A financially motivated data theft and extortion group is attempting to inject itself into the Iran war, unleashing a worm that spreads through poorly secured cloud services and wipes data on infected systems that use Iran’s time zone or have Farsi set as the default language.

Experts say the wiper campaign against Iran materialized this past weekend and came from a relatively new cybercrime group known as TeamPCP. In December 2025, the group began compromising corporate cloud environments using a self-propagating worm that went after exposed Docker APIs, Kubernetes clusters, Redis servers, and the React2Shell vulnerability. TeamPCP then attempted to move laterally through victim networks, siphoning authentication credentials and extorting victims over Telegram.

In a profile of TeamPCP published in January, the security firm Flare said the group weaponizes exposed control planes rather than exploiting endpoints, predominantly targeting cloud infrastructure over end-user devices, with Azure (61%) and AWS (36%) accounting for 97% of compromised servers.

“TeamPCP’s strength does not come from novel exploits or original malware, but from the large-scale automation and integration of well-known attack techniques,” Flare’s Assaf Morag wrote. “The group industrializes existing vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and recycled tooling into a cloud-native exploitation platform that turns exposed infrastructure into a self-propagating criminal ecosystem.”

On March 19, TeamPCP executed a supply chain attack against the vulnerability scanner Trivy from Aqua Security, injecting credential-stealing malware into official releases on GitHub actions. Aqua Security said it has since removed the harmful files, but the security firm Wiz notes the attackers were able to publish malicious versions that snarfed SSH keys, cloud credentials, Kubernetes tokens and cryptocurrency wallets from users.

Over the weekend, the same technical infrastructure TeamPCP used in the Trivy attack was leveraged to deploy a new malicious payload which executes a wiper attack if the user’s timezone and locale are determined to correspond to Iran, said Charlie Eriksen, a security researcher at Aikido. In a blog post published on Sunday, Eriksen said if the wiper component detects that the victim is in Iran and has access to a Kubernetes cluster, it will destroy data on every node in that cluster.

“If it doesn’t it will just wipe the local machine,” Eriksen told KrebsOnSecurity.

Aikido refers to TeamPCP’s infrastructure as “CanisterWorm” because the group orchestrates their campaigns using an Internet Computer Protocol (ICP) canister — a system of tamperproof, blockchain-based “smart contracts” that combine both code and data. ICP canisters can serve Web content directly to visitors, and their distributed architecture makes them resistant to takedown attempts. These canisters will remain reachable so long as their operators continue to pay virtual currency fees to keep them online.

Eriksen said the people behind TeamPCP are bragging about their exploits in a group on Telegram and claim to have used the worm to steal vast amounts of sensitive data from major companies, including a large multinational pharmaceutical firm.

“When they compromised Aqua a second time, they took a lot of GitHub accounts and started spamming these with junk messages,” Eriksen said. “It was almost like they were just showing off how much access they had. Clearly, they have an entire stash of these credentials, and what we’ve seen so far is probably a small sample of what they have.”

Security experts say the spammed GitHub messages could be a way for TeamPCP to ensure that any code packages tainted with their malware will remain prominent in GitHub searches. In a newsletter published today titled GitHub is Starting to Have a Real Malware Problem, Risky Business reporter Catalin Cimpanu writes that attackers often are seen pushing meaningless commits to their repos or using online services that sell GitHub stars and “likes” to keep malicious packages at the top of the GitHub search page.

This weekend’s outbreak is the second major supply chain attack involving Trivy in as many months. At the end of February, Trivy was hit as part of an automated threat called HackerBot-Claw, which mass exploited misconfigured workflows in GitHub Actions to steal authentication tokens.

Eriksen said it appears TeamPCP used access gained in the first attack on Aqua Security to perpetrate this weekend’s mischief. But he said there is no reliable way to tell whether TeamPCP’s wiper actually succeeded in trashing any data from victim systems, and that the malicious payload was only active for a short time over the weekend.

“They’ve been taking [the malicious code] up and down, rapidly changing it adding new features,” Eriksen said, noting that when the malicious canister wasn’t serving up malware downloads it was pointing visitors to a Rick Roll video on YouTube.

“It’s a little all over the place, and there’s a chance this whole Iran thing is just their way of getting attention,” Eriksen said. “I feel like these people are really playing this Chaotic Evil role here.”

Cimpanu observed that supply chain attacks have increased in frequency of late as threat actors begin to grasp just how efficient they can be, and his post documents an alarming number of these incidents since 2024.

“While security firms appear to be doing a good job spotting this, we’re also gonna need GitHub’s security team to step up,” Cimpanu wrote. “Unfortunately, on a platform designed to copy (fork) a project and create new versions of it (clones), spotting malicious additions to clones of legitimate repos might be quite the engineering problem to fix.”

Update, 2:40 p.m. ET: Wiz is reporting that TeamPCP also pushed credential stealing malware to the KICS vulnerability scanner from Checkmarx, and that the scanner’s GitHub Action was compromised between 12:58 and 16:50 UTC today (March 23rd).

85% of enterprises are experimenting with AI agents—autonomous systems that lack judgment and disregardconsequences. Cisco announces Zero Trust for AgenticAI, integrating identity, access, and behavioral controlsto secure your adoption of AI.

Discover why 85% of organizations are exploring agentic AI, yet only 5% are in production. Learn how to bridge the agent trust gap with robust security.

Plus: The FBI admits it’s buying phone data to track Americans, Iranian hackers disrupt medical care at Maryland hospitals, and more.

Congressman Jim Himes claims a sweeping surveillance authority should stay intact because he hasn't seen abuses by Kash Patel's FBI, according to internal messaging obtained by WIRED.

What happens when a cyberattack hits and products aren't enough? Cisco has people for that. This is their story.

Part 2 to A Retrospective on VoidLink and the Emerging Workload Security Threat.

Meta blamed users for not opting into the privacy-protecting feature. Experts fear the move could be the first major domino to fall for end-to-end encryption tech worldwide.

What you do – and how fast – after an account is compromised often matters more than it may seem

The Aisuru, Kimwolf, JackSkid, and Mossad botnets had infected more than 3 million devices in total, many inside home networks, according to the US Justice Department.

Moxie Marlinspike says the technology powering his encrypted AI chatbot, Confer, will be integrated into Meta AI. The move could help protect the AI conversations of millions of people.

Today marks the start of Spring in the Northern Hemisphere, and with warmer weather setting in summer trips are vacation planning are starting to take shape.   

But before you respond to that message about your hotel booking or payment confirmation, it’s worth asking: is it actually legit? 

This week in scams, we’re breaking down a travel phishing scheme making the rounds through realistic booking messages, as well as new McAfee research on betting scams and AI-driven malware. 

We’ll walk through what happened, what to watch for, and how McAfee’s tools can help you stay safe. 

Scammers Who Know Your Exact Travel Reservation Details 

A new phishing campaign targeting travelers is exploiting hotel booking platforms like Booking.com, and it’s convincing enough to fool even cautious users. 

According to reporting from ITBrew and Cybernews, attackers are running a multi-stage scam: 

How The Booking Scam Works 

Scam Stage	How It Works	What You’ll Notice	How to Protect Yourself	Where McAfee Helps
Stage 1: Hotel account gets compromised	Attackers phish or hack hotel staff to access booking platforms and guest reservation data.	You won’t see this part — it happens behind the scenes.	Use strong, unique passwords and enable multi-factor authentication on your own accounts to reduce risk of similar breaches.	Identity Monitoring can alert you if your personal information appears in suspicious places or data leaks.
Stage 2: You receive a realistic message	Scammers use stolen booking data to send messages via WhatsApp, email, or even booking platforms.	The message includes your real name, hotel, and travel dates, making it feel legitimate.	Be cautious of unexpected outreach, even if the details are correct. Don’t assume accuracy means authenticity.	Scam detection tools can help flag suspicious messages and identify potential phishing attempts.
Stage 3: Urgency is introduced	The message claims there’s an issue with your reservation and pushes you to act quickly.	Phrases like “confirm within 12 hours” or “risk cancellation” create pressure.	Pause before acting. Legitimate companies rarely require urgent payment changes without prior notice.	Scam detection can help identify high-risk messages designed to pressure you into quick decisions.
Stage 4: You’re sent to a fake payment page	A link leads to a convincing lookalike site designed to steal your payment details.	The page looks real but may have subtle URL differences or unusual formatting.	Always navigate directly to the official website or app instead of clicking links in messages.	Safe Browsing tools can help block risky or known malicious websites before you enter sensitive information.

March Madness Brackets, Bets, and Bad Actors 

March Madness brings brackets, bets, and a flood of bad actors. 

New McAfee research found that 1 in 3 Americans (32%) say they’ve experienced a betting or gambling scam, and nearly a quarter (24%) say they’ve lost money to one. On average, victims reported losing $547. 

That’s not surprising when you look at the environment around the tournament. More than half of Americans are watching, more than half are participating in some form of betting, and 82% say they’ve seen betting promotions in the past year. 

Some of the most common setups this season include: 

• “Guaranteed win” or “can’t lose” betting tips that require payment upfront 
• Fake sportsbook promotions offering bonus bets or free credits 
• Messages claiming you have winnings, but need to pay a fee to unlock them 
• Impersonation scams posing as sportsbook support or betting platforms 
• Invitations to private “VIP betting groups” on WhatsApp or Telegram 

The takeaway:
If a betting offer promises guaranteed results, demands the use of bizarre apps and sites, asks for money upfront, or pushes you to act quickly, it’s not an edge. It’s a scam. 

“AI-Written” Malware Is Hiding in Everyday Downloads 

Not all scams start with a message. Some start with a search. 

McAfee Labs uncovered a large-scale malware campaign hiding inside hundreds of fake downloads, including game mods, AI tools, drivers, and trading utilities. 

In January alone, researchers identified: 

• 443 malicious ZIP files disguised as legitimate software 
• 1,700+ file names used to make those downloads look credible 
• 48 variants of a malicious DLL file used to infect devices 

These weren’t hosted on obscure corners of the internet either. The files were distributed through platforms people recognize, including Discord, SourceForge, and file-sharing sites. 

Here’s how the attack typically works: 

• You search for a tool. 
• You download what looks like the right file. 
• It opens normally at first. 

Then, behind the scenes, malware loads quietly and begins pulling in additional code. In some cases, victims are shown fake error messages while the real infection happens in the background. 

From there, attackers can: 

• Turn your device into a cryptocurrency mining machine 
• Install additional malware like infostealers or remote access tools 
• Slow down your system while running hidden processes 

What makes this campaign stand out is that some of the code appears to have been generated with help from AI tools. 

That doesn’t mean AI is running the attack on its own. But it does suggest attackers are using AI to: 

• Generate code faster 
• Create more variations of malware 
• Scale campaigns more efficiently 

In other words, the barrier to building malware is getting lower. 

The takeaway:
If a download is unofficial, hard to find, or feels like a shortcut, it’s worth slowing down. The file may look right, but that doesn’t mean it’s safe. 

How McAfee+ Advanced Works in These Scam Moments 

Whether it’s a message about your booking, a betting offer that looks legitimate, or a download that appears to be exactly what you were searching for, these scams all rely on the same thing: they blend into everyday moments. 

That’s where having backup like McAfee+ Advanced comes in. It includes: 

• McAfee’s Scam Detector, which helps flag suspicious links in texts and messages like the ones used in these booking and betting scams, so you can spot something risky before you engage

• Web protection and real-time device security, helping protect against risky links, malicious sites, and evolving threats if you do click, including fake betting platforms or malware hidden in downloads

• Personal Data Cleanup, which helps remove your information from sites that sell it, making it harder for scammers to access the personal details that make messages and scams feel legitimate

• Secure VPN, which helps keep your personal info safe and private anywhere you use public Wi-Fi, like hotels, airports, and cafés while traveling

• Identity Monitoring and alerts, with 24/7 scans of the dark web to help ensure your personal and financial information isn’t being exposed or reused

• Credit and transaction monitoring, so you can get alerts about suspicious financial activity if your information is ever compromised 

• Identity restoration support and up to $2 million in identity theft coverage, giving you access to US-based experts and added peace of mind if something does go wrong 

Stay skeptical, verify before you click, and we’ll see you next week with more. 

The post This Week in Scams: Why That “Booking Confirmation” Message Might Be Fake appeared first on McAfee Blog.

McAfee Labs has uncovered a widespread malware campaign hiding inside fake downloads for things like game mods, AI tools, drivers, and trading utilities. 

In January 2026, researchers observed 443 malicious ZIP files impersonating software people might actively search for online. Across those files, McAfee identified 48 malicious WinUpdateHelper.dll variants used to infect devices. The campaign was spread through a mix of file-hosting and content delivery services, including Discord, SourceForge, FOSSHub, and mydofiles[.]com. 

What makes this campaign especially notable is that some parts of it appear to have been built with help from large language models (LLMs). McAfee researchers found signs that certain scripts likely used AI-generated code, which may have helped the attackers create and scale the campaign faster. 

That does not mean AI created the whole operation on its own. But it does suggest AI may be helping cybercriminals lower the effort needed to build malware and launch attacks. 

Want the full research? Dive in here. 

We break down the top takeaways below. 

What McAfee Found 

Finding	What it means
443 malicious ZIP files	Attackers created many different fake downloads to reach more victims
48 malicious DLL variants	The campaign used multiple versions of the malware, not just one file
1,700+ file names observed	The same threat was repackaged under many different names to look convincing
17 distinct kill chains	Researchers found multiple attack flows, but they followed a similar overall pattern
Hosted on familiar platforms	The malware was distributed through services users may recognize, including Discord and SourceForge
AI-assisted code suspected	Some scripts contained explanatory comments and patterns that strongly suggest LLM assistance
Cryptomining and additional malware observed	Infected devices could be used to mine cryptocurrency or receive more malicious payloads

What Is “AI-Written Malware”? 

In this case, “AI-written malware” does not mean an AI system independently invented and launched the attack. 

Instead, McAfee Labs found evidence that the attackers very likely used AI tools to help generate some of the code used in the campaign, especially in certain PowerShell scripts. 

Put simply: 

Term	Plain-English meaning
Large language model (LLM)	An AI system that can generate text and code based on prompts
AI-assisted malware	Malware where attackers appear to have used AI tools to help write or structure parts of the code
Vibe coding	A style of coding where someone describes what they want and an AI does much of the writing

This matters because it can make malware development faster, easier, and more scalable for attackers. 

 

How The Fake Download Attack Works 

The attack begins when someone searches for software online and downloads what looks like the tool they wanted. 

That tool might appear to be a game mod, AI voice changer, emulator, trading utility, VPN, or driver. But behind the scenes, the ZIP archive includes malicious components that start the infection. 

Step	What happens
1. A user downloads a fake file	The ZIP archive is disguised as something useful or desirable, such as a mod menu, AI tool, or driver
2. The file appears normal at first	In some cases, the package includes a legitimate executable so it feels more convincing
3. A malicious DLL is loaded	A hidden malicious file, often WinUpdateHelper.dll, starts the real attack
4. The user is distracted	The malware may display a fake “missing dependency” message and redirect the user to install unrelated software
5. A PowerShell script is pulled from a remote server	While the user is distracted, the malware contacts a command-and-control server and runs additional code
6. More malware is installed	Depending on the sample, the device may receive coin miners, infostealers, or remote access tools
7. The infected device is abused for profit	In many cases, attackers use the victim’s system resources to mine cryptocurrency in the background

What Kinds of Files Were Used as Bait 

McAfee found that the attackers cast a very wide net. The malicious ZIP files impersonated many types of software, including: 

Bait category	Examples
Gaming tools	game mods, cheats, executors, Roblox-related tools
AI-themed tools	AI image generators, AI voice changers, AI-branded downloads
System utilities	graphics drivers, USB drivers, emulators, VPNs
Trading or finance tools	stock-market utilities and related downloads
Fake security or malware tools	fake stealers, decryptors, and other risky-looking utilities

That broad range is part of what made the campaign effective. It was designed to catch people already looking for shortcuts, unofficial tools, or hard-to-find software. 

Why McAfee Researchers Believe AI Was Used 

One of the strongest clues came from the comments inside some of the attack scripts. 

McAfee researchers found explanatory comments that looked more like AI-generated instructions than the kind of shorthand attackers usually leave for themselves. In one example, a comment referred to downloading a file from “your GitHub URL,” which suggests the code may have come from a generated template and was not fully cleaned up before use. 

These details do not prove every part of the campaign was AI-made. But they do support McAfee’s assessment that certain components were likely generated with help from large language models. 

What Happens on an Infected Device 

In many cases, the malware was used to turn victims’ computers into quiet crypto-mining machines. 

McAfee observed mining activity involving several cryptocurrencies, including: 

• Ravencoin 
• Zephyr 
• Monero 
• Bitcoin Gold 
• Ergo 
• Clore 

Some samples also downloaded additional payloads such as SalatStealer or Mesh Agent. 

For victims, that can mean: 

Possible effect	What it may look like
Slower performance	apps lag, games stutter, system feels unusually sluggish
High CPU or GPU usage	fans run constantly, laptop gets hot, battery drains faster
Background malware activity	unknown processes, suspicious downloads, unexpected behavior
Potential data theft	if an infostealer or remote access tool is installed

McAfee was also able to trace several Bitcoin wallets tied to the campaign. At the time of the report, those wallets held about $4,536 in Bitcoin, while total funds received were approximately $11,497.70. Researchers note the real total could be higher because some of the currencies involved are harder to trace. 

Who Was Targeted Most 

This campaign was observed most heavily in: 

• United States 
• United Kingdom 
• India 
• Brazil 
• France 
• Canada 
• Australia 

That does not mean users elsewhere were unaffected. These were simply the countries where researchers saw the highest prevalence. 

The post New Research: Hackers Are Using AI-Written Code to Spread Malware appeared first on McAfee Blog.

Authored by Aayush Tyagi  

Background 

The term ‘Vibe coding,’ first coined back in February of 2025 by OpenAI researchers, has exploded across digital platforms. With hundreds of articles and YouTube Videos discussing the dangers of Vibe coding and warning the internet about the rise of “Vibe Coders”, while others labelled it as the fundamental shift in software development and the future of coding.  

Vibe Coding is an approach where the AI does heavy lifting, rather than the user. Instead of manually writing code or implementing algorithms, users describe their intent through text-based prompt, and the LLMs respond with fully functional code and explanation. Unsurprisingly, the internet is now flooded with guides on the best LLMs and prompts to generate “perfect” code. 

Given the ease of generating fully functional code, McAfee Labs has also seen a rise in vibe-coded malware. In these campaigns, certain components of the kill chain contain AI-generated code, significantly reducing the effort and knowledge required to execute new malware campaigns. This shift not only makes malware campaigns more scalable but also lowers the barrier to entry for new malware authors. 

Executive summary 

In January 2026, McAfee Labs observed 443 malicious zip files impersonating a wide range of software, including AI image generators and voice-changing tools, stock-market trading utilities, game mods and modding tools, game hacks, graphics card and USB drivers, ransomware decryptors, VPNs, emulators, and even infostealer, cookie-stealer, and backdoor malware, to infect users.  

Across the 440+ zip files, we observed 48 unique malicious WinUpdateHelper.dll variants, responsible for the infections. McAfee has been detecting variants of this threat since December 2024, although the vibe coding observed in certain components appears to be a recent addition. These files are distributed through various legitimate content delivery network (CDN) services and file-hosting websites, such as Discord, SourceForge, FOSSHub, and MediaFire, to name a few. Another website that was actively delivering this malware was mydofiles[.]com. 

Here, the attackers implement volume-driven malware distribution techniques to infect as many users as possible.  

This attack begins when users surf the internet looking for tools and software that promise to simplify their tasks. Instead, they encounter trojanized zip files.  

We discovered over 100 URLs actively spreading this malware, of which approximately 61 were hosted on Discord, 17 on SourceForge, and 15 on mydofiles[.]com. 

On running the executable, it loads a malicious WinUpdateHelper.dll file, which redirects the user to file-hosting websites, under the disguise that they are missing crucial dependencies and tricks them into installing unrelated software, which is a distraction. Meanwhile, the DLL has already requested and executed a malicious PowerShell script from a command-and-control (C2) server.  

This script infects the user’s system and downloads additional mining software, and abuses the system’s resources, or it downloads additional payloads such as SalatStealer or Mesh Agent, depending on the WinUpdateHelper.dll sample which infected the user.  

In this PowerShell script, the presence of explanatory comments and structured sections strongly indicates the use of LLM models to generate this code. 

Read more about this in the Using AI to generate malware? section below.  

So far, we’ve observed the mining of Ravencoin, Zephyr, Monero, Bitcoin Gold, Ergo, and Clore cryptocurrencies.    

Due to the presence of hardcoded Bitcoin wallet credentials within these malware samples, we were able to trace on-chain transactions and identify wallets containing over $4,500 USD that are part of this campaign.  

Since most of the mining activity targets privacy-focused cryptocurrencies such as Zephyr, Ravencoin and Monero, the real financial impact is likely to be nearly double the amount identified through Bitcoin tracing alone.  

Geographical Prevalence 

This malware campaign has specifically targeted users in the following counties, ranked by prevalence: The United States of America, followed by United Kingdom, India, Brazil, France, Canada, Australia. 

Bottom Line

The availability of LLMs capable of generating code instantly, combined with the widespread accessibility of technical knowledge, has created a low-effort, high-reward environment, making malware deployment increasingly accessible. 

At McAfee Labs, we have been doing hard work so that you don’t need to worry. But it always helps to be informed and educated on the latest threat that steps into the threat landscape. 
We will continue monitoring these campaigns to ensure our customers remain informed and protected across platforms. 

Technical Analysis  

Impersonated Applications

Here we see malware distribution at a large scale and by analyzing the filenames of these ZIP archives, we can infer to the users that are being targeted. These are some of the names we’ve witnessed in the wild. 

The attackers are actively impersonating video game cheats and game mods for popular titles, and well-known script executors for Roblox, such as Delta Executor and Solara as seen above.  

Names such as Panther-Stealer and Zerotrace-Stealer indicate that even users looking for malware on the internet are not safe either, reinforcing the notion that there is truly no honor among thieves. 

The campaign also leverages drivers and AI-themed tools as part of its lure portfolio among other tools. Interestingly, we see the name ‘DeepSeek.zip’, where attackers are exploiting a prominent LLM model, DeepSeek. McAfee had encountered these types of attacks in early 2025 and covered them extensively.  

Read the previous blog here: Look Before You Leap: Imposter DeepSeek Software Seek Gullible Users  

Stage 1 Payload – Misleading Installation  

Once the user downloads the ZIP archive from Discord or any other website. They get the following set of files.

Here, the executable named ‘gta-5-online-mod-menu.exe’ (Highlighted in Blue) is a legitimate and clean file. Whereas the file named ‘WinUpdateHelper.dll’ (Highlighted in Red) is malicious.  

On executing ‘gta-5-online-mod-menu.exe’, the malicious DLL is loaded. The user is informed that they are missing dependencies, and they’re redirected to the following URL via default browser.  

hxxps://igk[.]filexspace.com/getfile/XKQLPSK?title=DependencyCore&tracker=gta-5-online-mod-menu 

Here, within the URL, a tracker variable is used to identify which malware has infected the user. In this instance, it was ‘gta-5-online-mod-menu’.  

Dependecycore.zip is a setup file. On execution, it installs unrelated 3rd party software on the victim’s system. 

In this instance, iTop Easy Desktop was installed. 

This unwanted installation is meant to subvert users’ attention. As, the WinUpdateHelper.dll has already connected to the C2 server and infected the system.   

Stage 1 Payload – Malicious Functionality  

Once the redirection code is executed, the malware executes the malicious code.  

In the above code snippet, which is present in the WinUpdateHelper.dll, we can see that a new service has been created under the name “Microsoft Console Host” to make it appear to be benign (Highlighted in Red). The parameters passed to this service ensure that it executes at system boot. This is done to maintain persistence in the system.

The service executes a PowerShell command that dynamically generates the C2 domain using the UNIX time stamp.  

Using the following code, 
$([Math]::Floor([DateTimeOffset]::UtcNow.ToUnixTimeSeconds() / 5000000) * 5000000).xyz 

It generates a domain name that changes once every 5,000,000 seconds or 58 days. 

The latest C2 domain we’ve discovered that is up and running is 
1770000000[.]xyz/script?id=fA9zQk2L0M&tag=WinUpdateHelper

During our analysis we observed the following domain 
1765000000[.]xyz/script?id=fA9zQk2L0M&tag=WinUpdateHelper, which is present in the following images.  

Here the id=fA9zQk2L0M is randomly generated, to uniquely identify the user and tag=WinUpdateHelper is used to identify the malware campaign.  

The malware connects to the above-mentioned C2 server to download a PowerShell script and execute it in memory. This fileless execution ensures improved evasion against signature-based detections. 

Stage 2 Payload – PowerShell Script  

It is funny to note here, that the first comment of this script says “# I am forever sorry” which indicates that the attacks do carry some guilt regarding their actions, but not enough to stop the campaign. We found similar comments, such as “# sorry lol”, across multiple PowerShell scripts we discovered.  

The first set of commands (Highlighted in Green) are used to delete windows services and scheduled tasks. This is done to remove older or conflicting persistence mechanisms and to avoid duplicate miners from running on the same system. 

The second set of commands (Highlighted in Red) are registry modifications, that adds “C:\ProgramData” to Windows Defender exclusion paths. That is, ProgramData Folder won’t be scanned by Windows Defender anymore. This exclusion allows malware to drop additional payloads to disk, without the risk of them being detected and removed.  

The third set of commands (Highlighted in Blue) does exactly that. It downloads the next level payload from the URL “hxxps://1765000000[.]xyz/download/xbhgjahddaa” and stored it at this path “C:\ProgramData\fontdrvhost.exe”.

Again the name ‘fontdrvhost.exe’ imitates a legitimate Windows binary, to masquerade its true intent. After the download, the file is decoded using a simple arithmetic decryption routine. This provides protection against static signature detection and network detection. 

The payload is an XMRIG miner sample. In the next command, the miner is initialized and executed. Here, we see the miner connecting to “solo-zeph.2miners.com:4444” and start CPU based Zephyr coin mining using the following wallet address: ‘ZEPHsCY4zbcHGgz2U8PvkEjkWjopuPurPNv8nnSFnM5MN8hBas8kBN4hoNKmc7uMRfUQh4Fc9AHyGxL6NFARnc217m2vYgbKxf’. 

In the second half of the script, we see another miner being set up and executed using the same technique (Highlighted in Red). This time the file is stored as “RuntimeBroker.exe” in the ProgramData folder. The miner is connecting to “solo-rvn.2miners.com:7070” to mine Ravencoin and it is using the system’s GPU instead of the CPU for mining (Highlighted in Blue).  

This is the wallet address used for mining in this instance ‘bc1q9a59scnfwkdlm6wlcu5w76zm2uesjrqdy4fr8r’.  

Hence, we see a dual coin-mining deployment infrastructure utilizing both CPU and GPU resources to optimize mining efficiency. 

Bitcoin? Interesting…  

What is interesting here is that attackers have used a bitcoin wallet address for mining Ravencoin, which indicates they are using multi-coin pools for mining. The attackers are using the victims’ machine to mine Ravencoin and automatically convert the mining rewards to Bitcoin before the payout.  

This is done for a variety of reasons, such as, bitcoin offers higher liquidity and has broader acceptance, but most importantly, Ravencoin is computationally easier and economically viable to mine on victim’s system. Bitcoin requires specialized ASIC hardware for profitable mining and attempting to mine Bitcoin directly on infected systems would generate negligible returns. We’ve seen the same behaviour in multiple samples. 

This is a smoking gun. Unlike Zephyr coin or Monero, Bitcoin’s blockchain is fully traceable. Every Satoshi, the smallest unit of Bitcoin, can be traced across the blockchain from the moment it was mined to its current holder. From there, it becomes easy to determine how much cryptocurrency the threat actor is receiving. More on this later.  

Anti-Analysis Techniques 

The attackers have meticulously designed the campaign and have implemented various anti-analysis techniques to thwart researchers.  

The PowerShell script we’ve seen above is responsible for downloading and initializing the coin miner samples. It is only accessible via PowerShell. If we try to access the server via Curl, we get the following response.  

 This indicates that the server is actively monitoring the User-Agent of incoming requests and deploys the payload only when the request originates from PowerShell. 

 Similarly, the URLs embedded within the PowerShell script that download the next payload are unique to each victim and remain active for 60 seconds. After that, they return a 404 Not Found error.  

These techniques are meant to confuse and disorient researchers, making the analysis difficult.  

Using AI to generate malware?  

While working on this malware campaign, we came across over 440 unique zip files. These same zip files were distributed with over 1700 different names, targeting various software. 

Across these 440 zip files, we noticed 48 unique variants of WinUpdateHelper.dll. These 48 files can be clustered together into 17 distinct kill chains, each featuring their own C2 infrastructure, misleading installation setups, second-stage PowerShell scripts and final payloads, yet the cryptocurrency wallet credentials remain similar. 

In the above technical analysis, we’ve only covered 1 kill chain. Yet, across these 17 kill chains, we’ve noticed the flow remain the same.  

Across multiple second stage payloads, we encounter multiple comments such as the following, embedded within the code:

# === Create and execute run.bat in C:\ProgramData ===

:: This batch file:

:: – Creates the hidden folder C:\ProgramData\cvtres if it doesn”t exist (using CMD attrib for hidden + system)

:: – Downloads cvtres.exe from your GitHub URL

:: – Saves it to C:\ProgramData\cvtres\cvtres.exe

:: – Executes it immediately

:: – Runs completely hidden/minimized (no window visible)

The presence of such explanatory-style comments indicates that large language models were likely used during the development of these scripts. Especially, the comment “Downloads cvtres.exe from your GitHub URL”, where ‘Your GitHub URL’ refers to the threat actor’s GitHub repository that is hosting the malware, which indicates potential vibe coding.  

Tracking Bitcoin Across the Blockchain 

During analysis of this malware campaign, we came across few instances where the final payload was Infostealer malware. In most cases it was coin miner samples. 
In these cases, we encountered wallet credentials and mining pool URLs for several alternative cryptocurrencies such as Ravencoin, Zephyr, Monero, which aren’t traceable.  

Fortunately, we came across 7 bitcoin wallets that are part of this malware campaign and are actively receiving mined cryptocurrency. 

bc1q9a59scnfwkdlm6wlcu5w76zm2uesjrqdy4fr8r     bc1q7cpwxjatrtpa29u85tayvggs67f6fxwyggm8kd 

bc1qyy0cv8snz7zqummg0yucdfzpxv2a5syu7xzsdq    bc1qxhp6mn0h7k9r89w8amalqjn38t4j5yaa7t89rp 

bc1qxnkkpnuhydckmpx8fmkp73e38dfed93uhfh68l    bc1qrtztxnqnjk9q4d5hupnla245c7620ncj3tzp7h 

bc1q97yd574m9znar99fa0u799rvm55tnjzkw9l33w 

As of writing this blog, these wallets contain Bitcoin valued at approximately $4,536.20 USD. 

These wallets have seen regular withdrawals, with total funds received amounting to approximately $11,497.7 USD. 

McAfee Coverage 

McAfee has extensive coverage for this Coinminer Malware Campaign. We’re proactively covering new samples observed in the wild. 

Trojan:Win/Phishing.AP 

Trojan:Script/Coinminer.AT 

Trojan:Win/Dropper.AT 

Indicator of Compromise(s)

File Type	SHA256/URLs	File Name
SHA256	94de957259c8e23f635989dd793cd fd058883834672b2c8ac0a3e80784fce819	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	db8afdafbe39637fec3572829dd0a 1a2f00c9b50f947f1eb544ede75e499dca7	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	f15098661d99a436c460f8a6f839 a6903aebd2d8f1445c3bccfc9bf64868f3b0	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	3abf66e0a886ec0454d0382369dd6 d23c036c0dd5d413093c16c43c72b8ccb0b	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	767b63d11cee8cfb401a9b72d7bcc a23b949149f2a9d7456e6e16553afcef169	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	12850f78fc497e845e9bf9f10314c4ecc 6a659dcd90e79ef5bd357004021ba78	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	0a8a58d18adc86977b7386416c6be8db 850a3384949b6750a6c6b2136138684a	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	1a60852904ff9c710cd754fa187ce58cb18c69 e35ea4962a8639953abe380f64	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	4ab63b5ccd60dfd66c7510d1b3bc1f45f0 c31c2d4c16b63b523d05ccac3fcb9d	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	1390e61a45dd81fa245a3078a3b305 e3c7cdeb5fa1e63d9daca22096b699f9e8	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	a0c3de95e5bf84cb616fe1ee1791e96ff57 53778b36201610e6730d025a6cb12	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	ea65298d8d8ce4b868511a1026f8657abcc 6b2e333854f4fc1bd498463b24084	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	6ea34fd213674f31a83c0eee2fb521303d2 a7c23e324bbdfa1a8edd7b6b6b6f1	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	7bec5e37777e6a2ca50e765b07e8cb 65e88f4822ab19d98c32f1c69444228e5c	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	64c96f0251363aaf35c3709c134aab52b9 81508b0ce9445e42774d151e43686b	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	393f6c6b307aecfe46acc603da812cc17f 0ebf24b66632660a2e533dfa4f463f	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	94077065d049e821803986316408b 82edad43fcd5a154f6807b4382eece705c3	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	a206ff592aea155d2bb42231afc3f060 494ffa8f3de8f25aaf8881639c500b44	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	cb2eebf27def80261eef6b80d898e06 f443294371463accd45ca24ce132fad98	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	3fea0a031ffd78c8d08f6499c2bbc 6a9edac5dc88b9ba224921f8f142e5a9adb	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	4fe5d461aaa752b94d016ca4e742e 02d30d3d4848a32787ce3564b5393017d77	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	04399f9f3ef87d8dd15556628532a84 d63d628eaae0ed81166d6efbee428cdba	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	dd37cd62fa18af798018a706f20a91a537f 0993f0254a0c84d64097c6480afb2	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	1d85ffe28d065780c9327078941cb76 2915c69c69012303e45eee44c092f8046	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	86e14dd0ab29ee0eab21874811b7e4 50d609feb606f77206627b62cccbd58afa	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	17704d58fb9c4e68c54a56fa97cd32599 792d00da53691b8bdb58e49296b7feb	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	491019e31af8f1489aea8d4c0f9816 813698def0301a2abb88e5248b37753d2b	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	c0ab89c3d9c7b9a04df5169eb175d517 3c6de08a4ef3674cd6d7f9a925d63151	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	df0ca0f15926964040bb43978f97faccc0 0bae5f6a00d8bd7d105d8c7d32efb1	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	e40f2628b2981226b1afe16c1cf3796b94 82b2ac070adac999707fc09909327c	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	f6093084196acded1179d3a1466908beb 966dceaba03e1dfeb02a2628fdb0423	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	fcc512630ee95d3f4c31e3aabc75ad2e29 dfacb4d4bcce7a12abe9a516979dbd	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	fe02d8d7a6b8f66624b238665d63094 a2bcd19c44a3f9c449788cadbb1b741a6	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	1967f6f42710b43506a0784a28ca8785a f91b84dfa8629ec5be92be8eec564c6	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	5280b0ecb6c7246db84a9b194f5c85cc3 03c028475900b558306fdd4e51f4fc3	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	ce06d83adb53c8b9d240202193ca4c04d 0163994dad707aed0f0e67fdd2a42fe	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	13976bdc28d3b3ae88ed92fcf49ff9e083b 0ce5fd53e60680df00cd92bdfb33b	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	4135754b26dfac10cd19dcf6e03677b53 7244cf69fdce9c4138589e59449b443	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	7d69eca36c0f69b3007cdbf908f15545 e95611acf4bad8b9e30e54687a6d33bb	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	085dc279b422d761729374b01eae1e2 2375ef9538a6c4bc7cc35e8a812450f93	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	99ff2045d1377db7342420160eb254b7 b09cc4ce41a97b6bf0ec4d3f65d9ede6	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	396f397099a459f3adeba057788aa3d3488 2eea7d1665c828449f205a86dc80f	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	908d35e6afd90da2e7c71cf82c8a61b5534 10ca920e67dba1bae35c2b6b19bad	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	7029d68969814f1473e4e4a22abd4be8 5678a03bbe4c0f6194f3b7e421872ab3	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	d3ba17aa83748c539c75cee7eedb03a4 83f2e86af10b69da3f0c8e549f014ac3	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	d758820962ead89d5eaf7e45930a5eb 6ab11d5508988087faf84d8d7524408f1	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	e863f45099f3dc057a5aee5990fabfb4 e8ea8849cd5bc895092ff0a305a3f85d	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	0db26e9a1213d09521fc0dbfe15f807c9 960f62bc1cf4071001f58f210c53e9c	WinUpdateHelper.dll
	94de957259c8e23f635989dd793cdfd 058883834672b2c8ac0a3e80784fce819	WinUpdateHelper.dll
C2 URLs	hxxp://85[.]235[.]75[.]242/script[.]ps11
	hxxp://41[.]216[.]188[.]184/downloads/loader[.]ps1
	hxxp://46[.]151[.]182[.]238:6969/script
	hxxps://mydofiles[.]com/script[.]ps1
	hxxp://45[.]141[.]119[.]191/jjj[.]txt
	hxxps://getthishasg[.]live/cz8wl3k[.]php? cnv_id=cee43wfhqb7b81&payout=1
	hxxps://gocrazy[.]gg/script?id=fA9z Qk2L0M`&tag=schtasks
	hxxps://dystoria[.]cc/mon
	hxxp://85[.]235[.]75[.]242/script[.]ps1
	hxxps://github[.]com/dextamoggan4-sudo/ shineex/releases/download/python/script[.]ps1
	hxxp://45[.]141[.]119[.]191/gg[.]txt
	hxxps://codeberg[.]org/Yesdev123/ load/raw/branch/main/testfile[.]txt
	hxxp://45[.]141[.]119[.]191/jjjj[.]tt
	hxxps://kenovn[.]net/script
	hxxps://1765000000[.]xyz/script? id=fA9zQk2L0M&tag=WinUpdateHelper
	hxxp://46[.]151[.]182[.]238:6969/scrpt
	hxxp://46[.]151[.]182[.]238:6969/script
	hxxps://cutt[.]ly/ke0WRr70
	hxxps://cutt[.]ly/pe0WRidw
	hxxps://1770000000[.]xyz/script?id =fA9zQk2L0M&tag=WinUpdateHelper
	hxxp://150[.]241[.]64[.]28/panfish
Final Payload URLs	hxxps://github[.]com/gaescmo-ai/justin/ releases/download/son/xmrig[.]exe
	hxxps://github[.]com/gaescmo-ai/justin/ releases/download/son/ethminer[.]exe
	hxxp://41[.]216[.]188[.]184/downloads /windows-service[.]zip
	hxxp://46[.]151[.]182[.]238:6969/exe/rat[.]exe
	hxxp://46[.]151[.]182[.]238:6969/exe/miner[.]exe
	hxxp://46[.]151[.]182[.]238:6969/exe/titledetector[.]exe
	hxxps://github[.]com/jimbrock44/filezilla2025/ raw/refs/heads/main/sc[.]msi
	hxxps://github[.]com/softwarelouv/software/ raw/refs/heads/main/scvhosts[.]exe
	hxxps://github[.]com/softwarelouv/software/ raw/refs/heads/main/cvtres[.]exe
	hxxp://109[.]120[.]177[.]217:8082/download
	hxxp://45[.]141[.]119[.]191/fontdrvhost[.]exe
	hxxps://codeberg[.]org/Yesdev123/load/raw/ branch/main/source[.]exe
	hxxps://1765000000[.]xyz/download/xbhgjahddaa
	hxxps://1765000000[.]xyz/download/ebhgjahddaa
	hxxp://46[.]151[.]182[.]238:6969/autoexec
	hxxp://62[.]113[.]112[.]203/adm[.]exe
	hxxps://evilmods[.]com/api/nothingtoseehere[.]exe
	hxxps://evilmods[.]com/api/nothingbeme[.]exe
	hxxps://evilmods[.]com/DependencyCore2
	hxxps://evilmods[.]com/DependencyCore
Unwanted Installers	CD1B15644BF0D7CBF270E8F21CEAE5E6	Dependecycore.zip
	7d18257b55588bccb52159d261f9cd7f	Dependecycore.zip
	A518FB6B9D2689737CE668675EEDE98F	iTop Easy Desktop
	E3BB21152BA90990E3CCBC1A05842F8B	Opera Installer
	A6BC4C6A58AC533D3DB5F96D24DDE0EF	Docs Helper Setup
	FA24733F5A6A6F44D0E65D7D98B84AA6	Windows Manager
	CDB67B1C54903F223F7DCCA14AEA67DF	eld4.exe
Final Payloads	e07a76cc4258c6b4b3f85451ea2174d5	xmrig.exe
	d32395a3a340e033e11bd89acddaa9cd	ethminer.exe
	14f1de874c78221e7b6889af7463de69	WindowsService.exe
	47c8731b2526613e1e3bc61a88680cd0	rat.exe
	fbac126407b5735583dac5ea7cf519b3	SalatStealer
	4dc93730ebe04a9b508a9f9dae74ae09	miner.exe
	90e10b510144719613b1017abe227b87	titledetector.exe
	8dadf8a4b77a340fcbb402789f9a07db	agent
	4c8e8e2fdc23bb7b24e6b410eb69fb4a	scvhosts.exe
	79ea41812bd3310e11fc95403504f048	sc.msi
	1b1bd2783d4e8d1c2d444ffa8689677b	cvtres.exe
	16b70d148b66c20c709b7eed70100a96	source.exe
	e2af5595c9a0b7feaa9291b405d4c991	XMRIG _Miner
	b133229ed0be8788c84a975656a7339c	CoinMiner
	754b581c7e3593446f0a06852031564a	MeshAgent
	a7400236ffab02ae5af5c9a0f61e7300	NiceHash Miner
	d7d34c0559b3f6ba70be089e4cc6172c	lolMiner
PowerShell Scripts	02a4d24d0cdaa6f9a3ecf4b71e3f2eec
	2a153877acc9270406d676403e999490
	77f491c1c50e224d0c61ed608445d8a9
	c60a3307d21840d1e15ee78b07d3eb04
	d17b85de54d0c438c092c1e889b8c63f
	e35c04a7c31f8641757374404edea395
	fa8b5b5a302c0e353f4983973cf4b37e
	d2ad87a1fd1e8812c5ba4b259de4f885
Wallet Address	46NgyMUVMf6Xzsao9XR C6BTjJpjUJFfA12F8BPmD 86Y7biz4gZdjCWsSXMUZo mtuUs8crujryAvhRFMyvhzb s6naMKucHFi	Monero (XMR) wallet address
	RJe6FfyoWDq6M4i3b17LxvjdT2fSNTLTYA	Ravencoin (RVN) wallet address
	ZEPHsCY4zbcHGgz2U8 PvkEjkWjopuPurPNv8nnSFn M5MN8hBas8kBN4hooNKmc7uMRfU Qh4Fc9AHyGxL6NFARnc217m2vYgbKxf	Zephyr (ZEPH) wallet address
	bc1qyy0cv8snz7zqummg0yucd fzpxv2a5syu7xzsdq	Bitcoin (BTC) address
	bc1q7cpwxjatrtpa29u85tayvggs 67f6fxwyggm8kd	Bitcoin (BTC) address
	bc1qxhp6mn0h7k9r89w8amalqj n38t4j5yaa7t89rp	Bitcoin (BTC) address
	bc1qxnkkpnuhydckmpx8fmkp73e3 8dfed93uhfh68l	Bitcoin (BTC) address
	bc1qrtztxnqnjk9q4d5hupnla245c762 0ncj3tzp7h	Bitcoin (BTC) address
	bc1q9a59scnfwkdlm6wlcu5w76zm2 uesjrqdy4fr8r	Bitcoin (BTC) address
	bc1q97yd574m9znar99fa0u799rvm 55tnjzkw9l33w	Bitcoin (BTC) address
URL Distributing Malware	http://www[.]mydofiles[.]com/ MultiClicker[.]zip
	http://www[.]mydofiles[.]com/ ProCheatsInstaller[.]zip
	http://www[.]mydofiles[.]com/ RobloxCheatEngine[.]zip
	http://www[.]mydofiles[.]com/ ST-Bot[.]zip
	https://sourceforge[.]net/projects/ delta-executor-for-pc/files/latest/download
	https://ixpeering[.]dl[.]sourceforge[.]net/project/ delta-executor-for-pc/DeltaExecutor[.]zip?viasf=1
	https://sourceforge[.]net/projects/ delta-executor-for-pc/files/DeltaExecutor[.]zip/download
	https://cdn[.]discordapp[.]com/ attachments/1436383055471185961/ 1454995091423887442/Keyser[.]zip? ex=6953c606&is=69527486&hm= e3ba56d122cc6b6228d787d29c6b5db31 709fd16be119fa8d3a09d92cb0291e4&
	https://cdn[.]discordapp[.]com/attachments/ 1436746541669945409/1454995359754358875/ Matcha[.]zip?ex=6953c646&is=695274c6&hm= 1bae58927d0bcd6a1971b604644035ad938c1d535 61f7d4e951fdf5454d52f8d&
	https://cdn[.]discordapp[.]com/ attachments/1437009916224209018/ 1454995174328500318/CheatLoverz[.]zip? ex=69531d5a&is=6951cbda&hm= f1ac26bebf4394c43cbf21ed531f5dfdf7 d31f30853b126611c1a39b970b81bc&
	https://cdn[.]discordapp[.]com/attachments/ 1438966596222849134/1454995223171170386/ Complex[.]zip?ex=69531d65&is=6951cbe5&hm= b66d9539c0d487fc63125982db773e42eee01dfc 4bc5a28dc1a7a773134a7bc6&
	https://cdn[.]discordapp[.]com/attachments/ 1438966596222849134/1454995223171170386/ Complex[.]zip?ex=6953c625&is=695274a5&hm= 0d6ba0e247e275a9824a838969ee06452e188310 c434c5d852141bfad3eedff2&
	https://cdndownloads[.]com/ download?clickid=277af8wcia4d4b
	https://cdndownloads[.]com/ download?clickid=53ba0myoj8p617
	https://download[.]fosshub[.]com/Protected/ expiretime=1735860643;badurl=aHR0cHM6L y93d3cuZm9zc2h1Yi5jb20vQnVsay1DcmFwLVV uaW5zdGFsbGVyLmh0bWw=/db8e43d66065d d656635ff00c50d96369d2fc4dddad18f52c5d00 05f868649b8/5b964d315dc7e865ea596350/67 3508bbeeeeed04938b399f/BCUninstaller_5 [.]8[.]2_setup[.]exe
	https://download[.]fosshub[.]com/ Protected/expiretime=1738877220; badurl=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZm9z c2h1Yi5jb20vQnVsay1DcmFwLVVu aW5zdGFsbGVyLmh0bWw=/bd26 b0ced684ddb98f194568d7f05c819 71932a5bfb323ed73296940dd8ec74d/ 5b964d315dc7e865ea596350/673508bb eeeeed04938b399f/BCUninstaller_5[.]8[.] 2_setup[.]exe
Malicious ZIPs	001cdd8e978b8233a958cfb81b202 72a5d3a9c53ce2eb9dda28f0755f95f3e14	bluetoothCore.zip
	00226d16b97c2a2201ca806491f5a6df 3650a70c19e82b791740aaef7cf93e72	octet-stream
	00d70985e5e73cba934ffc7b886cea5df 2d9f04c72b80f1e653ae709910666da	FreeFireForPC.zip
	0165aa283b6dd66db66d5865907e75 3acc68b894fc8086bffe106ac3d550d0df	AIVoiceChanger.zip
	020b6449605713404d9ea6bd332df47 f815663f239b39c368208158b1411efb2	r6s-multi.zip
	04d3477a22a0693c3278c5a86f9c882 89a7ccc2565cb61f8a78c9b269666baff	EZFN.zip
	054d2da6e959466490cb0c3cdc2acb9 602e47ac56b977a3d365b4d1728eb2dd5	download
	057121dd0ecbb242f7a26ec277249614 7ae2ec2ee03abd6e79a2bfb5a6ac60e9	demonCore.zip
	063d5400db74f7e064141e3cb9bdc6e 71fec88956560de94c280cf59bbc65c78	Nihon-Executor.zip
	3be99fb0b3bcaa125583bd1763537216 34c090233dd018e56cd3fa8ac89c3aee	Panther-Stealer.zip
	07aa31bd8b220f79acd6b26accfb84ab 6b67f1e6b1baa57ad2f48c5db6771ec5	DeltaExecutor.zip
	1097bc1ed1dd2e46f65fe16f18f431a1539 cf73f97599aec2b81d1ad07f2e485	gta-5-online-mod-menu.zip
	112c08db627e759a499ab96e7964425f7 21fda8b56029e15ab27c762bf1d91cc	DeltaExecutor.zip
	113c38d3c1b6d6a87bc99dcfda4020245 47ecdbdc1d7577a4c0cb3a88569582a	Fortnite-External.zip
	116760f2d7d0b138a2d62683bc08d4620 87dbd278e491177ae9c978e1fddb1a0	roblox-multi.zip
	11b129c8373b6621343dbfe837e21c016f6 fe1f9bdbb2a40283c15cc046fd0ba	Matcha.rar
	1217e31084df1dbe3fb37cd2b0c65bc70ec2 0278ab11471f0adafe845ed482d9	roblox-counter-blox-multi.zip
	12e5890426baa26062077ec41d407ddfcd 8df88480cce6308c0b4064530e767f	AIAutoClicker.zip
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The post AI Wrote This Malware: Dissecting the Insides of a Vibe-Coded Malware Campaign appeared first on McAfee Blog.

Whether you’re a hardcore basketball fan or the office colleague who gets roped into filling out a bracket every year, March Madness is the season for brackets, office pools, and last-minute picks. 

More than half of Americans (57%) plan to watch the NCAA basketball tournament, and 55% say they participate in some kind of betting or bracket activity during March Madness, from office pools to licensed sportsbook wagers.  

But where there’s excitement and money, scammers aren’t far behind. 

New research from McAfee finds that 1 in 3 Americans (32%) say they’ve experienced a betting or gambling scam, and 24% say they’ve lost money to one, with victims losing an average of $547. 

Big events like March Madness create the perfect storm: massive attention, constant betting promotions, and fans searching online for predictions, tips, and an edge. 

Scammers know it, and they’re exploiting the moment. 

Why March Madness is Prime Time for Betting Scams 

Sports betting promotions are everywhere during major events like March Madness. 

According to McAfee research, 82% of Americans say they’ve seen sports betting promotions or offers in the past year, often on social media, streaming broadcasts, and sports websites. 

That flood of promotions makes it easier for scams to blend in with legitimate content. 

Many scams start the same way legitimate offers do, through messages, ads, or links promising bonuses or tips. But once someone clicks or responds, the situation can escalate quickly. 

For example: 

• 42% of Americans say they’ve been asked to click a link sent via email tied to a betting offer 
• Others report links sent through social media messages or text messages directing them to betting sites, apps, or private betting groups 

In many cases, victims are then asked to send money to unlock winnings, activate accounts, or access premium betting picks. 

The payout rarely exists. 

The Most Common Betting Scams Fans Encounter 

Betting scams come in several forms, but many follow familiar patterns. 

Here are some of the most common tactics reported in McAfee’s research: 

Scam Type	Definition	How It Works	Red Flags
Guaranteed Win Scam	A betting scam where someone promises a “guaranteed win,” “sure bet,” or “can’t lose” outcome in exchange for money, clicks, or sign-ups. According to McAfee Findings, about 1 in 6 Americans say they’ve received these kinds of messages, which are designed to lure fans looking for an edge.	Scammers send private messages, emails, or social posts claiming they have insider knowledge or a lock on a game. The goal is usually to get the victim to pay for picks, join a private group, or click a malicious link.	Claims that a bet is guaranteed, pressure to act fast, requests for payment to access picks, and promises that sound risk-free.
Fake Free Bet Promotion Scam	A scam that pretends to offer bonus bets, deposit matches, or free credits through a fake sportsbook promotion.	The victim sees what looks like a real sportsbook offer, often through social media, email, or text. Clicking may lead to a fake site that steals login details, payment information, or deposits.	Unfamiliar brand names, unofficial links, urgent sign-up language, and promotions that seem unusually generous.
Winnings Release Fee Scam	A scam where a victim is told they have winnings waiting, but must first pay a fee, deposit, or processing charge to collect them.	The scammer claims the user has won money, then invents a reason payment is required before the funds can be released. Once the fee is sent, the payout never arrives.	Requests to pay before receiving winnings, vague “processing” or “verification” fees, and pressure to send money immediately.
Fake Betting App or Website Scam	A scam involving a fraudulent app or website designed to look like a real sportsbook or betting platform.	Victims are directed to a fake platform where they may create an account, enter personal information, or deposit money. The site may appear legitimate, but withdrawals are blocked or impossible.	Slightly misspelled URLs, strange app download paths, poor website quality, and platforms that make deposits easy but withdrawals difficult.
Sportsbook Impersonation Scam	A scam in which someone pretends to represent a legitimate betting platform or sportsbook support team.	The scammer contacts the victim claiming there is an issue with an account, a bonus, or winnings. They then ask for login credentials, payment details, or personal information.	Requests for passwords, bank details, or identity information; unexpected outreach; and messages pushing you to resolve an “account issue” through a link.
Fake Insider Tip Scam	A scam that uses claims of insider information, fixed games, or special access to make a betting offer sound exclusive and trustworthy.	Scammers position themselves as experts, insiders, or connected sources who can help the victim beat the odds. The real goal is usually payment, account access, or enrollment in a scam betting channel.	Claims of fixed outcomes, “insider” knowledge, exclusive access, and offers that rely on secrecy or urgency.
Celebrity or Influencer Endorsement Scam	A betting scam that uses fake or misleading celebrity, athlete, or influencer endorsements to make an offer seem legitimate.	Scammers create ads, videos, or posts that appear to feature a public figure recommending a betting platform, app, or tip service. In some cases, AI-generated content makes these endorsements look more convincing.	Endorsements that seem off-brand, videos or graphics that look unnatural, unfamiliar accounts, and promotions tied to fake urgency or suspicious links.
Private Betting Group Scam	A scam that tries to move betting conversations into private channels like WhatsApp, Telegram, or Signal.	After initial contact on social media or another public platform, the scammer encourages the victim to join a private group for “exclusive picks,” “VIP bets,” or “premium insights.” These groups are often used to pressure victims into sending money or clicking malicious links.	Pressure to move off-platform quickly, promises of VIP access, requests for payment to join, and little proof that the group is legitimate.

AI Is Making Betting Scams Harder to Spot 

Artificial intelligence is beginning to change how scams look and sound. 

About 1 in 5 Americans say they’ve encountered betting scams that appeared more realistic because of AI, and 27% believe they’ve seen AI-generated betting content such as fake promotions, images, or videos.  

Among those who encountered AI-driven scams: 

• 58% reported AI-generated images or graphics in betting ads 
• 57% saw AI-written messages that sounded natural or personalized 
• 45% encountered fake celebrity or influencer endorsements 
• 36% interacted with chatbots posing as betting experts or support agents  

As these tools improve, scam messages are becoming smoother, more convincing, and harder to distinguish from legitimate promotions. 

Safety Check	What To Do
Be skeptical of “guaranteed wins”	No bet is risk-free. Ignore messages promising sure bets, insider picks, or guaranteed outcomes.
Use only licensed sportsbooks	Stick to official betting apps and well-known sportsbooks. Avoid unfamiliar websites or apps.
Don’t click betting links from unknown messages	If you receive a betting offer via email, text, or social media, go directly to the official site instead of clicking the link.
Never pay fees to unlock winnings	If someone says you must send money to claim winnings or activate a betting account, it’s almost certainly a scam.
Be cautious of private betting groups	Invitations to “VIP betting groups” on apps like Telegram or WhatsApp are often used to promote scam picks or collect payments.
Protect your accounts	Use strong passwords and turn on two-factor authentication wherever possible. Try our free strong password generator.
Use scam detection tools	Tools like McAfee’s Scam Detector can flag suspicious links, websites, and messages before you engage.

March Madness is meant to be fun, filling out brackets, debating picks with friends, and cheering for the next big upset. Betting can be part of that excitement, but it’s worth remembering that scammers are watching the tournament too. 

A simple rule of thumb can go a long way: if a betting offer promises guaranteed wins, asks for money upfront, or pushes you to act quickly, take a step back and verify it first.  

The safest plays are the ones where you slow down, stick to trusted platforms, and keep your personal information protected. 

If You or Someone You Know Needs Help 

Sports betting can be fun, but for some people it can become difficult to manage. If you or someone you know is struggling with gambling, help is available through the National Problem Gambling Helpline (1-800-MY-RESET), operated by the National Council on Problem Gambling. 

The post 1 in 3 Has Experienced a Betting Scam. What March Madness Fans Should Know appeared first on McAfee Blog.

A powerful iPhone-hacking technique known as DarkSword has been discovered in use by Russian hackers. It can take over devices running iOS 18 that simply visit infected websites.

A panel of WIRED experts dissected the defense tech industry’s impact on modern warfare.

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McAfee Total Protection has been recognized with three major honors in the AV-TEST Best Awards 2025, receiving awards for Best Performance, Best Advanced Protection, and Best Usability. 

Among consumer security products, McAfee was the only solution to receive both the Best Performance and Best Advanced Protection awards, highlighting its ability to deliver strong security while keeping everyday devices running smoothly. 

The awards are issued by AV-TEST, an independent cybersecurity research institute that evaluates security products through thousands of lab tests each year. 

Together, these recognitions reinforce what matters most for people using security software every day: protection that works quietly in the background without slowing down your system or interrupting your workflow. 

How Big is an AV-TEST Award? 

Pretty big! The AV-TEST Awards recognize security products that deliver consistently strong results across independent testing throughout the year. 

To qualify, products must demonstrate exceptional performance across multiple categories, including protection against modern threats, system performance impact, and usability. 

In the 2025 test cycle, McAfee Total Protection earned recognition in three key areas. 

Best Performance Award 

Security software needs to protect your system without slowing it down. 

In AV-TEST’s Windows performance testing, researchers measure how much a security solution impacts system resources during everyday tasks such as launching applications, installing programs, browsing the web, and copying files. 

McAfee Total Protection earned the Best Performance Award for maintaining strong protection while keeping system impact minimal. 

For users, that means protection that runs efficiently in the background so your PC stays responsive while you work, stream, or game. 

Best Advanced Protection Award 

Modern cyberattacks rarely rely on a single tactic. Today’s threats often combine multiple techniques, including ransomware, infostealers, and other advanced attack methods. 

To evaluate how well security products handle these complex threats, AV-TEST runs Advanced Threat Protection (ATP) tests, which simulate real-world attacks using the latest techniques. 

In the 2025 testing cycle, McAfee Total Protection delivered consistently strong results across these real-world attack scenarios, earning the Best Advanced Protection Award for consumer users. 

These results demonstrate how multiple protection layers inside the product work together to detect and stop threats, even if an attack attempts to bypass initial defenses. 

Best Usability Award 

Strong security should also be easy to live with. 

In AV-TEST’s usability tests, researchers evaluate how accurately a product distinguishes between legitimate files and malicious ones, while monitoring for false alarms. 

McAfee Total Protection earned the Best Usability Award for its accurate threat detection and low rate of false positives. 

That means fewer unnecessary alerts and interruptions, while still maintaining strong protection against real threats. 

Recognition from AV-TEST 

According to AV-TEST’s testing team, McAfee stood out across multiple categories in the 2025 evaluation. 

“The team of the AV-TEST Institute is delighted to present McAfee with three of the highly coveted trophies. The manufacturer received recognition for its consistently efficient use of system resources, clear distinction between benign and malicious files, and strong results in Advanced Threat Protection testing.”
— Marcel Wabersky, Lead Mobile & Network Testing, AV-TEST 

What is the AV-TEST Institute 

Independent testing plays an important role in helping consumers evaluate cybersecurity tools. 

The AV-TEST Institute is an independent IT security research organization based in Germany and operating for more than 20 years. The institute runs one of the world’s largest testing laboratories dedicated to cybersecurity products. 

From its headquarters in Magdeburg, Germany, AV-TEST researchers analyze new malware, study emerging attack techniques, and conduct large-scale comparative testing of security software used by both consumers and businesses. 

These tests are designed to be standardized, transparent, and repeatable, allowing security products to be evaluated under the same conditions across multiple vendors. 

The AV-TEST Best Awards recognize products that deliver consistently strong results across a full year of testing. Because the awards are based on sustained performance rather than a single test cycle, they are widely used as an indicator of long-term security reliability. 

For McAfee users, these awards reinforce the goal behind McAfee Total Protection: delivering powerful protection that stays fast, accurate, and easy to use. 

Frequently Asked Questions  

FAQ

Q: What are the AV-TEST Best Awards?   A: The AV-TEST Best Awards are annual honors given by the independent cybersecurity testing institute AV-TEST. The awards recognize security products that deliver consistently strong results across a full year of testing in areas such as protection, performance, and usability.

Q: What awards did McAfee win in the AV-TEST Awards 2025?   A: McAfee Total Protection received three AV-TEST Best Awards for 2025: Best Performance, Best Advanced Protection, and Best Usability. McAfee was also the only consumer security product to receive both the Best Performance and Best Advanced Protection awards in the 2025 evaluation.

Q: What does the AV-TEST Best Performance award mean?   A: The AV-TEST Best Performance award recognizes security software that provides strong protection while using minimal system resources. AV-TEST measures how security products affect everyday activities such as launching programs, installing applications, browsing the web, and copying files.

Q: What is Advanced Threat Protection (ATP) testing?   A: Advanced Threat Protection (ATP) testing simulates real-world cyberattacks using techniques such as ransomware and infostealer malware. AV-TEST runs these scenarios to evaluate how well security products detect and stop attacks at multiple stages of an infection attempt.

Q: What does the AV-TEST Best Usability award measure?   A: The AV-TEST Best Usability award evaluates how accurately security software distinguishes between safe files and malicious threats. Products that score well demonstrate strong detection capabilities while minimizing false alarms and unnecessary alerts.

Q: Why do independent cybersecurity tests matter?   A: Independent cybersecurity testing organizations like AV-TEST evaluate security products using standardized and transparent testing methods. These tests help consumers compare protection tools based on measurable results rather than marketing claims.

 

The post McAfee Wins 3 Major AV-TEST Awards for 2025 Security Performance appeared first on McAfee Blog.