A few days ago I wrote about how the Trivy ecosystem got turned into a credential stealer. One of my takeaways was “pin by SHA.” Every supply chain security guide says it, I’ve said it, every subreddit says it, and the GitHub Actions hardening docs say it.
The Trivy attack proved it wrong, and I think we need to talk about why.
Here is a draft for a Reddit post tailored for the r/homelab community.
Title: [Project] Turning a Raspberry Pi into a "Poor Man's" Enterprise IDS/NSM using Zeek and Suricata
Hey everyone,
I’ve been looking for ways to get better visibility into my network traffic without dropping $500+ on dedicated hardware or running a power-hungry 1U server 24/7. I came across this guide from HookProbe that breaks down how to deploy Zeek and Suricata on a Raspberry Pi (specifically optimized for the Pi 4/5), and I thought it would be right up this sub's alley.
Link: Deploying Zeek and Suricata on Raspberry Pi for Edge Security
Why this is cool for a Homelab:
The Setup: The guide walks through the /etc configurations for both tools. If you’re like me and love structured logs (DNS queries, SSL handshakes, HTTP headers) for your ELK stack or Grafana dashboards, Zeek is a goldmine.
Some questions for the community:
I’m planning to set this up this weekend to feed into my local SOC dashboard. If you're looking for a low-cost way to move past "just a basic firewall," this seems like a solid weekend project.
Curious to hear if anyone has tried a similar "Edge Security" approach!
Built a free red team arena for testing real attack paths against a live defense system for ShieldNet DLX7.
This is NOT a CTF or a static lab. It actually responds to what you do.
Current scenarios:
Everything runs in a sandbox. No production targets. Novel attacks generate detection rules that get reviewed and pushed into the system
If you want to test how your payloads actually hold up against modern defenses, this is useful.
Mongoose network library <= 7.20
CVE-2026-5244 - mg_tls_recv_cert pubkey heap-based overflow (exploitable)
CVE-2026-5245 - mDNS Record stack-based overflow (exploitable)
CVE-2026-5246 - authorization bypass via P-384 Public Key (trivially exploitable)
Fun ride.
Researcher Yarden Porat (Cyata) disclosed a vulnerability chain in CrewAI, the widely-used Python multi-agent framework. CERT/CC advisory VU#221883. No full patch released yet.
The chain:
CVE-2026-2275 — Code Interpreter silently falls back to SandboxPython when Docker is unavailable. SandboxPython allows arbitrary C function calls → RCE.
CVE-2026-2287 — CrewAI does not continuously verify Docker availability during runtime. An attacker who triggers the fallback mid-execution lands in the vulnerable sandbox.
CVE-2026-2285 — JSON loader tool reads files without path validation. Arbitrary local file read.
CVE-2026-2286 — RAG search tools don't validate runtime URLs → SSRF to internal services and cloud metadata endpoints.
Attack entry point: prompt injection against any agent with Code Interpreter Tool enabled. The attacker doesn't need code execution access to the host — they just need to reach the agent with crafted input.
Scope: Any CrewAI deployment running Code Interpreter Tool where Docker is not guaranteed to be available (or can be disrupted). Default "unsafe mode" config is fully exposed.
Current status: CrewAI maintainers are working on mitigations (fail closed instead of fallback, block C modules, clearer warnings). Not released. No CVSSv3 scores published yet.
Has anyone tested whether the Docker availability check can be disrupted mid-execution in a containerized deployment, or does that attack path require an already-degraded environment?
On March 24, 2026, Mercor AI was reportedly affected by a breach linked to the hacking group Lapsus$. The incident is believed to have originated from a supply chain attack involving a compromised LiteLLM package, which may have been inadvertently pulled by one of Mercor’s AI agents.
Through this vector, attackers allegedly gained access to internal systems, including Tailscale VPN credentials, and exfiltrated approximately 4TB of data. The leaked data reportedly included 211GB of candidate records, 939GB of source code, and around 3TB of video interviews and identity documents.
In a public statement on X (formerly Twitter), Mercor said that it had identified itself as one of many companies impacted by the LiteLLM supply chain attack. The company added that its security team acted quickly to contain the breach and begin remediation efforts. Possible attack chain pathway linked.
Cisco reportedly suffered a breach of its internal development environment after attackers leveraged credentials stolen during the recent Trivy supply-chain compromise. More details linked with sample data
Questions regarding netsec and discussion related directly to netsec are welcome here, as is sharing tool links.
As always, the content & discussion guidelines should also be observed on r/netsec.
Feedback and suggestions are welcome, but don't post it here. Please send it to the moderator inbox.
It’s crazy how things come full circle more than a decade later.
About a decade ago, I got interested in calendar phishing after seeing Beau Bullock’s work at BHIS. Around that time, I built and shared some of my own Graph API scripts for calendar phishing, added support for it in my open source PhishAPI tool, and even introduced the idea to KnowBe4 so they could eventually bring it into phishing training for clients (which Kevin Mitnick himself used Beau's command-line tool to demonstrate).
I brought it to their attention at a client’s request after using the technique successfully on them, during a time when calendar phishing was still largely overlooked as a real-world attack path.
Back then, it was still niche enough that plenty of defenders were not thinking about calendar invites as a phishing channel at all.
More than a decade later, I’m still refining the concept, now as part of the commercial PhishU Framework.
I’m happy to say the Framework fully supports Calendar Event phishing again, but now in a much more usable way:
· Native calendar event workflow
· Simple WYSIWYG w/ AI-generated timing suggestions and content
· As easy as selecting the Calendar Event template
· Automatically tied into training when used in a campaign
It’s built for red teams and security teams that want realistic phishing assessments, including credential and session capture paths, not just allow-list-only email testing.
Most AI discussions focus on correctness.
Accuracy. Alignment. Output quality.
But there’s a more fundamental problem underneath all of that:
Who — or what — is actually allowed to execute a decision?
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I just published a paper introducing:
Authority Encoding Risk (AER)
A measurable variable for something most systems don’t track at all:
Authority ambiguity at the moment of execution.
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Today’s systems can tell you:
• if something is likely correct
• if it follows policy
• if it appears safe
But they cannot reliably answer:
Is this decision admissible under real-world authority constraints?
---
That gap shows up in:
• automation systems
• AI-assisted decisions
• institutional workflows
• underwriting and loss modeling
And right now, it’s largely invisible.
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The paper breaks down:
• how authority ambiguity propagates into risk
• why existing frameworks fail to capture it
• how it can be measured before loss occurs
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If you’re working anywhere near AI, risk, infrastructure, or decision systems — this is a layer worth paying attention to.
---
There’s a category of risk most AI systems don’t even know exists.
This paper represents an initial formulation.
Ongoing work is focused on tightening definitions, expanding evidence, and strengthening the model.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=6229278
By end of 2026, will the penetration testing market bifurcate such that average prices for traditional high-end pentests remain within 20 percent of 2024 rates AND AI-automated pentest offerings commoditize the low end priced comparably to vulnerability scanning tools like Qualys or Tenable under 10K per year for equivalent coverage, rather than AI displacing mid-career pentesters through firm closures and broad price compression across all tiers?
If you set LmCompatibilityLevel to 5 a couple years back and called it done, there's a good chance NTLMv1 is still running in your environment. Not because the setting doesn't work. Because it doesn't work the way you think it does.
This isn't just aimed at people who never fully switched to Kerberos. It's also for the ones who are pretty sure they did.
For people not deep into auth protocols: NTLMv1 and NTLMv2 are both considered unsafe today. NTLMv1 especially. It uses DES encryption, which with a weak password can be cracked in seconds. And because NTLM never sends your actual password (challenge-response, the hash gets passed not the plaintext), it's also wide open to pass-the-hash. An attacker intercepts the hash and reuses it to authenticate as you. Responder is the tool that makes this trivial and it's been around forever.Silverfort's research puts 64% of authentications in AD environments still on NTLM.
Here's the actual problem with the registry fix. LMCompatibilityLevel is supposed to tell your DCs to reject NTLMv1 traffic and require NTLMv2 or Kerberos instead. Sounds reasonable. But enforcement runs through the Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC), the mechanism application servers use to forward auth requests to your domain controllers. There's a structure in that protocol called NETLOGON_LOGON_IDENTITY_INFO with a field called ParameterControl. That field contains a flag that can explicitly request NTLMv1, and your DC will honor it regardless of what Group Policy says.
The policy controls what Windows clients send. It has no authority over what applications request on the server side. Any third party or homegrown app that hasn't been audited can still be sending NTLMv1 traffic and you'd have no idea.
Silverfort built a POC to confirm this. They set the ParameterControl flag in a simulated misconfigured service and forced NTLMv1 authentications through a DC that was configured to block them. Worked. They reported it to Microsoft, Microsoft confirmed it but didn't classify it as a vulnerability. Their response was to announce full removal of NTLMv1 starting with Windows Server 2025 and Windows 11 24H2. So that's something, atleast.
If you're not on those versions, you're still exposed and there's no patch coming.
What you can do right now: turn on NTLM audit logging across your domain. Registry keys exist to capture all NTLM traffic so you can actually see what's authenticating how. From there, map every app using NTLM, whether primary or as a fallback, and look specifically for anything requesting NTLMv1 messages. That's your exposure.
The University of North Georgia is one of the lesser known of the nation's senior military colleges (SMCs). But last week it beat out all the other five SMCs—and two of the elite service academies—in a capture-the-flag hacker contest staged at the Pentagon's Cyber Workforce Summit.
The contest was designed by specialists from the Air Force Research Laboratory to be operationally realistic. In the first round, teams had to geo-locate a targeted individual through his devices and apps, prevent him from getting warning messages, and then call in an air strike to kill him.
More details and quotes from UNG students—plus the team from The Citadel they bested in the final—in my latest story.
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