's advisory: https://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_Doc_Ref=SEVD-2026-069-01&p_enDocType=Security+and+Safety+Notice&p_File_Name=SEVD-2026-069-01.pdf

Human thought is still evolving to handle the digital world. We act instinctively when we should act deliberately — and under pressure, we rarely consider all the options available to us. This article examines how we think under stress and outlines practical steps organizations can take to protect themselves